The EPA and the DOJ have entered into a Stipulation of Settlement with insecticide manufacturer to address alleged chemical accident prevention violations at its former facility. The company will pay a $3.1 million civil penalty. On November 15, 2014, an incident occurred, and nearly 24,000 pounds of methyl mercaptan (MeSH) were released within the insecticide unit. The release resulted in the deaths of four persons inside the manufacturing building. The four employees died from a combination of asphyxia and acute exposure to MeSH. EPA, OSHA, and the CSB all conducted inspections or investigations after the incident. The insecticide unit was shut down after the incident. The Chemical Safety Board issued Interim Recommendations from its investigation on September 30, 2015. In March of 2016, the business announced that it was closing the facility. The Complaint alleges 22 separate violations of the Clean Air Act’s Risk Management Program. The violations alleged in the Complaint include:
- failure to develop and implement written operating procedure
- failure to adequately implement management of change procedures
- failure to implement safe work practices
- mechanical integrity violations
No injunctive relief was required since the facility is no longer in operation. The Complaint and Stipulation of Settlement were filed on Monday, July 23, 2018, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Here are the details of what happened and the RMP violations:
The Defendant owned and operated the insecticide manufacturing facility. The Incident occurred in the Insecticide Business Unit (“IBU”), which was divided into two primary insecticide product lines. The product lines were manufactured inside a four-story, enclosed manufacturing building at the Facility, with process units located both inside and outside of the building. The building was subdivided into four functional areas: the “wet end,” “MIC” (methyl isocyanate), the “damp end,” and the “dry end.” Each of these four areas served a different function in the processing and manufacture of Lannate.
The Facility’s manufacturing building was separated on each floor by an internal wall. Liquid processing equipment was housed on the east side of the wall and was referred to as the wet end. Liquids were removed via damp and dry processing equipment on the west side of the wall, which was called the dry end. The internal wall was equipped with fire doors allowing workers to access both sides.
The two sides of the manufacturing building were separately ventilated by fans located on the roof-the “wet end fan” and the “dry end fan.” Fresh air was drawn into each floor on each side of the building, entering at floor level through a mechanical louver system. Air then flowed from the new air louvers, across the process equipment, and up into return ducts located at the ceiling along the internal wall.
The manufacturing building was designed so that toxic gases were supposed to be swept into ceiling-mounted return ducts toward the north end of the building on either side, where the gases were collected via a vertical duct header that directs the exhaust air from all of the floors on each side up toward the dilution air exhaust fan on the roof. Exhaust air was discharged directly to the atmosphere and contaminants were not removed via any pollution control system.
Both processes used methyl mercaptan (MeSH) as an intermediate raw material in the production of insecticides, and both processes were located within the IBU. The Incident occurred within the Lannate area of the IBU.
The Facility produced, processed, handled, and stored regulated substances including, but not limited to, MeSH and chlorine. MeSH is a regulated toxic substance pursuant to Section 112(r)(3) of the Act, and listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, Tables 1 and 2. When inhaled, MeSH may reasonably be anticipated to cause death or serious injury.
MeSH is also considered to be an extremely flammable substance and may explode if heated.
Chlorine is a regulated toxic substance pursuant to Section l 12(r)(3) of the Act, and listed in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, Tables 1 and 2. When inhaled, chlorine may reasonably be anticipated to cause death or serious injury.
Chlorine is also considered to be an oxidizer that may cause or intensify fire, may explode if heated, cause severe skin bums and eye damage, and is corrosive to the respiratory tract.
At all times relevant to this Complaint, portions of the Lannate process contained at least 10,000 pounds of MeSH and 2,500 pounds of chlorine, both regulated toxic substances.
At all times relevant to this Complaint, the Lannate process at the Facility had the threshold quantity as set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 68. 130, Tables 1 and 2, for these regulated toxic substances.
