Respondent owns and operates a controlled temperature storage warehouse. The Facility is located within a mixed business-residential area within half a mile of many businesses and residences. At the time of the EPA inspection, approximately 14,600 pounds in total ammonia was present at the Facility; however, the facility had two (2) separate refrigeration systems, each of which contained approximately 7,300 pounds of anhydrous ammonia through various physical states to cool the products in Respondent’s Facility.
Pursuant to Section 112(r)(l) of the CAA, owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling, or storing substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, or any other extremely hazardous substance, have a general duty, in the same manner and to the same extent as 29 U.S.C. § 654, to
(a) identify hazards which may result from accidental releases of such substances using appropriate hazard assessment techniques;
(b) design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases; and
(c) minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur.
This section of the CAA is referred to as the “General Duty Clause.” The extremely hazardous substances listed pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA, include, among others, anhydrous ammonia.
Due to the dangers associated with anhydrous ammonia, the ammonia refrigeration industry has developed industry standards to control the risks associated with the use of ammonia. In collaboration with the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (“IIAR”) has issued (and
updates) the following standard:
Standard 2: Equipment, Design, and Installation of Closed-Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems, along with other applicable standards and guidance.
Relevant IIAR bulletins and guidance documents include without limitation:
IIAR Bulletin No. 109, Guidelines for ]JAR Minimum Safety Criteria/or a Safe Ammonia Refrigeration System;
IIAR Bulletin No. 110, Guidelines for Start-Up, Inspection, and Maintenance of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigerating Systems; IIAR
Bulletin No. 114, Guidelines for Identification of Ammonia Refrigeration Piping and System Components; and IIAR Bulletin 116, Guidelines for Avoiding Component Failure in Industrial Refrigeration Systems Caused by Abnormal Pressure or Shock.
The IIAR has also issued the 2005 Ammonia Refrigeration Management Program (“IIAR ARM Program”), recently revised as the Ammonia Refrigeration Management Guidelines (“IIAR ARM Guidelines”), which is intended for systems containing less than 10,000 pounds of ammonia.
Also, in collaboration with ANSI, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (“ASHRAE”) has issued (and updates) the following standard:
Standard 15: Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems.
These standards, bulletins, and guidelines are consistently relied upon by refrigeration experts and are sometimes incorporated by reference into state building, mechanical, and fire codes.
On February 15, 2018, EPA inspectors visited the Facility to inspect and assess Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA. The EPA inspectors toured the following areas of the Facility:
- building perimeter and loading dock,
- refrigeration systems in the two ammonia machinery rooms,
- rooftop, and
- the “#2 Room
At the time of the violations alleged herein, Respondent operated two separate ammonia refrigeration systems (“Systems”) with equipment in two machinery rooms: the ammonia machinery room north (“AMRN”) and ammonia machinery room south (“AMRS”). Each System had several components typically found in such systems, some of which are described below:
a. Receivers: Receivers are tanks that have the function of (i) collecting ammonia after the condensing stage; (ii) storing most of the ammonia in a typical refrigeration system; and (iii) sending the ammonia to the evaporators.
b. Compressors: After being allowed to evaporate, ammonia gas flows at low pressure to a compressor where it is compressed to a higher pressure. This compression process also raises the temperature of the gas. The hot, compressed vapor is then in a thermodynamic state known as a superheated vapor and is at a temperature and pressure at which it next will be condensed with either cooling water or cooling air. Oil is used in the compressors to help seal them and lubricate the compressor’s parts. Used oil must be regularly removed from the compressors.
c. Automatic purgers (“Auto-Purger “): A mechanical device integrated into a system that gathers, separates, and expels non-condensable gases (that is, gases, commonly including air, nitrogen, hydrogen, and hydrocarbons, that will not liquefy at the temperatures and pressures present in condensers consistent with industrial refrigeration system) from multiple points in the refrigeration system without operator assistance.
d. Pumps and valves: Like most ammonia refrigeration systems, each System had multiple pumps and valves to move and control the flow of ammonia through the System. Ammonia receivers have “king valves” that can be used to stop the flow of ammonia from the receivers to the rest of the System during an emergency. Closing the king valve can shorten the duration of any continuing ammonia releases. Often solenoid valves near these king valves can be activated by emergency switches outside the building so that emergency responders do not have to enter a building filled with ammonia vapors to turn off a system.
e. Piping: Pipes throughout the Facility and on the roof carried ammonia in all its various physical states.
