The respondent is the owner and operator of a chemical manufacturing facility. EPA conducted an inspection of the Facility on May 1-4, 2018, to determine the Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA and 40 C.F.R. Part 68. The following chemicals are “regulated substances” pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. The threshold quantity for the regulated substances, as listed in 40 C.F.R . § 68.130 are listed respectively:
a. Chlorine – 2,500 pounds;
b. Chloroform [methane, trichloro-] – 20,000 pounds;
c. Methyl chloride [methane, chloro-] – 10,000 pounds; and
d. Vinyl chloride – 10,000 pounds
At all relevant times, Respondent was required to submit an RMP pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(a) and comply with the Program 3 prevention requirements because pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.I0(i), the covered process at the Facility did not meet the eligibility requirements of Program I and is in North American Industry Classification System code 325199.
EPA Findings of Violation
Count One – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility – October 29, 2015, Incident
Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA provides in part that an owner or operator of a stationary source that produces, processes, handles, or stores a regulated substance (as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130) or an extremely hazardous substance has a general duty in the same manner and to the same extent as [the OSHA General Duty Clause, 29 C.F.R. § 654(a)(I) to design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as are necessary to prevent accidental releases.
The Respondent processes handles, and/or stores hydrogen at its facility. Hydrogen is a “regulated flammable substance” as set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. Hydrogen gas forms explosive mixtures with air in concentrations from 4 – 74% and with chlorine at 5- 95%. The explosive reactions may be triggered by spark, heat, or sunlight.
The risk of fire from the accidental release of hydrogen is a recognized hazard. An accidental release involving hydrogen may cause death, serious injury, or substantial property damage.
On or about October 29, 2015, the Respondent issued a safe work permit and a hot work permit for maintenance work on an area sump line. The Respondent failed to conduct initial atmospheric monitoring for flammable gases at the point of work prior to obtaining a hot work permit as required by the Respondent’s hot work permit procedure.
The workers did not continuously monitor for flammable gases at the point of work as required by the Respondent’s hot work permit procedure.
The flammable gas detector remained in the man lift, ten feet away from where the work was performed.
The flammable gas detector used was not calibrated and bump tested correctly prior to the incident.
Once the contract workers were positioned in the pipe rack, one contract worker turned on a grinder. Once the grinder was activated, a hydrogen leak from a nearby hydrogen line was ignited. The combination of a flammable atmosphere in the area where the grinder was activated created a fire.
The immediate cause of the event was the flammable ignition of an unknown hydrogen gas leak in the area of an ignition source that was not detected due to hot work procedure requirements not being followed.
The release of hydrogen into the ambient air was an “unanticipated emission.” The release of hydrogen is an “accidental release” as that term is defined in Section 112(r)(2)(A) of the CAA. There are feasible means and/or methods for eliminating or mitigating the risk of a fire associated with a leak of hydrogen.
Therefore, the Respondent violated Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA by violating its general duty to design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as necessary to prevent an accident release of a regulated substance.
Count Two – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility – August 1, 2016, Incident
The Respondent’s process handles, and/or stores sulfuric acid at its facility. An accidental release associated with sulfuric acid may cause death, serious injury, or substantial property damage. The sulfuric acid processed, handled, and/or stored at Respondent’s facility is an “extremely hazardous substance” within the meaning of Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA.
At all times relevant to this CAFO, the Respondent mixed sodium sulfite and sulfuric acid. A potential hazard associated with mixing sodium sulfite and sulfuric acid in a tank is if an excessive amount of sodium sulfite is mixed with sulfuric acid, an amount of sulfur dioxide gas may be produced, which may result in an elevated pressure potentially compromising a tank’s integrity.
On August 1, 2016, at 2:40 pm, a reaction occurred elevating the pressure in the tank where sodium sulfite and sulfuric acid are mixed which compromised the tank’s integrity. The elevated pressure lifted the tank approximately 70 feet vertically and it came to rest in a pipe rack approximately 40 feet away. The entire contents of the tank (sulfuric acid, sodium sulfite, sulfur dioxide, and water) were released. Two constituents exceeded the environmental reportable quantity (RQ): sulfuric acid released was 1,276 pounds (1,000 Pound RQ) and sulfur dioxide released was I, 753 pounds (500 Pound RQ).
Substantial property damage in the amount of approximately $700,000 resulted from the accidental release of sulfuric acid.