At all times relevant to this Complaint, portions of the Lannate process were a Program 3 “covered process” within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. § 68.3. The Facility was a stationary source that had Air Operating permits 1845, 1846, and 1905 issued by the EPA and the Facility’s Lannate process contained more than a threshold quantity of the regulated substances MeSH and chlorine. The Defendant submitted a RMP describing the Lannate process as containing MeSH and chlorine held at more than a threshold quantity . The process is subject to Program 3 requirements because it does not meet the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.12(b), belongs to NAICS code 32532 (Pesticide and Other Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing), and is subject to OSHA’s Process Safety Management Standard (29 C.F.R. § 1910.119).
In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.3, the definition of process states that “any group of vessels that are interconnected … shall be considered a single process.” As such, the following groups of interconnected components that contained MeSH were part of the Lannate covered process including, but not limited to, the following: MeSH railcar; piping, valves, and meters in liquid MeSH service from the railcar to the MeSH storage tank; MeSH storage tank and associated equipment; piping, valves, meters, and pump in liquid MeSH service from the MeSH storage tank to the MeSH cooler; piping, valves, meters, and pump in liquid MeSH service from the MeSH storage tank to the bottom of the 7015 reactor; sodium methyl mercaptide (“MeSNa”) cooler; 7023 reactor; 7023 cooler; waste gas vent header piping; and Lannate building ventilation system, including the wet fan and MeSH detectors.
In addition, the following groups of interconnected components that contained chlorine were part of the Lannate covered process including, but not limited to, the following:
chlorine railcar, piping, valves, and meters in liquid chlorine service from the railcar to the sparger at the 7022 reactor; acetaldehyde oxime (“AAO”) mix tank; 7022 cooler;
7022 reactor; and the sparger to the bottom of the 7013 reactor.
The immediate chain of events leading to the Incident began on Monday, November 10, 2014, when the Defendant’s operator unloaded acetaldehyde oxime (AAO) from a tank truck into the AAO mix tank, which is an interconnected part of the Lannate covered process. AAO is a raw material used in the Lannate process. During this time period, the Defendant had an operating procedure for unloading AAO from railcars, issued June 17, 2014. While this procedure stated that AAO can be received and unloaded from tank trucks, all of the instructions pertained to unloading AAO from railcars, and not tank trucks.
During the unloading process, the operator opened a manual valve that allowed water to flow into the AAO mix tank, but the operator left the valve in the open position after he had completed unloading the AAO from the tank truck. At the same time, the automatic valve on the water supply to the AAO mix tank was in the forced open position, a procedure the Defendant identified as a process interlock bypass. The automatic valve had been previously opened on February 23, 2014, to allow water to flow to the AAO mix tank as part of a decontamination procedure, while the manual valve was closed to isolate the water supply. This was the same manual valve opened by the Defendant’s operator on November 10, 2014.
Pursuant to the Defendant’s own Area Safety Rules, issued March 31, 2013, the Defendant should have placed an informational tag on the process interlock when the automatic valve was opened on February 23, 2014, to notify future operators of the prior bypass. No such informational tag was in place when the Defendant’s operator unloaded the AAO from the tank truck on November 10, 2014.
As a result, water continued to flow into the AAO mix tank even after the truck was unloaded, diluting the AAO, causing the mix tank to overflow, and triggered the AAO mix tank high level alarm at approximately 5:37 p.m. The Defendant’s board operator failed to notice the alarm, contrary to the alarm procedure outlined in the AAO Unloading Operating Procedures, issued June 17, 2014.
At approximately 8:00 p.m., another operator walked by the AAO mix tank, noticed it was overflowing, and contacted his shift leader. The shift leader investigated the overflow, closed the manual valve, and stopped the overflow. The diluted AAO caused operating difficulties that forced a shutdown of the Lannate process, at approximately 8:30 p.m.
By the time of the shutdown, approximately 1,250 gallons of AAO and water had overflowed from the AAO mix tank into the tank’s concrete dike. The Defendant then dispatched a vacuum truck to vacuum the contents of the dike.
