Respondent is the owner and/or operator of a manufacturing facility, where vinyl fluoride is a raw material used at the Facility during the polymerization process, which is a risk management program covered process. The equipment in the polymerization process includes a supply tank, a reactor, separators, and a slurry flash tank. At the slurry flash tank, steam and vinyl fluoride are flashed off through the flash tank vent. After the slurry flash tank, the slurry, which still contains some vinyl fluoride, is then pumped through a cooler and sent to one of three slurry storage tanks (slurry tanks #1, #2 and #3). At the time of the incident described below, these three slurry tanks were interconnected by a common overflow line.
There is a U-leg loop seal pipe which is a liquid trap on the end of the overflow line inside slurry tank #2. The U-leg loop seal pipe is designed to prevent steam and vinyl fluoride vapors from passing directly from the flash tank and entering the slurry tank. However, if the slurry flash tank level was too high, hot slurry would pass through the flash tank overflow line directly into slurry tank #2. Facility staff had noted in late 2009 that the U-leg loop seal pipe in slurry tank #2 was cracked. Prior to the November 2010 Incident, the U-leg loop seal pipe was not repaired. On November 3, 2010, Facility staff noted that the U-leg loop seal pipe in slurry tank #2 had a “fishmouth” split in the pipe. Facility staff concluded that the slurry tank could be returned to service without repairing the split.
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, Facility staff restarted the process after concluding that the damaged U-leg loop seal pipe did not increase the risk of vinyl fluoride vapor transfer into slurry tank #2. Vinyl fluoride then flowed directly into slurry tank #2. On November 8, 2010, the liquid ring compressor that was intended to reduce the amount of vinyl fluoride in the flash tank within the TEDLAR® process malfunctioned, and the process was restarted without the compressor operating, which is a change to the equipment in the process.
Prior to the incident described below, Facility staff calculated that the loss of this compressor would double the amount of vinyl fluoride going to the flash tank. Facility staff restarted the process without first evaluating the effect of the change to process equipment. The process operated in this mode until the incident described below. Prior to the incident described below, a stream of vinyl fluoride vapor entered slurry tank #2 through the damaged U-leg loop seal pipe. Damage to the U-leg loop seal pipe was noted by Facility staff on November 3, 2010. The three slurry tanks were joined by a common slurry tank overflow line so that vinyl fluoride in the slurry in slurry tank #3 and the vinyl fluoride and steam entering slurry tank #2 from the flash tank via the damaged U-leg loop seal pipe had an open path to slurry tank #1. A flammable concentration of vinyl fluoride accumulated in slurry tank #1.
On November 9, 2010, a contractor was performing “hot work” repairs on top of slurry tank #1. These repairs involved welding and grinding steel on top of slurry tank #1. “Hot work” is any flame or spark-producing operation including welding, grinding, and riveting, and is defined at 40 C.F.R. § 68.3 as “work involving electric or gas welding, cutting, brazing, or similar flame or spark-producing operations.” At approximately 11:04 am on November 9, 2010 (the “November 2010 Incident”), a flammable concentration of vinyl fluoride in slurry tank #1 was ignited by the hot work repairs which were being performed on top of the tank #1 . Sparks from the hot work activities ignited the flammable vinyl fluoride mixture inside the tank and resulted in an explosion and fire. The welder lost his life, and the foreman who was standing nearby on fire watch was injured.
Following the November 2010 Incident, staff at Respondent’s Facility conducted an incident investigation regarding the Incident and prepared incident investigation reports dated November 11, 2010 and January 12, 2011. Following the November 2010 Incident, OSHA and the CSB investigated the Incident, and EPA conducted an inspection of the Facility on June 5 – 6, 2012.
Respondent has made changes at the Facility in response to the November 2010 Incident. The changes include upgrades to the Facility’s process hazard analysis process, the addition of layers of protection to reduce the risk of vapors entering the slurry tanks, and other policy changes recommended by Respondent’s incident investigation team. In addition, Respondent has changed the configuration of the overflow from the slurry tanks, and for the two remaining slurry tanks (slurry tank #2 and slurry tank #3), the vapor space between the tanks is not connected and will not allow a path for vinyl fluoride to be concentrated in the off-line tank.
EPA CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Vinyl fluoride is a flammable gas. It is an extremely hazardous substance and a regulated substance pursuant to Section 112(r)(2) and (3) of the CAA. Respondent was in charge of the Facility at the time of the November 2010 Incident. At its Facility, Respondent stores, processes, handles, and/or produces extremely hazardous substances, including substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, including vinyl fluoride.