f. Ammonia detectors: These devices, typically placed in ammonia machinery rooms, detect ammonia vapors that have been released at certain concentrations. They activate alarms to warn of a release, and they activate ventilation systems to prevent vapors from building up to dangerous levels. It is essential for detectors to be properly placed, maintained, calibrated, and connected to alarms and ventilation systems so that they can fulfill their function.
g. Emergency controls: An emergency control box, typically placed outside the designated machinery room door, allows emergency responders to control releases by activating or deactivating key refrigeration system equipment, such as compressors, ventilation, and king valves.
h. Evaporators: These are the units in which the ammonia is allowed to evaporate (at a low -28° F boiling point), drawing and absorbing the heat from a room as the ammonia evaporates, thereby cooling a room.
EPA’s inspection of the Facility and review of submitted information revealed some potentially dangerous or deficient conditions relating to the Facility at the time of the inspection in 2018, including the following:
a. The AMRN only had audio/visual (“AV”) alarms inside (but not outside) the engine room to warn people of an ammonia release, and the AMRS did not have adequate AV alarms inside the room. Primary access doors into both the AMRN and AMRS were not equipped with adequate AV alarms. Some doors had visual alarms, but no audio alarms. None of the alarms were marked to identify the purpose of the alarm.
b. Doors into the AMRS and AMRN did not contain adequate warning signs.
c. The AMRS and AMRN contained emergency showers and eyewash stations inside each engine room, but not immediately outside the primary entrances to these rooms.
d. A significant amount of piping and equipment in both the AMRS and AMRN, on the roof, and at other ammonia-containing areas was inadequately labeled or missing labeling indicating contents, physical state, direction of flow, and specific identification tags.
e. The walls of the AMRS and AMRN did not have tight seals around several pipes and electrical conduits where such pipes and conduits penetrated the AMRS and AMRN.
f. In the AMRS, the inspectors could not read some of the “U” or “UM” stamps signifying compliance with the rules of Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC) on some of the compressor oil separator pots that were greater than six inches in diameter.
g. There was missing, damaged, and stained insulation in multiple areas on ammonia piping and vessels along the roof servicing both the AMRS and AMRN.
h. The isolation valves (e.g., king valves) for the ammonia in the AMRS high pressure receiver (“HPR”) were not clearly labeled and identified. In addition, the isolation valve for the AMRN HPR was located approximately eight to ten feet above ground level with no permanent platform, ladder, or chain for operation to access the valve in the case of an emergency.
i. On the rooftop condenser for the AMRS, there were several instances of rusted valves and piping around uninsulated valve manifolds.
j. The AMRS and AMRN were not adequately vented and, in particular, the pressure relief valve (“PRV”) vent lines for the AMRS and AMRN were misdirected. Each of these vents were below the level of the maintenance access platforms for each condenser.
k. Pallet racks were installed near the ceiling and directly underneath ammonia piping and evaporator units in the “#2 Room.” The inspectors explained that a forklift or other equipment could run into the ceiling evaporators, as they were not equipped with any means to adequately protect the ammonia system from damage.
l. The support legs on the AMRS roof-top condenser showed significant signs of rust and degradation.
m. The Facility contained only one windsock. Lack of adequate wind direction devices presents a hazard to employees, truck drivers, and emergency personnel in the event of a chemical release at the Facility.
n. The HPRs in the AMRS and AMRN were not placarded with NFP A hazard diamonds indicating the presence of ammonia in the vessel.
o. A clearly marked emergency ventilation switch with on/override capability and a tamper-resistant cover was not available immediately outside each primary access door to either the AMRS or AMRN. During the inspection, emergency controls at the ground levels for the ARMS and AMRN were both locked, and or maintained in conditions that, in the event of an emergency, were not immediately accessible to any of Respondent’s employees.
p. In the AMRS there were cardboard boxes, miscellaneous pieces of wood, florescent bulbs, metal oil drums, and other combustible materials. The oil drums were not stored in secondary containment.
q. There were no emergency shut-down instructions posted outside either the AMRS or AMRN.
r. Respondent operated the Facility without adequate personnel training.
By a letter dated August 9, 2018, EPA provided Respondent with notice of potential Clean Air Act Section 112(r) violations. Respondent was responsive to that letter and has taken steps to address deficiencies at the Facility.