After modifying the AAO concentration control system to resolve the dilution problem, on Wednesday, November 12, 2014, the Defendant attempted to restart the Lannate process. The restart failed because piping within the MeSH reactor system was plugged with a slurry material during the shutdown. When water and MeSH were combined at low temperatures (~52°F), a solid ice-like slurry material was formed, commonly referred to as a “hydrate.” As a result of the hydrate plugging, the water level of the MeSH storage tank continued to rise steadily until approximately 11:43 p.m. that day, with a total level increase of approximately 2,400 pounds.
After the Incident, the Defendant determined that insulation had been removed from the MeSH storage tank in late 2005 because it had been improperly installed, such that water underneath the insulation caused corrosion to the exterior of the tank. The Defendant did not follow its written Process Change Procedure prior to implementing its plan to remove the insulation.
The increased water level in the MeSH storage tank triggered a series of alarms from November 12, 2014, through the date of the Incident. These alarms included level, pressure, and MeSH detector alarms associated with the MeSH storage tank. The Defendant’s operators failed to properly respond to these alarms, contrary to the Defendant’s Operating Procedure for MeSH Storage, issued July 17, 2014. As a result, a plant-wide fume alarm was not activated on the date of the Incident.
Prior to November 12, 2014, the Defendant had never experienced a plug in the MeSH feed line between the MeSH storage tank and the MeSNa cooler. However, the Defendant had experienced prior plugs at the sodium methyl mercaptide (MeSNa) cooler system, which were historically resolved by applying heat to the exterior piping at the MeSNa cooler system with a hose or flushing the cooler internally with hot water. Despite this historic practice, the Defendant had never developed an adequate written operating procedure to provide clear instructions for the temporary operation of unplugging the MeSNa cooler system.
On various occasions dating back to at least August 15, 2010, the Defendant also failed to adequately implement its own Process Change Procedure, revised April 12, 2013, prior to taking action to unplug the MeSNa cooler system at the Facility. The Defendant’s actions would have been considered either a change in equipment, a change in procedure, or a change to a stationary source that affected a covered process because the Defendant used a hose to apply hot water to the discharge piping within the MeSNa cooler system.
The Defendant also experienced prior plugs in the 7023 cooler at the Facility, which were historically resolved by flushing the 7023 cooler with hot water by connecting a hose to the 7023 pump and running hot water through the 7023 cooler and into the 7023 reactor. This constituted a change in equipment or, alternatively, a change to a stationary source that affected a covered process.
On various occasions dating back to at least January 4, 2010, the Defendant did not follow its written Process Change Procedure prior to implementing its action plan to unplug the 7023 cooler, nor did the Defendant develop an adequate written operating procedure to provide clear instructions for the temporary operation of unplugging the 7023 cooler.
At approximately 10:00 a.m. on Friday, November 14, 2014, the Defendant’s shift supervisor held a meeting with process engineers to develop an action plan to unplug the MeSH feed line. Similar to the unwritten, historic practices for clearing plugs in the MeSNa and 7023 coolers, the group’s plan included applying heat to the external surface of the pipe and attempting to flow nitrogen through the valves leading to the waste gas vent header from the MeSH feed line at a railcar spot. This plan was verbally communicated to the Defendant’s day shift supervisor.
The Defendant did not follow its written Process Change Procedure prior to implementing its action plan to unplug the MeSH feed line, nor did the Defendant develop an adequate written operating procedure to provide clear instruction for the temporary operation of unplugging the MeSH feed line.
The Defendant knew that when heated, MeSH can potentially expand and required a safe place to vent to avoid over pressurization of the feed line. To address this concern, the Defendant opened valves at interconnections between the MeSH feed line and the waste gas vent header piping.
Because the Lannate process was shut down, an additional valve between the MeSH feed line and the MeSH reactor system was closed, preventing MeSH from entering the reactors while they were not running. This modified configuration created the potential for the liquid MeSH to flow directly into the waste gas vent header piping, where it was not designed to go.
The Defendant’s day shift personnel applied hot water under the insulation and on the outside of the liquid Me SH feed line. The Defendant started this process at the MeSH storage tank and the associated MeSH feed pump piping segments, and then continued down the MeSH feed line toward the reactor system.