Respondent has a general duty, in the same manner and to the same extent as 29 U.S.C. § 654, to (a) identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of a regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance, using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, (b) design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and (c) minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur.
COUNT 1
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, Respondent failed to identify that a flammable concentration of vinyl fluoride could accumulate in the slurry tanks.
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, the existence and purpose of the U-leg loop seal pipe in slurry tank #2, which is designed to prevent steam and vinyl fluoride vapors from entering the slurry tank, was not properly identified on Facility documentation, including drawings, piping and instrumentation diagrams (“P&lDs”), and the Facility’s Process Technology package.
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, Facility staff incorrectly assumed that vinyl fluoride could not reach flammable levels in the slurry tanks.
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, Facility staff restarted the process without properly evaluating the effect of the change regarding the malfunction of the liquid ring compressor, which more than doubled the amount of vinyl fluoride going to the flash tank.
As described above, Respondent failed to identify hazards, and failed to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases regarding the Facility. Respondent’s failure to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases regarding the Facility constitute violations of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1). Respondent is therefore subject to the assessment of penalties under Section 113(d) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d).
COUNT 2
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, Facility staff was aware of the crack in the U-leg loop seal pipe and the “fishmouth” split in the U-leg loop seal pipe in slurry tank #2, and returned the slurry tank to service without repairing the split.
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, Facility staff restarted the process without properly evaluating the effect of the change regarding the malfunction of the liquid ring compressor.
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, Facility staff did not properly isolate and lockout slurry tank #1 from slurry tanks #2 and #3 prior to authorizing the hot work repairs on slurry tank #1 . Flammable vinyl fluoride passed directly from slurry tank #2 to slurry tank #1 through the overflow line, and accumulated in slurry tank #1.
Prior to the November 2010 Incident, Facility staff failed to assure the absence of any flammable vapor in areas where hot work was to take place, including the atmosphere inside the tank, even though the repair work involved significant grinding and welding directly on the top of the tank.
As described above, Respondent failed to identify hazards, and failed to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases regarding the Facility. Respondent’s failure to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases regarding the Facility constitute violations of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).
COUNT3
The Facility staff who signed off on the hot work permit for the work performed at the time of the November 2010 Incident were not knowledgeable in the operations and hazards of the process connected to the slurry tanks. They were not aware of the crack in the U-leg loop seal pipe or the split in the U-leg loop seal pipe, and what effect this would have inside the atmosphere of the slurry tanks. They were also not aware of the malfunction of the liquid ring compressor, which increased the amount of vinyl fluoride going into the slurry flash tank, which, with the crack in the U-leg loop seal pipe, would increase the amount of flammable vapor inside the slurry tanks.
The Facility’s hot work permit, for the work performed at the time of the November 2010 Incident, was not fully completed, including the section which asked if flammable material would be within 35 feet of the hot work. This section was not completed even though the hot work was carried out within 35 feet of the slurry flash tank that was designed to vent vinyl fluoride to the atmosphere.
The contractors for the work performed at the time of the November 2010 Incident were unfamiliar with the process, the process equipment and connected equipment, and the chemical hazards.
As described above, Respondent failed to identify hazards, and failed to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases regarding the Facility. Respondent’s failure to design and maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases regarding the Facility constitute violations of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S .C. § 7412(r)(1).
CONSENT AGREEMENT
Respondent agrees to pay a civil penalty in the total amount of $723,438.00. S
Supplemental Environmental Project
Respondent agrees to, and shall in accordance with the terms and conditions of this CA/FO, implement and perform a Supplemental Environmental Project (“SEP”) that consists of the purchase of the equipment described below and payment for training for first responder staff on the equipment that it will provide to the Brighton Fire Department. To implement this SEP, Respondent shall spend a net expenditure of $111,953.00.
Respondent shall purchase the following equipment within sixty (60) days of the effective date of this CA/FO:
- a RadSeeker® Handheld Radioisotope Identifier; and
- a GasID® Portable Gas and Vapor Identifier, and ensure they are delivered to and received by the Brighton Fire Department within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the effective date of this CA/FO.
Such purchase shall be inclusive of Manufacturer-supplied training sessions for first responder staff on the new equipment referenced above.
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