EPA issues RMP citations @ frozen poultry storage facility (NH3 & $151K)

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The Respondent operates a frozen poultry storage facility adjacent to other businesses, within several hundred feet of residences, and near a hospital. Respondent uses anhydrous ammonia in a refrigeration “process,” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3, in a system of pipes and vessels at the Facility (the “Process”). On June 5, 2019, EPA inspectors visited the Facility to assess the Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA, Part 68, and Sections 302-312 of EPCRA.  The complainant alleges the following violations of 40 C.F.R. Part 68.

 

Count 1: Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirements

EPA alleges that Respondent failed to document that the Processes complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (“RAGAGEP”) and that equipment designed according to outdated standards was designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner.

Accordingly, by failing to document that the Process complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices and that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA.

 

Count 2: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Mechanical Integrity Requirements

Respondent had not maintained the mechanical integrity of the Process equipment by correcting deficiencies that are outside of acceptable limits (as defined by the process safety information in 40 C.F.R. § 68.65) before continuing to use the equipment, or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to ensure safe operation. For example, an ammonia sensor was not functioning adequately, and some insulation on ammonia piping was not adequately maintained.

By failing to comply with the Program 3 mechanical integrity requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA for the Process.

 

Count 3: Failure to Adequately Identify, Evaluate, and Control Hazards

Respondent performed an updated PHA in 2015 and 2019 and identified recommended action items. However, the Respondent’s PHA was inadequate. Deficiencies included but are not limited to the following:

  • the 2015 PHA included findings that were not addressed by the time of the Inspection;
  • the 2019 PHA did not identify access hazards associated with eyewash stations; and
  • the Facility’s 2016 compliance audit noted that items identified the PHA had not been addressed.

Accordingly, Respondent violated the PHA requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA for the Process.

 

TERMS OF CONSENT AGREEMENT

Respondent agrees to pay the civil penalty of $151,000 (“EPA Penalty”) within 30 calendar days of the Effective Date of this CAFO.

 

ATTACHMENT A

Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices

In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“UAR”) has issued (and updates)

Standard 9-2020: Standard for Minimum System Safety Requirements for Existing Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (hereinafter “IIAR 9-2020”);

Standard 2: Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 2”), specifically, Int’] Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Standard 2-2014, Standard for Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (2014), [hereinafter “IIAR 2-2014”]1;

Standard 4: Installation of Closed­ Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 4”),

Standard 6: Standard for Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 6”),

Standard 7: Developing Operating Procedures for Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 7”),

Standard 9: Standard for Minimum System Safety Requirements for Existing Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems (“ANSI/IIAR 9”)

Bulletins and guidance include, without limitation, IIAR Bulletin No. 109, Guidelines for IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System (1997, and in effect until 2019 when ANSI/IIAR 6 replaced it) (“IIAR Bull. 109”);

IIAR Bulletin No. 110, Guidelines for Start-Up, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (1993, most recently updated in 2007, and in effect until 2019 when ANSI/UAR 6 replaced it) (“IIAR Bull. 110”);

IIAR Bulletin No. 114, Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and Components (1991, most recently updated in 2018) (“IIAR Bull. 114”);

IIAR Bulletin No. 116, Guidelines for Avoiding Component Failure in Industrial Refrigeration Systems Caused by Abnormal Pressure or Shock (1992) (“IIAR Bull. 116”); and

the Ammonia Refrigeration Management Program (2005, most recently updated in 2019) (“IIAR ARM Program”), is intended to provide streamlined guidance to facilities that have less than 10,000 pounds of ammonia.

Also in collaboration with the American National Standards Institute, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) “Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.” Refrigeration experts consistently rely upon these standards and are often incorporated into state building and mechanical codes.

In general, the standards of care cited below are those that were in effect in 2015 when Respondent completed its latest Process Hazard Analysis prior to EPA’s Inspection, except ANSI/IIAR 9-2020, which ANSI approved for publication on March 3, 2020.

ANSI/IIAR 9-2020 is cited for informational purposes as it is IIAR’s latest pronouncement on minimum safety standards for ammonia refrigeration systems, regardless of size or age.