There were four interconnections in the process between the MeSH feed line and the waste gas vent header piping. Three of the four- railcar spot 1A4, railcar spot 1A2, and the “burp” line-were located between the MeSH feed line and the waste gas vent header, while the fourth was a MeSH storage tank vent line running between the storage tank and the vent header. The MeSH storage tank vent line did not connect to the MeSH feed line. The Defendant used pressure gauges to determine blockage locations at the three interconnections along the MeSH feed line.
Later in the day on November 14, 2014, the Defendant’s night shift reported to work. The Defendant’s day shift supervisor verbally briefed the night shift supervisor about the plugging issues in the MeSH feed line. At that time, the hydrate plug in the MeSH feed line was between railcar spots 1A4 and 1A2. The Defendant’s post-Incident investigation found it likely that its operators attempted to introduce high pressure nitrogen through the MeSH feed line at the 1A2 railcar spot.
The Defendant’s AAO Master Start Up Procedure, issued June 25, 2013, failed to specifically address interconnections at the 1A2 and 1A4 railcar spots at the Facility. This procedure did not require that interconnections had to be closed to prevent liquid MeSH flowing from the MeSH feed line into the waste gas vent header piping.
At approximately 1:20 a.m. on Saturday, November 15, 2014, the first MeSH alarm was triggered by a detector located at the top of the 7015 reactor. The Defendant’s operators did not comply with the Defendant’s Lannate/ API Emergency Planning and Response Manual, issued September 15, 2014, because they failed to immediately contact the area supervisor and process operator when the alarm activated, which would have initiated emergency response procedures. As a result, a plant-wide fume alarm was not activated during the Incident and the Defendant did not initiate emergency response procedures until approximately 3:40 a.m.
By approximately 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 2014, the Defendant believed it had successfully cleared the MeSH feed line and attempted to start up the Lannate process. With the MeSH pump on, the Defendant opened the valve between the feed line and the reactor system, but found that MeSH was still not flowing to the reactors. The blockage remained and the Defendant closed the valve between the feed line and the reactor system.
At approximately 2:45 a.m. on November 15, 2014, the level in the MeSH storage tank began to drop. The Defendant later determined that the hydrate plug was cleared from the MeSH feed line at this time and liquid MeSH was fed into the system by the pump, flowed through the open second valve at the 1A2 car spot, and into the waste gas vent header piping.
As liquid MeSH flowed into the waste gas vent header piping, pressure began to build within that system. Such high-pressure events within the vent system were not unusual due to flawed equipment design that allowed liquid to accumulate at low points in the system. During this time period, multiple toxic chemical gas detectors were activated, which appeared as an alert on the Defendant’s control room operator’s computer. However, the Defendant did not have any audible or visible alarms to warn personnel. Despite the alarm’ s activation, the Defendant’s emergency response team was not notified and the area was not cleared of personnel.
High-pressure events in the waste gas vent header piping occurred so frequently that the Defendant instructed its operators to open the piping by opening valves to the atmosphere, a process the Defendant described as a site line break, and then drain liquid from the vent system on a daily basis. The Defendant’s operators informed two fellow workers about the high pressure problem and instructed them to execute the response of draining liquid from the vent system by opening two valves on the third floor of the Lannate building.
From at least July 30, 2011, until November 15, 2014, the Defendant did not follow its written Process Change Procedure before draining liquid from the waste gas vent header piping to the floor drain, nor did the Defendant develop a written operating procedure to provide clear instructions for the temporary operation of draining liquid from the waste gas vent header piping. Further, the Defendant failed to implement its own Site Line Break Procedure, revised September 6, 2013, when opening the waste gas vent header piping by opening valves to the atmosphere, the prerequisite to draining liquid from the waste gas vent header piping.
