Respondent owns and operates an ice-making plant that uses anhydrous ammonia in a refrigeration “process”. In 2016, Respondent filed a Program 3 RMP for the Process and reported that it used 22,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(a) and (f)-(h), the Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia in the Process are subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3. On April 3, 2018, an ammonia release occurred at the Facility. Following Respondent’s report of the release to the National Response Center, EPA representatives visited the Facility on April 4 and 19, 2018 (the “Inspection”), and
reviewed documents to assess Respondent’s compliance with Part 68. The complainant alleges the following violations of 40 C.F.R. Part 68:
Count 1: Failure to Comply with Safety Information Requirements
Respondent failed to document that its equipment complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) and that equipment designed according to outdated standards were designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner. The primary RAGAGEP for the ammonia refrigeration industry is issued by the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, and fire code associations. Specifically:
(a) In several areas, the ammonia machinery rooms (“AMRs”) were inadequately isolated to prevent ammonia releases from spreading to other areas. For example, in several places, the facility lacked tight-fitting doors, and the second floor AMR was not constructed to isolate releases;
(b) Ventilation in several areas, including the first and second floor AMRs, was inadequate to clear ammonia releases and ensure that expelled ammonia-contaminated air would not be brought back into the building;
(c) Several areas lacked required audio/visual alarms, and signage on existing alarms was sometimes confusing;
(d) The facility lacked sufficient emergency stop buttons in some places. In one place, the e-stop was improperly labeled and could (and did) shut down emergency ventilation during a release;
(e) There was no shower/eyewash outside the second floor AMR of the Block Ice Building;
(f) Labeling on ammonia piping was inadequate in numerous places, often not providing information on the presence of ammonia, its physical state and flow direction;
(g) Door, refrigeration system, and emergency signage were inadequate in some places;
(h) Some ammonia-containing pipes and a valve were inadequately supported and lacked protection from physical impacts;
(i) There was inadequate access to key valves on the high-pressure receiver;
(j) The relief header pipe for the Main Building did not vent at least 20 ft. from a window. This issue had been identified in the previous EPA inspection; and
(k) The egress from the roof where ammonia equipment was located was unsafe. For example, the door lacked panic hardware and swung in the wrong direction.
Accordingly, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) and (3).
Count 2: Failure to Adequately Identify, Evaluate, and Control Hazards
Respondent performed an updated PHA in 2015 and identified recommended action items. However, the 2015 PHA was incomplete. Specifically, Respondent did not identify basic engineering deficiencies in the second floor AMR, including isolation and emergency ventilation deficiencies.
Accordingly, Respondent violated the PHA requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67
COUNT 3: Failure to Comply with Training Requirements
After the inspection, the inspection team reviewed training documentation provided to EPA for the years 2015-2018. The following deficiencies were identified:
a. Comprehensive refresher ammonia safety training was not routinely being provided at least every three years to four employees working in the AMR;
b. During the period reviewed, operator training was limited only to review of start-up/shutdown SOPs, or general ammonia properties training;
c. Records provided indicate that one employee received an “Ammonia System Component Review” in 2017, but no other similar training was completed by the other three employees with AMR duties/responsibilities;
d. Training documentation provided does not include information on the means used to verify that the employees understood the training.
Employees did not receive adequate training on emergency response procedures in 2017.
By failing to comply with training requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71
TERMS OF CONSENT AGREEMENT
EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of $170,000 for the violations alleged in this matter.
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