VIOLATIONS
COUNT 1 – FAILURE TO DESIGN AND MAINTAIN A SAFE FACILITY IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
Pursuant to the General Duty Clause, Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, owners and operators of stationary sources producing, processing, handling, or storing extremely hazardous substances have a general duty to, in the same manner and to the same extent as Section 654 of Title 29, design and maintain a safe facility, taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases.
The recommended industry practice and standard of care for designing and maintaining a safe facility with ammonia refrigeration systems of the same size and type as Respondent’s Systems is to base design considerations upon applicable design codes, federal and state regulations, and industry guidelines to prevent releases or minimize their impacts as well as to develop and implement standard operating procedures, maintenance programs, personnel training programs, management of change practices, incident investigation procedures, self-audits, and preventative maintenance programs. IIAR, ASHRAE and others have developed standards and guidelines for this purpose, such as the IIAR Bulletins, ANSI/IIAR Standard 2, the IIAR ARM Program, and ANSI/ ASHRAE Standard 15. See also EPA’s GDC Guidance, Section 2.3.2 and National Fire Protection Association 1, Fire Code, Section 53.
At all times relevant to the allegations in this CAFO, Respondent failed in its general duty to design and maintain the Facility as a safe facility, taking such steps as were necessary to prevent a release of an extremely hazardous substance, in at least the respects listed in the subparagraphs below. Attachment A provides more information about
each listed hazard, including examples of industry standards of care that address each type of hazard, and an explanation of how each hazard could result in a harmful release or exacerbate the consequences of a release. The industry standards of care illustrate how the ammonia refrigeration industry has recognized hazards associated with designing and maintaining an ammonia refrigeration system and developed measures to reduce such hazards. The following hazards existing at the Facility at the time of the inspection resulted in violations of the General Duty Clause’s second duty:
a. Inadequate alarms and the absence of markings to identify the purpose of alarms that did exist;
b. Inadequate warning signs on doors into rooms containing ammonia equipment;
c. Ammonia piping and equipment that was inadequately labeled or missing labeling indicating contents, physical state, and direction of flow and specific identification tags.
d. Illegible “U” or “UM” stamps signifying compliance with the rules of Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC) on some of the compressor oil separator pots;
e. Ammonia piping with damaged and stained insulation;
f. Ammonia piping and vessels missing insulation;
Some of these violations also resulted in violations of the General Duty Clause’s third duty, as further discussed in Count II.
g. Valves (e.g., king valves) for isolating the ammonia without clear labels;
h. Lack of permanent structures or chains for operation of king valves;
i. Rusted valves and piping around uninsulated valve manifolds.
j. The AMRS and the AMRN were inadequately vented;
k. Ammonia equipment without protection from physical damage;
l. Inadequate maintenance of structural supports for roof-top condensers;
m. A clearly marked emergency ventilation switch with on/override capability and a tamper-resistant cover was not available immediately outside each primary access door to either ammonia machinery room;
n. Inadequate access to ammonia equipment emergency controls;
o. Presence of combustible materials in proximity to ammonia equipment;
p. Absence of emergency shut-down instructions at the ammonia machinery rooms;
and
q. Operation of the Facility without adequate personnel training.
Accordingly, Respondent violated the General Duty Clause’s requirement to design and maintain a safe facility, in violation of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
COUNT 2 – FAILURE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES THAT DO OCCUR IN VIOLATION OF THE CAA’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
Industry standards and guidelines for minimizing the consequence of an accidental release from ammonia refrigeration systems are found, among other things, in the IIAR ARM Program, ANSI/IIAR Standard 2, ANSI/ ASHRAE Standard 15, IIAR bulletins, and other materials (including updates and revisions) consistently relied upon by
refrigeration experts. They include design and maintenance measures to minimize the severity and duration of releases that do occur, such as, among other things, standards for vapor detection, alarms, equipment and door labeling, emergency shut-off switches, ventilation, keeping combustible materials and electrical hazards away from ammonia, safe oil drain systems, tight construction of machinery rooms, designing safe pressure relief valves and associated piping, reducing obstructions for responders, and having emergency eye wash stations and showers.
In addition, EPA’s General Duty Clause Guidance discusses the standard of care for emergency response planning at facilities that have extremely hazardous substances, such as anhydrous ammonia. The recommended industry practice and standard of care for emergency planning at ammonia refrigeration systems of the same size and type as Respondent’s Systems is to, among other things, design and implement an emergency response plan that specifically addresses release scenarios developed from hazard analyses and facility-based knowledge; identifies emergency response equipment and its whereabouts; includes communication with and involvement of emergency planning and response officials; incorporates accident training for employees; and involves conducting periodic exercises to ensure that the plan is adequate to address emergency scenarios.