The Defendant recognized the potential hazard of opening valves to the atmosphere and draining the liquid, but anticipated that the line would contain organic compounds from the process, rather than toxic MeSH. Despite the daily nature of this activity, the Defendant failed to conduct any training for employees involved in the removal of accumulated liquid from the waste gas vent header piping at the Facility. From at least July 30, 2011, until November 15, 2014, the Defendant did not train its employees on the process hazards or applicable procedures associated with removing accumulated liquids to enable its operators to perform tasks in a safe manner.
Two of the Defendant’s workers went to the third floor of the Lannate manufacturing building and opened the two valves at approximately 3:13 a.m on November 15, 2014. When the valves were opened, liquid MeSH drained into the building, where it vaporized and filled the room with a highly toxic gas. The two ventilation fans – the wet end fan and the dry end fan – in the Lannate manufacturing building were not in operation at the time of the Incident. The Defendant had classified these fans as critical process safety equipment because the fans’ function was to remove toxic MeSH vapor.
The dry end fan had been inoperable since June 2014, due to an electrical problem. The Defendant had submitted multiple work orders for repair of the dry end fan on June 13, July 23, and August 25, 2014. The Defendant turned off the wet end fan on October 20, 2014, due to excessive noise and vibration and submitted an “urgent” work order for repair. The Defendant also submitted multiple work orders for repair of the wet end fan on September 15, 2013 and May 23, July 24, and November 10-11, 2014.
Despite the ventilation fans not being in service, the Defendant did not restrict worker access to the building between at least January 1, 2012, and November 15, 2014, which was required under its own Operating Procedures for the Building Ventilation System, issued May 3, 2010. The Defendant did not implement any restrictions or safety precautions, such as extra personal protective equipment requirements, worker access restrictions to the manufacturing building, or supplemental operational or emergency response protocols.
In its 2011 S-methyl N-(hydroxyl) thioacetimidate (“MHTA”) Synthesis PHA, the Defendant identified the release of MeSH inside the Lannate building as a potential hazard and mentioned the ventilation fan as a safeguard to a MeSH release. Therefore, the Defendant was required to assess the hazards of a failed ventilation system in the MHT A Synthesis PHA or as part of another PHA.
The Defendant lacked adequate written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of the Facility’s ventilation system, which the Defendant acknowledged as process safety equipment. The Defendant never tested the ventilation system to determine whether it met its design objective standards, nor did it establish any acceptable performance criteria for the ventilation system. Further, the Defendant failed to maintain a list of contaminants, failed to establish acceptable workplace exposure levels, and failed to explain how the system was designed to meet exposure levels. A 2009 PSM audit found that the site level mechanical integrity manual did not include procedures for the ventilation system. The Defendant did not submit a mechanical integrity plan addressing the ventilation system until December 14, 2014, a month after the Incident.
The Incident resulted in the deaths of four of the Defendant’s workers, caused by a combination of asphyxia and acute exposure to the toxic chemicals that were released. The Incident also caused exposure injuries to three workers and exposure symptoms in another three workers.
The Defendant’s emergency response vehicles – a fire truck, “brush truck,” and “utility truck” – all failed to operate when called upon in response to the Incident. The fire truck responded to the scene, but was then rendered inoperable due to a malfunctioning injector pump, while the other two vehicles were unable to respond because their respective engines would not start. All of the vehicle issues stemmed from the Defendant’s failure to provide procedures for compliance with the inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements for its emergency response equipment in its emergency response plan.
The MeSH release continued for another one and one-half hours before emergency responders with proper protective gear were able to enter the Lannate building and close the valves. The Defendant estimated that approximately 24,000 pounds ofMeSH were released during the Incident, which constituted an “accidental release” within the meaning of Section 112(r)(2)(A) of the Act.
On December 15-18, 2014, the EPA conducted a post-Incident inspection at the Facility .
- During the inspection, the Defendant was unable to locate its 2013 annual certification for the Lannate process.
Program 3 Prevention Program-Operating Procedures (40 C.F.R. § 68.69)
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68 .69(a) by failing to develop and/or implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the Lannate covered process.