The Respondent made the following findings during its investigation of the incident:
a) When another tank was bypassed on July 20, 2016, sulfuric acid and sulfite were no longer in-line mixed.
b) When the tank was bypassed, sulfuric acid was routed through a dip tube and sulfite was routed through a side nozzle. This arrangement inhibited adequate mixing of sulfite and sulfuric acid.
c) The sulfite metering pump was by-passed, and a larger pump was used to increase sulfite to the mixing tank (without an approved MOC).
d) Two dip tubes were installed during the mixing tank replacement, inhibiting proper mixing.
e) The PSV’s vent discharge was blocked in because the scrubber had failed. No car seal was used to ensure the valve to the vent remained open.
f) When the mixing tank was replaced, the PSV was vented to the scrubber rather than to the atmosphere. The previous system vented the mixing tank to the scrubber from the pipe between the tank and the PSV, allowing the mixing tank to be protected from overpressure even if the scrubber was blocked in.
The release of sulfuric acid into the ambient air is an “unanticipated emission”.
The release of sulfuric acid is an “accidental release” as that term is defined in Section 112(r)(2)(A) of the CAA
The release of sulfur dioxide gas into the ambient air is an “unanticipated emission.”
The sulfur dioxide gas involved in the incident is an extremely hazardous substance within the meaning of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
The release of sulfur dioxide gas is an “accidental release” as that term is defined in Section 112(r)(2)(A) of the CAA.
There are feasible means and/or methods for eliminating or mitigating the risk of a reaction associated with mixing sodium sulfite and sulfuric acid in a tank.
Therefore, the Respondent violated Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA by violating its general duty to design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as necessary to prevent an accident release of an extremely hazardous substance.
Count Three – Inadequate Operating Procedures
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) provides the following: The owner or operator shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements:
3. Safety and health considerations
Properties of, and hazards presented by, the chemicals used in the process;
Precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment
The Respondent has implemented standard operating procedures (SOPs) as part of the Diaphragm Control Technician Startup Checklist. The Chlorine process uses the Diaphragm Control Technician Startup Checklist. Each of the SOPs references the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Hazard Assessment to determine the required PPE to be worn while performing the SOP.
As of the date of the May 1-4, 2018, EPA inspection, the PPE Hazard Assessment does not list five of the SOPs identified in Diaphragm Control Technician Startup Checklist and three (3) SOPs identified for the Chlorine Process. Therefore, the SOPs did not address the appropriate PPE to be worn while performing the corresponding SOP.
The Diaphragm Control Technician Startup Checklist SOPs did not address the properties of, and hazards presented by the chemicals in the process.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(3) by failing to develop and implement operating procedures that provide for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process by failing to identify the appropriate PPE in certain SOPs, and by failing to address the properties of, and hazards presented by the chemicals in the process for certain SOPs.
Count Four – Failure to Implement Safe Work Practices – March 29, 2017, Incident
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d) provides that the owner or operator shall develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as lockout/tagout; confined space entry, opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a stationary source by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These safe work practices shall apply to employees and contractor employees.
On March 29, 2017, a maintenance worker was exposed to chlorine, when a co-worker accidentally bumped a valve handle on a chlorine sample system line where they were working, releasing chlorine from disassembled tubing. The exposed worker inhaled some chlorine before he was able to exit the area. He reported to the on-site medical department, where he received oxygen. A total of 0.47 pounds of chlorine was released to the atmosphere.
The Respondent’s line break procedure requires supplied air respiratory protection for a line break involving liquid chlorine.
On or about March 29, 2017, maintenance workers obtained a safe work permit to conduct a line break to replace tubing in chlorine service. The safe work permit allowed the use of a half-face respirator. Maintenance workers made an initial line break with the incorrect respiratory protection. After the initial line break, the workers were allowed to downgrade PPE to no respiratory protection. The workers did not follow the proper procedure to downgrade PPE. Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d) by failing to follow safe work practices during a line break.
Count Five – Failure to Conduct Mechanical Integrity Inspections
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a) provides that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) applies to the following process equipment:
a) Pressure vessels and storage tanks;
b) Piping systems (including piping components and valves);
c) Relief and vent systems and devices;
d) Emergency shutdown systems;
e) Controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks); and
f) Pumps
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) provides the following:
3) The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience …
Question 10 of EPA’s Information Request required the Respondent to provide certain information regarding all overdue mechanical integrity inspections required by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73.
On or about April 19, 2019, the Respondent submitted its response to Question 10.
The Respondent failed to timely conduct certain mechanical integrity inspections (internal/external visual inspections) for the process equipment set forth in the attached Exhibit A, which is incorporated by reference.
The Respondent failed to conduct timely external visual mechanical integrity inspections for four (4) pressure vessels and two (2) piping circuits.
