The Respondent owns a milk production facility and according to the U.S. Census data from 2010, several thousand people live near the Facility. The Facility has been in use as a dairy since 1886, and at the time of EPA’s inspection, included a milk production site, office space, chemical storage, warehousing, and production areas.
The Facility includes an ammonia refrigeration system for cooling milk, orange juice, and other products. On August 27, 2014, EPA inspectors visited the Facility and performed an inspection (“the Inspection”) to assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA.
At the time of the Inspection, the Facility was a building or structure from which an accidental release may occur and was therefore a “stationary source,” as defined at Section 112(r)(2)(C) of the CAA and 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
At the time of the Inspection, Respondent used anhydrous ammonia in a refrigeration process (“the Process”), as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
Respondent conducted a Process Hazard Analysis (“PHA”) for the Facility on January 19-20, 2010.
On May 30, 2013 , Respondent submitted an RMP submission for the Facility (‘the 2013 RMP”). In the 2013 RMP, Respondent reported that the Facility used 11,500 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in a Program Level 3 process.
Respondent submitted Tier II reports pursuant to Sections 311 and 312 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (“EPCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021 and 11022, reporting that the Facility used the following quantities of ammonia:
- Over 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in reporting year 2011.
- Over 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in reporting year 2012.
- 12,400 pounds of anhydrous ammonia in reporting year2013 .
Accordingly, at the time of the Inspection, the Process was a “covered process” subject to the provisions of Part 68 because Respondent “used,” “stored,” and “handled” the RMP chemical anhydrous ammonia at the Facility in the process in an amount greater than 10,000 pounds.
According to Respondent’s 2013 RMP, there were public receptors within the distance to the endpoint for a worst-case release of the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in the Process. Likewise, modeling performed by EPA indicates that the endpoint for a worst-case release from the Process is greater than the distance to a public receptor. Additionally, at the time of the Inspection, the Process was subject to OSHA’s PSM requirements at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 because it uses anhydrous ammonia in an amount over the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds.
Therefore, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.l0(a)-(d), Respondent’s use, storage, and handling of anhydrous ammonia in its Process at the Facility is subject to the requirements of RMP Program 3.
The Inspection and EPA’s review of subsequently submitted information, including the 2013 RMP submission, revealed some potentially dangerous conditions relating to the Process, including:
- Failure to register as an RMP facility in accordance with 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.10, 68.12, 68.150(a), and 68.150(b)(3). Respondent failed to comply with RMP facility registration requirements by failing to submit its RMP to EPA by the date on which anhydrous ammonia was first present above the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds in the Process at the Facility, which was at least by 2011. Respondent’s EPCRA Tier II reporting indicates that the Facility used over 10,000 pounds of ammonia at least by 2011. Respondent first submitted an RMP for the Facility on May 30, 2013.
- Failure to comply with Program 3 training requirements in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.71. For the time period before 2014, at the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to produce any records documenting initial or refresher training of employees to perform routine maintenance on the Covered Process or detailing what to look for during an inspection of the Process performed by Respondent’ employees. Respondent had no formal documentation or formal written program outlining any Facility-specific operating training before 2014. Respondent was required to comply with the training requirements of Part 68 beginning when the Facility first began using over 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, which occurred at least by 2011. Respondent has subsequently located and provided additional training records. Refresher training on the Covered Process is required at a minimum of every three years following initial training.
- Failure to maintain and comply with process safety information requirements in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.65. Respondent failed to comply with process safety information requirements, including failure to document that either the equipment complied with RAGAGEP or that existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use was designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner. For Respondent’s Process, at the time of the Facility’s last PHA before EPA’s Inspection, applicable RAGAGEP sources included: Int’ ) Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Standard 2-2008, with Addendum A: Equipment Design and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems (August 4, 2010), [hereinafter “IIAR 2-2008”]; IIAR Bulletin No. 109: IIAR Minimum Safety Criteria for a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System, [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 109”]; Int’ ) Inst. of Ammonia Refrigeration, Bulletin No. 110: Guidelines for: Start-up, Inspection and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 110”]; IIAR Bulletin No. 114: Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components [hereinafter “IIAR Bull. 114”]; and, ANSI, ASHRAE 15-2010: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems, [hereinafter “ASHRAE 15-2010”]. In addition, at the time of the Inspection, significant portions of the ammonia refrigeration system at the Facility did not meet these standards. Normal day-to-day maintenance and inspection was substantially lacking. Specific issues identified, include:
- At the time of the Inspection, the Facility lacked an eyewash station or body shower outside the entrance to the machinery room. The standard industry practice is to maintain an eyewash station and body shower unit located external to the machinery room and readily accessible by an exit. See e.g., IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 13 .1.6 and Bull. 109, supra, § 4.10.10.