- The Defendant failed to develop and implement an adequate operating procedure for unloading a tank truck of 50% AAO at the AAO mix tank at the Facility on November 10, 2014. From at least November 10, 2014, to November 15, 2014, the Defendant did not have a specific operating procedure for unloading a tank truck, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(ii) . During this time period, the Defendant had an operating procedure for unloading AAO from a railcar, issued June 17, 2014. While this procedure stated that AAO can be received and unloaded from tank trucks, all of the instructions pertained to railcars, with no instructions for tank trucks.
- The Defendant failed to adequately implement operating procedures to bypass the process interlock at the AAO mix tank at the Facility on November 10, 2014. According to the Defendant’s Area Safety Rules, issued March 31, 2013, an informational tag should have been placed on the process interlock to alert operators that the automatic valve was opened on February 23, 2014, thereby bypassing the process interlock, more than eight months prior to the Incident. However, no such tag was in place, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(ii).
- The Defendant failed to adequately implement AAO unloading operating procedures by not responding to the AAO mix tank high level alarm at the Facility at approximately 5:37 p.m. on November 10, 2014, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(ii). By not responding to the alarm until 8:30 p.m. on November 10, 2014, the operator did not take action in a timely manner to address the excess flow of water into the AAO mix tank, as required by its AAO Unloading Operating Procedures, issued June 17, 2014. This resulted in diluted AAO in the mix tank, an overflow from the mix tank into the concrete dike, and the shutdown of the Lannate process.
- The Defendant failed to develop and implement an adequate operating procedure for startup of the AAO process specifically addressing the interconnections at the 1A2 and 1A4 railcar spots at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(l)(i). The Defendant’s AAO Master Start Up Procedure, issued June 25, 2013, failed to require that the interconnections be closed to prevent liquid MeSH movement from the MeSH feed line into the waste gas vent header piping that feeds into the third floor of the Lannate manufacturing building.
Program 3 Prevention Program – Management of Change and Operating Procedures (40 C.F.R. §§ 68.75 and 68.69(a))
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a) by failing to establish and/or implement written management of change (“MOC”) procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures, and/or changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process.
- The Defendant failed to adequately implement its written MOC procedure prior to implementing an action plan to unplug the MeSH feed line at the Facility beginning on November 14, 2014. The Defendant’s technique of using a hose to apply hot water to the liquid MeSH feed line and injecting nitrogen into the feed line through valves would be considered either a change in equipment or, alternatively, a change to a stationary source that affects a covered process. The Defendant has a written Process Change Procedure, revised April 12, 2013, to manage changes, but failed to follow it, resulting in the valves remaining open during its attempts to unplug the feed line.
- Alternatively, and/or in addition to the allegations stated above, the Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(l)(iii) by failing to develop and implement an adequate written operating procedure that provided clear instructions for temporary operations, beginning on November 14, 2014, to unplug the MeSH feed line at the Facility. The Defendant has a written Process Change Procedure to manage changes, but failed to follow it, resulting in the valves remaining open during its attempts to unplug the feed line.
Program 3 Prevention Program – Management of Change (40 C.F.R. § 68.75)
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a) by failing to establish and/or implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures, and/or changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process.
- On various occasions dating back to at least August 15, 2010, the Defendant failed to adequately implement its MOC procedure prior to taking action to unplug the MeSNa cooler system at the Facility . The Defendant’s use of a hose to apply hot water to the discharge piping within the MeSNa cooler system would be considered either a change in equipment, a change in procedure, or a change to a stationary source that affects a covered process. The Defendant has a written Process Change Procedure to manage changes, but did not follow it.
- The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a) by failing to establish and/or implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures, and/or changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process. The Defendant failed to adequately implement its MOC procedure prior to taking action to use a hose to drain accumulated liquid from the waste gas vent header piping into a floor drain at the Facility on various occasions from at least July 30, 2011, until November 15, 2014. Connecting a hose to the piping could be considered either a change in equipment or a change to a stationary source that affects a covered process. The Defendant has a written Process Change Procedure to manage changes, but did not follow it for over three years.