The Respondent failed to conduct timely thickness surveys for each piece of process equipment set forth in the attached Exhibit B, which is incorporated by reference into this CAFO.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) by failing to timely conduct mechanical integrity inspections on certain process equipment.
Count Six- Failure to Implement Written Procedures to Maintain the On-Going Integrity of Process Equipment – December 2, 2015, Incident
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b) provides that the owner or operator shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment.
On December 2, 2015, a chlorine release, from a rupture disk assembly occurred because two of the four bolts from the assembly were corroded and separated, compromising the integrity of the holder. A fugitive emission of process chemicals inside the rupture disk assembly reacted with ambient moisture outside of the assembly, causing external corrosion and a leak at the rupture disk holder. To stop the leak, the absorber was by-passed, and chlorine was sent directly to the emergency knock-out drum. However, the absorber’s pressure control loop had failed, and the valve was closed. This began to pressure up the snift gas chiller, resulting in a secondary release from PSVs. The snift compressor was shut down to stop the release. A total of 14 pounds of chlorine were released to the atmosphere. The incident took place at the Chlorine process.
The Respondent determined that one of the root causes was that the absorber’s PSV/rupture disk assembly was not inspected as required during the weekly inspection rounds. Relief and vent systems and devices are “process equipment” as that defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a)(3). Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b) by failing to implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of process equipment by failing to properly inspect the absorbers PSV/rupture disk assembly every week.
Count Seven – Inadequate Emergency Response Plan
40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a) provides the following:
a) The owner or operator shall develop and implement an emergency response program for the purpose of protecting public health and the environment. Such program shall include the following elements:
1) An emergency response plan, which shall be maintained at the stationary source and contain at least the following elements:
Documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures; and
iii. Procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a regulated substance;
As of the date of May 1, 2018, – May 4, 2018, EPA inspection, the Respondent maintained Medical Treatment Protocols, but the protocols were not included in the Emergency Response Plan (Emergency Control Manual). As of the date of the May 1, 2018, – May 4, 2018, EPA inspection, the Respondent’s Emergency Response Plan (Emergency Control Manual) did not include procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a regulated substance from the 4CPe unit.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(I )(ii) by failing to include all required elements in its Emergency Response Plan (Emergency Control Manual).
Count Eight – Failure to Timely Update RMP
40 C.F.R. § 68.190(a) provides that the owner or operator shall review and update the RMP as specified in 40 C.F.R. § 68.190(b) and submit it in the method and fonnat to the central point specified by EPA as of the date of the submission.
40 C.F.R. § 68.190(6)(3) provides that the owner or operator of a stationary source shall revise and update the RMP submitted under 40 C.F.R. § 68.150 no later than the date on which a regulated substance is first present in an already covered process above a threshold quantity.
On or about December 23, 2013, the Respondent submitted an RMP to EPA.
The RMP stated that the Shipping process had chlorine, methyl chloride, and chlorofonn present above the threshold quantity.
On or about May 4, 2018, the Respondent submitted an RMP to EPA. The RMP stated that the Shipping process had chlorine, methyl chloride, chloroform, and vinyl chloride present above a threshold quantity.
At some time prior to May 4, 2018, the Shipping process had vinyl chloride present above a threshold quantity.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.190(b)(3) by failing to timely update its RMP to include vinyl chloride in the Shipping process.
Count Nine – Failure to Timely Correct RMP
40 C.F .R. § 68. I 95(a) provides that the owner or operator of a stationary source for which an RMP was submitted shall correct the RMP for new accident history information. For any five-year accident history reporting requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.42 and occurring after April 9, 2004, the owner or operator shall submit the data required under 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.168, 68.1700), and 68.175(1) with respect that that accident within six months after the release or by the time the RMP is updated under 40 C.F.R. § 68.190, whichever is earlier.
On or about January 28, 2014, an incident occurred which met the five-year accident history reporting requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.42. The Respondent was required to correct its RMP no later than July 28, 2014. The Respondent did not correct its RMP until May 4, 2018. On or about March 29, 2017, an incident occurred which met the five-year accident history reporting requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.42. The Respondent was required to correct is RMP no later than September 29, 2017. The Respondent did not correct its RMP until May 4, 2018. Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68. I 95(a) by failing to correct its RMP by including two incidents that met the five-year accident history reporting requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.42.
CONSENT AGREEMENT
Respondent agrees that, in settlement of the claims alleged herein, Respondent shall pay a civil penalty of Five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
CLICK HERE for the CAFO