Respondent owns and operates a chemical warehouse and repackaging facility. From November 2 through November 5, 2021, EPA performed an inspection of the Facility to evaluate compliance with Section 103 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), EPCRA Sections 304-312, and CAA Section 112(r). Based upon the information gathered during the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent violated certain provisions of EPCRA and the CAA.
At all times relevant to this CA/FO, over 500 pounds each of anhydrous ammonia and sulfur dioxide were present at the Facility.
At all times relevant to this CA/FO, Respondent had 2,500 pounds or more of chlorine and 5,000 pounds or more of sulfur dioxide in one or more processes at the Facility.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW
Count I – Failure to Accurately Report Tier II Inventory Information
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s 2018 Tier II inventory information for the Facility estimated the maximum amount of anhydrous ammonia and sulfur dioxide present on a single day at the Facility in the preceding year to be significantly higher than the actual maximum amount.
By failing to accurately report the maximum amount of anhydrous ammonia and sulfur dioxide present on a single day at the Facility in the preceding year, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R.§ 370.42(s)(2).
Count II – General Duty Clause – Failure to Design and Maintain a Safe Facility
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 1079 indicates repair kits for emergency response purposes are available at the Facility. However, EPA determined that Respondent did not inspect the repair kits to ensure they are in working condition in the event of use by third-party emergency responders.
By not inspecting the test kits to ensure they are in working order in the event of use by third-party responders, Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as necessary to prevent releases, in violation of CAA Section 112(r)(1), 40 U.S.C. § 9413(d).
Count III – Failure to Develop an Accurate Management System
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent’s organizational chart had no person assigned to have overall responsibility for the development, implementation, and integration of the RMP elements. EPA determined that Respondent’s organizational chart identified people responsible for individual RMP requirements, but some of the people assigned were unable to answer EPA’s questions about their assigned responsibilities. In addition, EPA determined that the job positions with assigned responsibility for RMP elements were inconsistent with Respondent’s corporate standard operating procedures, which assigned responsibility for RMP elements to those holding different job positions.
By failing to develop an accurate management system that identifies people assigned to individual requirements of the RMP elements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.15(a) and (c).
Count IV – Failure to Include Information in Executive Summary
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s RMP for the Facility lacked, in the executive summary, descriptions of the accidental release prevention program, the five-year accident history, and the emergency response program.
By failing to include required information in the executive summary for the Facility’s RMP, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.155.
Count V – Failure to Have the Correct Phone Number in the RMP
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the Respondent’s registration form in its February 26, 2021, RMP contained an incorrect phone number for the Respondent.
By failing to include an accurate phone number in the registration form in its RMP, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.160(b)(4).
Count VI – Failure to Include Process Safety Information for the Scrubber
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s written process safety information for the scrubber, which is a safety system for releases from the chlorine and sulfur dioxide processes, did not include information pertaining to process chemistry, safe upper and lower operating limits, an evaluation of the consequences of deviation, or information for the scrubber as a safety system.
By failing to include written process safety information pertaining to the technology of the process for its scrubber and information pertaining to the scrubber as a safety system, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(a), (c)(1) and (d)(1).
Count VII – Failure to Document that the Gas Room’s Ventilation System and Sodium Bisulfate Reactor Comply with RAGAGEP or were Designed and Operating in a Safe Manner
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that the Facility’s gas handling room, where it stored and processed chlorine and sulfur dioxide, was operated with exhaust fans and roll-up doors kept in the open position. With the roll-up doors in the open position, the gas room was not operated in negative pressure. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for gas rooms is to operate the room with an exhaust ventilation system and with the room in negative pressure. See, e.g., National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 400: Hazardous Materials Code §§ 21.2.4.1 & 21.2.4.1 (2019).
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that for the Facility’s sodium bisulfate (“SBS”) reactor, which was part of the sulfur dioxide process, Respondent had no information that identified the applicable RAGAGEP or applicable design standard to which the reactor was built. EPA further determined that Respondent’s process safety information for the SBS reactor documented that Respondent maintained, inspected, and tested it in a safe manner, but did not document that the SBS reactor was designed and operated in a safe manner.
By failing to document that its gas handling room and SBS reactor, for which Respondent did not document compliance with RAGAGEP, were designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and/or operating in a safe manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d).
Count VIII – Failure to Promptly Address Process Hazard Analysis Findings and Recommendations
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s 2018 PHA for the Facility repeated some recommendations from Respondent’s 2013 PHA that had not been resolved by the time of the 2018 PHA. At the time of EPA’s inspection, Respondent failed to provide documentation showing that some recommendations originally made in the 2013 PHA and repeated in the 2018 PHA, as well as new recommendations from the 2018 PHA, were resolved.
By failing to document that recommendations from the 2013 and 2018 PHAs were resolved in a timely manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e).