-
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C .F.R. § 68.75(a) by failing to establish and/or implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures, and/or changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process. The Defendant failed to adequately implement its MOC procedure prior to removing insulation from the MeSH storage tank at the Facility in 2005. The removal of insulation would be considered a change to the equipment and the insulation was never replaced. The Defendant has a written Process Change Procedure to manage changes, but did not follow it.
-
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.75(a) by failing to establish and/or implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures, and/or changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process. The Defedant failed to adequately implement its MOC procedure prior to unplugging the 7023 cooler at the Facility on various occasions dating back to at least January 4, 2010. The Defendant’s technique of connecting a hot water hose to the 7023 pump and running hot water through the cooler and into the 7023 reactor would be considered either a change in equipment or, alternatively, a change to a stationary source that affects a covered process. The Defendant has a written Process Change Procedure to manage changes, but did not follow it.
Program 3 Prevention Program-Operating Procedures) (40 C.F.R. § 68.69)
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R.§ 68.69(a) by failing to develop and/or implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the Lannate covered process.
- The Defendant failed to adequately develop and implement a written operating procedure for unplugging the MeSNa cooler system at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(iii) . Plugging in the MeSNa cooler system had occurred on various prior occasions at the Facility dating back to at least August 15, 2010, but the Defendant had no written procedure for clearing plugs within the system.
- The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) by failing to develop and/or implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the Lannate covered process.
- The Defendant failed to adequately implement written operating procedures instructing personnel on proper alarm activation and response procedures at the MeSH storage tank in the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(ii). Beginning on November 12, 2014, through the date of the Incident, operators failed to properly acknowledge the level, pressure, and MeSH detector alarms associated with the MeSH storage tank and execute corrective measures, in accordance with the Defendant’s Operating Procedure for MeSH Storage, issued July 17, 2014. As a result, a plant-wide fume alarm was not activated onNovember 15, 2014.
- The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) by failing to develop and/or implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the Lannate covered process. The Defendant has violated 40 C.F .R. § 68.69(a)(l)(v) by failing to adequately implement a written operating procedure for emergency operations at the Facility by limiting entry of nonessential personnel when either the wet end fan or the dry end fan were inoperable, pursuant to its Operating Procedures for the Building Ventilation System, issued May 3, 2010. On various occasions between at least January 1, 2012, and November 15, 2014, the Defendant failed to restrict access to the Lannate manufacturing building when either the dry end fan or the wet end fan were inoperable. Both fans were inoperable on the date of the Incident and were cited by the Defendant’s operators for various malfunctions predating the Incident.
- The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d) by failing to develop and/or implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations in the Lannate covered process. The Defendant failed to implement its safe work practice for opening the waste gas vent header piping valves, known as site line breaking, to drain liquid from the waste gas vent header piping at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d). On various occasions from at least July 30, 2011, until November 15, 2014, the Defendant executed site line breaks in the waste gas vent header piping without following its own Site Line Break Procedure, revised September 6, 2013.
- The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) by failing to develop and/or implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the Lannate covered process. The Defendant failed to develop and implement an adequate written operating procedure for draining accumulated liquid from the waste gas vent header piping at the Facility on various occasions from at least July 30, 2011, until November 15, 2014, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(ii) . The Defendant should have documented proper safety precautionsthroughout the procedure, such as use of proper personal protection equipment (“PPE”). The Defendant used this technique for over three years, yet it was never documented as a written operating procedure.
- The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) by failing to develop and/or implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the Lannate covered process. The Defendant failed to adequately implement written operating procedures for safety systems and their functions, instructing personnel on proper alarm activation and response procedures to address MeSH alarms in the Lannate manufacturing building at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(ii). The Defendant did not comply with its Lannate/API Emergency Planning and Response Manual, issued September 15, 2014, when operators failed to immediately contact the area supervisor and process operator upon activation of the first MeSH alarm at approximately 1:20 a.m. on November 15, 2014. As a result, a plant-wide fume alarm was not activated during the Incident.