 

  • The main shutoff value (“king valve”) was not operable from the floor level and did not have a hand wheel or chain to allow closure.
    • It is standard industry practice for the emergency shut- off valve to be directly operable from the floor or chain operated from a permanent work surface. See e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7. 3.3.3; HAR 2-2014, §§ 5.14.3, 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, and 13.37; ASHRAE 15-2013, §§ 9.12.6 and 11.2.2a.
  • The emergency stop button and ventilation override switch for the ammonia machinery room was located inside the ammonia machinery room rather than outside the primary entrance.
    • It is standard industry practice for the emergency shut-off switch to be located outside and adjacent to the designated principal machinery room door and to be clearly and uniquely identified at the valve itself and in schematic drawings. See, e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.11.1; IIAR 2-2014, § 6.12.1.
  • The entry door into the mezzanine area adjacent to the spiral freezer was not labeled to indicate the presence of ammonia and did not have required NFPA signage.
    • The standard industry practice is for buildings and facilities with refrigeration systems to include placards in accordance with NFPA 704 and include signage to indicate that only authorized personnel are permitted entry. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014 , §§ 6.15 and 7.2.2; IIAR 9-2020 , § 7.2.91; and NFPA 704, Section 4.3 (2017).
  • Audible ammonia alarms were not present in some required areas, including, but not limited to, outside the ammonia machinery room entry door.’
    • It is standard industry practice to have ammonia leak detection, with audible and visible alarms located both inside the ammonia machinery room and outside of each entrance to the machinery room. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 6.13; IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.12.1, ASHRAE 15-2019, § 8.13.10.1; and NFPA 1 2012, § 53.2.3.1.2.
    • It is also industry practice to have Level 1 detection and alarm in areas outside the machinery room where ammonia refrigeration equipment is installed. See e.,e., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 6.13 and 7.2.3.
  • Ammonia piping at some locations of the Facility lacked appropriate labeling or labeling was damaged or missing, including on the west exterior wall, in the processing area, and some locations on the roof.
    • The standard industry practice is for piping mains, headers, and branches to be identified as containing ammonia and as to the physical state of the refrigerant (that is, vapor or liquid, etc.), the relative pressure level of the refrigerant, and the direction of flow. See e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.2.9 .4; IIAR 2-2014, § 5.14.5, IIAR Bull. 109, § 4.7.6, IIAR Bull. 114, § 4.2 .1.
  • Ammonia piping below the compressor was not protected from impacts. The standard industry practice is for ammonia piping to be inspected throughout a facility to determine that no piping is exposed to possible physical damage through traffic hazards, for example, forklifts. See, e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, §§ 4.42 and 4.7.3.
    • It is standard industry practice for equipment to be protected where there is a risk of physical damage. For example, where equipment containing ammonia is located in an area with heavy vehicular traffic during normal operations, and risk of impact exists, it is standard industry practice to provide vehicle barriers or alternative protection in accordance with the fire code. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 5.17.1 and 7.2.4; IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.2.11.1 and 7.2.12.1 (protection from physical damage) and§§ 7.2.7.1 (adequate support) and 7.3.2.2 (piping support).
  • The ammonia machinery room at the Facility was not tightly sealed off from the rest of the Facility, which could allow ammonia to escape the ammonia machinery room in the event of a release.  Such openings included: the primary entry door into the ammonia machinery room and the double entry doors from the boiler/compressor room was not tight fitting at the bottom, and locations at the north dock alleyway and from the boiler/air compressor room were not tightly sealed.
    • It is standard industry practice for the ammonia machinery room to be separated from the remainder of the building by tight-fitting construction with a one-hour first resistance rating. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 6.2.1; IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.3.2.1, 7.3.2.5, and 7.3.9.2.
    • Specifically, it is standard industry practice for the doors to the ammonia machinery room to be self-closing and tight fitting. See e.g., IIAR 2-2014, §§ 6.2.1, 6.1 0.2, and 7.2.1; IIAR 9-2020, §§ 7.3.2.5 and 7.3.9.2, and ASHRAE 15-2013, §§ 8. l 1.2 and 8.12(b).