Count IX – Failure to Have Accurate Written Operating Procedures for Each Operating Phase
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA observed the following inconsistencies between Respondent’s written operating procedures for the Facility and actual operations at the Facility:
A. Respondent had written operating procedures for chlorine processes that no longer existed at the Facility;
B. Respondent’s written operating procedures for its chlorine and sulfur dioxide processes did not include operating procedures for its barcode tracking system for movement of chlorine and sulfur dioxide around the Facility; and
C. Respondent’s written operating procedures for startup of the sulfur dioxide process, which includes filling out a startup checklist (SOP 1079), were not consistent with staff practice.
By failing to have accurate written operating procedures for each operating phase, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1).
Count X – Failure to Have Written Operating Procedures that Include Operating Limits
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s operating procedures for the Facility’s sulfur dioxide covered process did not include the operating limits, consequences of deviation, or steps required to correct or avoid deviation for the sulfur dioxide scrubber system.
By failing to include operating limits for the sulfur dioxide scrubber system in the written operating procedures, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2).
Count XI – Failure to Certify Annually Operating Procedures are Current and Accurate
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent did not certify that part of its operating procedures at the Facility, SOP 1079, was current and accurate for the year 2020.
By failing to certify annually that part of its operating procedures are current and accurate, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c).
Count XII – Failure to Conduct Initial Training for Employees Involved in Operating a Process
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s training records for the Facility did not show that two employees involved in operating a process at the Facility had received initial training in operating the process.
By failing to provide initial training to employees involved in operating a process, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(a)(1).
COUNT XIII – Failure to Provide Refresher Training
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s training documents for the Facility did not include refresher training or any records that refresher training had been conducted.
By failing to provide refresher training every three years to each employee involved in operating a process, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b).
Count XIV – Failure to Conduct Mechanical Integrity Inspections and Tests
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent had no records that it conducted mechanical integrity inspections and tests on the E-stops for the sulfur dioxide process or inspections for corrosion on the sulfur dioxide piping and equipment. EPA further determined that Respondent’s documentation for inspections and tests for certain equipment, such as the loop checks for the GCV 5 and GCV 8 control loops, did not contain a description of the inspection or test performed.
By failing to conduct mechanical integrity inspections and tests on piping systems, emergency shutdown systems and controls and keep adequate documentation of inspections and tests, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.73(a), (d)(1) and (d)(4).
Count XV – Failure to Promptly Begin an Incident Investigation
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent’s documentation for Incident I-18-074-TCNV-Sparks-#150 Chlorine Cylinder Release, which involved a leak from a chlorine cylinder, indicates that the incident started on August 10, 2018 at 3:25 pm, and the investigation into the incident started on August 13, 2018 at 4:54 pm. EPA further determined that Respondent began the incident investigation for Incident I- 18-074-TCNV-Sparks-#150 Chlorine Cylinder Release more than 48 hours following the incident.
By failing to initiate an incident investigation as promptly as possible, but no later than 48 hours following the incident, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.81(b).
Count XVI – Failure to Evaluate Contractors’ Safety Performance and Programs
Based upon the Inspection and subsequent investigation, EPA determined that Respondent did not have any documentation of the contract owner or operator’s safety performance and programs for three contractors prior to selecting the contractor.
By failing to evaluate the contract owner or operator’s safety performance and programs when selecting a contractor, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b)(1).
CIVIL PENALTY
EPA proposes that Respondent be assessed, and Respondent agrees to pay, a civil penalty in the amount of SIXTY-NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS ($69,396)
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECT
Respondent shall complete an equipment donation SEP, consisting of purchasing and donating equipment, as described in further detail below, to the Sparks Fire Department in Sparks, Nevada. The Sparks Fire Department is part of a regional “TRIAD” hazmat team that includes the Reno Fire Department and Truckee Meadows Fire and Rescue. The TRIAD provides a coordinated response to any hazardous materials leak, spill, or condition that threatens the public and/or the environment in Washoe County, Nevada. The Sparks Fire Department will make the donated equipment available for use by the TRIAD. Respondent shall purchase, for the Sparks Fire Department, the following equipment:
A. Four (4) ZUMRO Model 284 low-pressure inflatable shelter systems;
B. Accessories for the four (4) ZUMRO Model 284 shelter systems:
(1) Four (4) LED light systems for Model 284;
(2) Four (4) units of insulation for Model 284;
(3) Four (4) anchor bladder sets for Model 284;
(4) Four (4) stake kits for Model 284;
(5) Four GM80 axial ventilators; and
(6) Four Pelsue axial ventilators with 1/3 HP, 120 VAC.
Respondent shall spend no less than ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND, SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX DOLLARS ($110,756) on implementing the SEP.
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