- The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a) by failing to develop and/or implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in the Lannate covered process. The Defendant failed to develop and implement an adequate operating procedure for unplugging the 7023 cooler at the Facility, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1)(iii). On various occasions dating back to at least January 4, 2010, the Defendant connected a hot water hose to the 7023 pump and ran hot water through the cooler and into the 7023 reactor to address plugs, but the Defendant had no written procedure for clearing plugs within the system.
Program 3 Prevention Program-Process Hazard Analysis (40 C.F.R. § 68.67)
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(a) by failing to perform a PHA appropriate to the complexity of the process.
- The Defendant failed to identify, evaluate, and control hazards via a PHA on the Lannate building ventilation system at the Facility. The Defendant identified the release of MeSH inside the Lannate building as a potential hazard in its 2011 MHT A Synthesis PHA and, therefore, should have assessed the hazards of a failed ventilation system in the MHTA Synthesis PHA or as part of another PHA.
Program 3 Prevention Program – Mechanical Integrity (40 C.F.R. § 68.73)
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b) by failing to establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment.
- The Defendant has violated 40 C.F .R. § 68 .73(b) by failing to establish and implement adequate written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of the Facility’s ventilation system (an acknowledged process safety component), which included the wet end ventilation fan.
- The Defendant never tested the ventilation system to meet its design objective standards, nor did it establish any acceptable performance criteria for the ventilation system.
- The Defendant failed to maintain a list of contaminants, failed to establish acceptable workplace exposure levels, and failed to explain how the system was designed to meet exposure levels. A 2009 PSM audit found that the site level mechanical integrity manual did not include procedures for the ventilation system.
- The Defendant did not submit a mechanical integrity plan addressing the ventilation system until December 15, 2014, a month after the Incident.
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e) by failing to correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits in a safe and timely manner.
- The Defendant has violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e) by failing to correct deficiencies pertaining to the wet end ventilation fan at the Facility. At the time of the Incident, the wet end ventilation fan in the Lannate manufacturing building was not in operation despite an ”urgent” maintenance work order, dated October 20, 2014, nearly a month prior to the Incident.
Program 3 Prevention Program – Mechanical Integrity & Training (40 C.F.R. §§ 68.73 and 68.71)
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. §§ 68 .73(c) and 68.71(a) by failing to train certain employees involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of process equipment in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee’s job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner.
- The Defendant has violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(c) by failing conduct training for certain employees involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of process equipment, specifically the removal of accumulated liquid from the waste gas vent header piping at the Facility. From at least July 30, 2011, until November 15, 2014, the Defendant did not train its employees on the process hazards or applicable procedures associated with removing accumulated liquids in the waste gas vent header piping so that the Defendant’s employees could safely perform the task.
Program 3 Prevention Program – Emergency Response Program (40 C.F .R. § 68.95)
The Defendant, as the owner and operator of the Facility, violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a) by failing to develop and implement an emergency response program to protect public health and the environment.
- The Defendant has violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(2) by failing to develop and implement procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and its inspection, testing, and maintenance. On November 15, 2014, the Defendant had one fire truck at the Facility, which responded to the Lannate building, but then was rendered inoperable during the Incident because the fire truck’s injector pump was not functioning properly. The Defendant’s other emergency response vehicles – a “brush truck” and “utility truck” – failed to operate in response to the Incident because their respective engines would not start. The Defendant’s failure to provide procedures for compliance with the inspection, testing and maintenance requirements for its emergency response equipment in its emergency response plan resulted in these vehicle malfunctions.
Program 3 Prevention Program – Operating Procedures and Recordkeeping (40 C.F.R. §§ 68.69 and 68.200)
The Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(c) by failing to review the operating procedures for the Lannate process at the Facility as often as necessary to ensure that they reflect current operating practice.
The Defendant violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.200 because it failed to maintain records supporting the implementation of 40 C.F .R. Part 68 for five years.
- During the EPA inspection on December 15-18, 2014, the Defendant was unable to locate its 2013 annual certification for the Lannate process.
The Defendant shall pay a civil penalty of $3,100,000.00