- At the time of the Inspection, all but one of the Facility’s pressure relief device headers on the roof was directed downward. The standard industry practice is for the discharge from pressure relief devices to the atmosphere to be arranged to avoid spraying of refrigerant on persons in the vicinity. See e.g. , IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 11 .3.6.4. In addition, standard industry practice is to prefer the direction of discharge to be vertically upwards. See e.g. , IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 11.3.6.3.
- At the time of the Inspection, a significant amount of piping in the ammonia refrigeration system had damaged or missing labeling. The standard industry practice is for all piping mains, headers, and branches to be identified as to the physical state of the refrigerant (that is, vapor or liquid, etc.), the relative pressure level of the refrigerant, and the direction of flow. The standard industry practice is to use an identification system that is either one established as a standard by a recognized code or standards body or one described and documented by the facility owner. See e.g. , IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 10.5 and IIAR Bull. 114 supra, and IIAR Bull. 109, supra, § 4.7.6.
- At the time of the Inspection, the manual king valves were located approximately eight to ten feet above the roof grade and were not readily accessible from the ground or via a platform, and were not operated by a chain. The standard industry practice is for all manually operated valves that are inaccessible from floor level to be operable from portable platforms, fixed platforms, ladders, or to be chain-operated. Isolation valves identified as being part of an emergency shutdown procedure should be directly operable or chain-operated from a permanent work surface. See IIAR 2-2008, supra, § 13.1.2.3. In addition, at the time of the Inspection, the automated and manual king valves on the high pressure receiver at the Facility were not labeled with prominent signs identifying the location of the valves. The standard industry practice is for main shut-off valves (king valves); hot gas defrost line main shut-off valves; and ammonia pump liquid main shut-off valves and/or disconnects of the ammonia system should be readily accessible and identified with a prominent sign having letters sufficiently large to be easily read. See UAR Bull. 109, supra, § 4.10.3.d. Failure to comply with the mechanical integrity requirements for the Process, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 .
- Respondent failed to establish a program to perform appropriate checks and inspections of the entire Covered Process to ensure that equipment was installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer’s instructions and RAGAGEP. Respondent also failed to correct equipment deficiencies in accordance with 40 C.F.R § 68.73. Normal day-to-day maintenance and inspection was substantially lacking. Specific issues identified, include:
- At the time of the Inspection, sections of piping and system components exhibited signs of corrosion or had insulation, lagging, and paint that were in poor condition, which increases the potential for corrosion related problems. The standard industry practice is to inspect ammonia piping for damage to insulation, damage to lagging, and for corrosion and to make timely corrective actions. See e.g. , IIAR Bull. 109, supra, § 4.7 and IIAR Bull. 110, supra, Appendix G-Typical Schedule for Inspection and Maintenance.
- At the time of the Inspection, at least one of the piping supports for the ammonia piping present on the roof was severely corroded and was not supporting the pipe. The standard industry practice is for piping hangers and supports to be able to carry the weight of the piping, as well as any other anticipated loads. See IIAR 2-2008, supra, §§ 10.4.1 and 10.4.4.
- At the time of the Inspection, several insulation deficiencies were identified, including:
- The insulation jacket on the ice maker in the East Ice Builder was in poor condition, including substantial deterioration and weathering, which creates the potential for moisture ingress and damage to the pressure vessel;
- The vapor barrier on piping was compromised in several areas, including insulation on piping on the roof that exhibited damage by compression. Some roof spaces lacked bridge crossovers thereby increasing the probability of damage to the vapor barriers by Facility employees walking on insulated piping;
- Several sections of piping in the machinery room were missing insulation and exhibited surface corrosion and/or damaged insulation; and,
- Several sections of piping and vessel jacketing and insulation exhibited areas that had been previously subjected to non-destructive testing such as inspection ports in the insulation; however, the tested areas had not been sealed or capped.
Failure to seal an inspection port can allow for water and moisture intrusion under the insulation.