IIAR, ANSI, ASHRAE, and other organizations have developed standards and guidelines for this purpose, including, among other things, ANSI/IIAR Standard 2, the IIAR ARM Program, and ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15. For example, the version of the IIAR ARM Program that was in effect as of the time of the Inspection provided that refrigeration facilities should develop an up-to-date, facility specific emergency response plan that accurately describes the facility and the potentially affected population. Such a plan should include, among other items, types of evacuation; evacuation procedures and routes; procedures for employees who remain to maintain critical operations; procedures for accounting for evacuated employees; employee rescue and medical duties; and means for reporting emergencies. An adequate emergency response program should also identify procedures for responding to an ammonia release, including shutting the system down; starting emergency ventilation; and coordinating with relevant off-site emergency responders. IIAR’s ARM Program, Section 7. IIAR’s ARM Revised Guidelines, Section 10 (2018), describes varying response levels depending on whether employees will respond to releases and provides model emergency planning documents.
At all times relevant to the allegations in this CAFO, Respondent failed in its general duty to minimize the consequences of an accidental release of an extremely hazardous substance at or from the Facility, in accordance with applicable industry standards (Identified in Attachment A) for ammonia refrigeration systems of the same size
and type as Respondent’s Systems, in at least the following respects.
Inadequate emergency ventilation system in machinery room: As noted in Count I and identified in Attachment A, the emergency ventilation systems for the ammonia machinery rooms had to be manually operated. Without adequate ventilation; vapors are more likely to build up to levels that are hazardous to human health or that risk causing fire or explosion. Moreover, a buildup of vapors makes it difficult to turn off the equipment in the machinery room. Responders and employees cannot enter the machinery room to turn off the equipment until vapors have been ventilated, resulting in a prolonged release.
Inadequate visual/audible alarms: As noted in Count I and identified in Attachment A, the ammonia detection system alarms were inadequate and did not identify the purpose of the alarms that existed. Ammonia detectors and alarms provide early warning that a release is taking place, enabling quick response and protecting workers, emergency responders, and the public from a larger release.
Combustible materials in ammonia machinery rooms: As noted in Count I and identified in Attachment A, there were combustible materials stored in the machinery rooms. These conditions exacerbate the risk of fire or explosion if there is an ammonia release because ammonia is flammable at certain concentrations. A fire or explosion could result in a much bigger release of ammonia than would otherwise occur.
Inadequate signage and labeling on System: As noted in Count I and identified in Attachment A, there was inadequate signage and labeling on various parts of the Systems, including doors, pipes, valves and equipment. The lack of signage and labeling could prevent workers and emergency responders responding to releases from having the information they would need to safely and timely perform their jobs. Signs and posted information provide a level of protection in addition to worker training and operating procedures.
Machinery room door and walls not sealed tight: As noted in Count I and identified in Attachment A, at the time of the EPA inspection, the ammonia machinery rooms were not sealed off from other parts of the Facility with tight-fitting construction. In the event of a release, this risks the spread of ammonia vapors to other parts of the
Facility and outdoors, putting employees and responders at risk.
Lack of safety showers: At the time of the EPA inspection, the AMRS and AMRN contained emergency showers and eyewash stations inside each engine room, but not immediately outside the primary entrances to these rooms. The lack of adequate safety showers and eyewash stations would make it difficult for emergency responders and workers to safely respond to releases and wash off ammonia, a corrosive and toxic chemical, in the event of exposure. Examples of industry standards for the placement of eyewashes and safety showers are found in Attachment A.
Improperly placed discharge relief: At the time of the EPA inspection, PRV piping and vent lines for the AMRS and AMRN were misdirected. Additionally, each of these vents were below the level of the maintenance access platforms for each condenser. Improperly placed discharge reliefs can result in ammonia being sprayed on people during a release, further exacerbating the consequences of a release. Examples of industry standards for the placement of pressure relief device discharge piping are found in Attachment A.
TERMS OF SETTLEMENT
Respondent certifies that it is currently operating the Facility in compliance with Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, Pursuant to Section 113(e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), and considering the relevant statutory penalty criteria (particularly the economic impact of the penalty on the business), the facts alleged in this CAFO, and such other circumstances as justice may require, EPA has determined that it is fair and proper to assess a civil penalty of $78,200 for the violations alleged in this matter.
CLICK HERE for the CAFO and APPENDIX A