  • The ammonia machinery room at the Facility lacked the required signage to display important information about the Process.
    • It is standard industry practice for the person in charge of a facility with an ammonia refrigeration system to provide directions for emergency shutdown of the system in a location that is readily accessible to trained refrigeration system staff and trained emergency responders. The schematic drawings or signage shall include several types of information including:
      • Instructions with details and steps for shutting down the system in an emergency; 
      • The name and telephone numbers of the refrigeration operating, maintenance, and management staff, emergency responders, and safety personnel;
      • The names and telephone numbers of all corporate, local, state, and federal agencies to be contacted as required in the event of a reportable incident;
      • Quantity of ammonia in the system; 
      • Type and quantity of refrigerant oil in the system; and
      • Field test pressures applied. See e.g.,IIAR 2-2014, § 5.15; ASHRAE 15-2013, § 11.2.1; and IIAR 9-2020,7.2.10.
  • The ventilation air intake in the Facility’s ammonia refrigeration room had issues, including the air intake location presenting a potential short-circuiting risk; and one air intake draws air from the north dock alleyway where ammonia piping is located.
    • It is standard industry practice for make-up air supply locations in the machinery room to prevent short-circuiting of the make-up air directly to the exhaust. See e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.14.2; HAR 2-2014, § 6.14.5.2. It is standard industry practice for air intakes for make-up air to draw only uncontaminated outdoor air. See, e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.14.3; IIAR 2-2014, § 6.14.5.4.
  • The Facility’s pressure relief valve on the roof would discharge horizontally rather than vertically.
    • It is standard industry practice for the termination of the discharge from the pressure relief devices to be directed upward and arranged to avoid spraying ammonia on persons in the vicinity. See, e.g., IIAR 2-2014, § 15.5.1.5 and IIAR 2-2008 (Addendum B), § 11.3.6.3. 
  • There were electrical issues with the Facility’s ammonia system, including a broken electrical conduit, exposed wiring in the ammonia machinery room, and an extension cord being used instead of permanent wiring.
    • It is standard industry practice for electrical equipment and connections not to be damaged in such a way that may adversely affect the safe operation or mechanical strength of the equipment, such as parts that are broken, bent, cut, or deteriorated by corrosion, chemical action, or overheating. See, e.g., NFPA 70- 2014, Section 110.12(B).
    • It is a standard industry practice that extension cords should not be used as substitutes for permanent wiring. See e.g., NFPA 1-2012, Section 11.1.7.6
  • The Facility’s low-level ammonia alarms will not activate at a low enough level (The facility’s low-level alarm will only activate at ammonia concentrations of 75 ppm). The Facility’s high-level ammonia alarm will not activate at a low enough level (The facility’s high-level ammonia detection starts at ammonia concentrations of 250 ppm rather than 150 ppm).
    • It is standard industry practice for ammonia detectors to activate an alarm to take corrective action at an indicated ammonia concentration of25 ppm or higher. See e.g. , IIAR 2-2014, §§ 6.13.1 and 6.13.2; IIAR 9-2020, § 7.3.12.2 (50 ppm).
    • It is standard industry practice for ammonia detection of concentrations equal to or exceeding 150 ppm to activate visual indicators, audible alarms, and emergency ventilation. See, e.g., IIAR 2014,§ 6.13.2.3.
  • There were problems with the insulation of ammonia piping at the Facility, including insulation that was damaged or corroded, indicating that the insulation was failing.
    • The standard industry practice is for piping and equipment surfaces not intended for heat exchange to be insulated, treated, or otherwise protected to mitigate condensation and excessive frost buildup where the surface temperature is below the dew point of the surrounding air during normal operation and in an area where condensation and frost could develop and become a hazard to occupants or cause damage to the structure, electrical equipment, or refrigeration system. See, e.g., IIAR 9-2020, § 7.2.6.1; IIAR 2-2014, § 5.10.1.
    • In addition, the standard industry practice is to check the piping for signs of corrosion, treat corroded piping with rust preventative paint, and replace the badly corroded pipe. See, e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, §§ 4.7.4 and 4.7.5.

 

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