The standard industry practice is for insulation to be regularly maintained and inspected. See IIAR 2-2008, supra, Appendix H: Insulation for Refrigeration Systems. In addition, the standard industry practice is to check piping for signs of corrosion and to treat corroded piping with rust preventative paint and to replace badly corroded pipe. See e.g., IIAR Bull. 109, supra, § 4.7.4.
At approximately 4:00 A.M. on October 3, 2015, the Facility experienced a release of anhydrous ammonia from the Facility’s refrigeration system when a clamp truck ran into and sheared the liquid feed line into one of the Facility’s evaporators. According to Respondent, it immediately evacuated the Facility and called 911. The
release was substantially complete after ten minutes, and the Facility’s system was isolated at approximately 7:00 A.M .
The October 3, 2015 release resulted in the discharge of approximately 1,290 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, which is approximately thirteen times the reportable quantity of 100 pounds established by 40 C.F.R. § 302.4.
Respondent notified the National Response Center about the October 3, 2015 release at approximately 10:20 A.M. on October 3, 2015 , which is approximately six hours after the release occurred.
On February 23, 2016, EPA sent Respondent a Notice of Potential Violation regarding the violations alleged herein, and on April 5, 2016, Respondent met with EPA to explain how Respondent had worked to bring the Facility into compliance.
VIOLATIONS
Count 1: Failure to register as an RMP facility in accordance with 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.10, 68.12, 68.lS0(a), and 68.150(b)(3).
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.10, the owner or operator of a facility that has more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process shall comply with the requirements of 40 C.F .R. Part 68 no later than the latest of: (a) June 21 , 1999; (b) Three years after the date on which a regulated substance is first listed under 40 C.F.R. § 68.130; or (c) The date on which a regulated substance is first present about a threshold quantity in a process.
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12, the owner or operator of a facility that is subject to 40 C.F.R. Part 68 shall submit a single RMP, as provided by 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.150 to 68.185, including a registration that reflects all covered processes at the facility.
Respondent failed to comply with the RMP facility registration requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.10 and 68.12 by failing to submit its RMP to EPA by the date on which anhydrous ammonia was first present above the threshold quantity of 10,000 pounds in the Process at the Facility, which was in at least 2011. Respondent’s EPCRA Tier II reporting indicate that the Facility used over 10,000 pounds of ammonia at least by 2011; however, Respondent did not submit an RMP for the Facility until May 30, 2013.
Accordingly, Respondent failed to comply with RMP registration requirements in violation of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.10, 68.12, 68.150(a), and 68.150(b)(3) and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least 2011, when the Facility’s Process included over 10,000 pounds of ammonia, until May 30, 2013, the date Respondent submitted an RMP for the Facility.
Count 2: Failure to Comply with Program 3 Training Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F .R. § 68. 71, the owner or operator of an RMP facility must ascertain that each employee involved in operating a covered process is trained in an overview of the process and operating procedures, including an emphasis on safety and health hazards, emergency operations and shutdown, and safe work practices. Refresher training is required every three years, and more often if necessary.
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.7l(c), the owner or operator of an RMP facility must document that the facility’s employees have been appropriately trained by preparing a record which contains the identity of the employee, the date of the training, and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training.
Although Respondent’s process at the Facility used over 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia by at least 2011, Respondent had insufficient documentation and no formal written program outlining any Facility-specific operating training before 2014.
By failing to adequately train and record compliance with training requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.71 and Section l 12(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E), from at least 2011 until January 1, 2014.
Count 3: Failure to Comply with Process Safety Information Requirements
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.65, the owner or operator of a Program 3 process is required, among other things, to compile written process safety information before completing the PHA, in order to perform an adequate PHA and to enable proper maintenance of process equipment. This includes documenting information pertaining to the hazards of the RMP chemical in the process and information pertaining to the technology and equipment of the process.
This compilation of process safety information enables appropriate identification and understanding of hazards posed by regulated substances in the process and the technology and equipment of the process. In addition, the owner or operator must document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP, and that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, and inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner. 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2) and (3).
Respondent failed to document that the Process equipment complied with applicable RAGAGEP or that any equipment that was designed according to outdated standards is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operated in a safe manner.
By failing to comply with process safety information requirements, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.65 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).
Count 4: Failure to Comply with Mechanical Integrity Requirements for the Covered Process
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 , the owner or operator of a Program 3 process must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of certain process equipment and train employees accordingly. The owner or operator must inspect and test the equipment either in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and good engineering practices, or more frequently if needed based on prior operating experience.
The owner or operator must also document the inspections or tests on process equipment, correct deficiencies, ensure that any new equipment is installed properly, and ensure that maintenance materials and spare parts are suitable for the process application.
At the time of the Inspection, Respondent failed to comply with the mechanical integrity requirements for the Process, including failing to establish a program to perform appropriate checks and inspections of the entire covered Process to ensure that equipment was installed properly and consistently with design specifications, the
manufacturer’s instructions, and RAGAGEP, and failing to correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits.
By failing to establish and implement a sufficient mechanical integrity program and by not correcting equipment deficiencies before further use or in a safe and timely manner, Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73 and Section 112(r)(7)(E) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(E).
Count 5: Failure to Notify the National Response Center of a Release in a Timely Manner
Pursuant to Section 103 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a), and 40 C.F.R. § 302.6(a), the person in charge of a facility or vessel from which a CERCLA hazardous substance has been released in an amount that meets or exceeds its reportable quantity must immediately notify the National Response Center as soon as that person has knowledge of the release.
As described in Paragraphs 36-39 above, at approximately 4:00 A.M. on October 3, 2015, the Facility experienced a release from the Facility’s refrigeration system of approximately 1,290 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, which is approximately thirteen times the reportable quantity of 100 pounds established by 40 C.F .R. § 302.4. Although Respondent responded to the release and evacuated the Facility immediately, Respondent only notified the National Response Center at approximately 10:20 A.M. on October 3, 2015, which is approximately six hours after the release occurred.
By failing to notify the National Response Center regarding the October 3, 2015 release in a timely manner as soon as Respondent had knowledge of the release, Respondent violated the requirements of Section 103 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a), and 40 C.F.R. § 302.6(a).
General Settlement Provisions
Respondent certifies that it is currently operating the Facility in compliance with 40 C.F.R. 68. Respondent also certifies that it has achieved the following key safety measures, which EPA has determined should be present at every facility with an ammonia refrigeration system, as specified below:
Identifying Hazards
- Hazard Addressed: Releases or safety deficiencies that stem from a failure to identify hazards in design/operation of system
- Facility has completed a process hazard analysis or review.
Operating Activities:
- Hazard Addressed: High risk of release from operating or maintenance activity
- System has self-closing/quick closing valves on oil pots.
- Facility has written procedures for maintenance and operation activities.
- Only authorized persons have access to machinery room and the ability to alter safety settings on equipment.
Maintenance/Mechanical Integrity:
- Hazard Addressed: Leaks/releases from maintenance neglect
- A preventative maintenance program is in place to, among other things, detect and control corrosion, deteriorated vapor barriers, ice buildup, and pipe hammering, and to inspect integrity of equipment/pipe supports.
- All piping system openings except the relief header are plugged or capped, or valve is locked.
- Equipment, piping, and emergency shutdown valves are labeled for easy identification, and pressure vessels have legible, accessible nameplates.
- All atmospheric pressure relief valves have been replaced in the last five years with visible confirmation of accessible pressure relief valves.
Machinery Room and System Design
- Hazard Addressed: Inability to isolate and properly vent releases
- The System(s) has/have emergency shut-off and ventilation switches outside each machinery room.
- The machinery room(s) has/have functional, tested, ventilation. Air inlets are positioned to avoid recirculation of exhaust air and ensure sufficient inlet air to replace exhausted air.
- Documentation exists to show that pressure relief valves that have a common discharge header have adequately sized piping to prevent excessive backpressure on relief valves, or if built prior to 2000, have adequate diameter based on the sum of the relief valve cross sectional areas.
Emergency Actions
- Hazard Addressed: Inability to regain control and reduce release impact
- Critical shutoff valves are accessible, and a schematic is in place to show responders where to access them.
- EPCRA Tier II reporting is up to date.
Penalty Payment
Pursuant to Sections 113(d)(2)(B) and (e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(B) and (e), and taking into account the relevant statutory penalty criteria, the facts alleged in this CAFO, and such other circumstances as justice may require, EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of one hundred fifty-seven thousand two hundred fourteen ($157,214) for the violations alleged in this matter.
- Respondent shall pay the CERCLA penalty in the amount of $22,066
- Respondent shall pay the CAA penalty in the amount of $135,148
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