On March 5, 2025, at 10:55 a.m., a welder, 57, with over seven (7) years of mining experience, died when he became entangled in a belt conveyor tail roller. The accident occurred because the mine operator did not de-energize and block the No. 12 belt conveyor against hazardous motion.
GENERAL INFORMATION
The mine is a surface crushed and broken granite quarry located in North Carolina. The mine employs 27 miners and operates one ten-hour production shift, five days per week. The mine drills and blasts granite in the pit. Front-end loaders and excavators load the blasted granite into haul trucks that transport and dump the granite into the hopper. The hopper feeds the material into the crusher, and belt conveyors transfer the crushed granite to other sizing and crushing locations at the mine. The mine sells the final product for use in the construction industry.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) completed the last regular safety and health inspection at this mine on January 29, 2025.
The 2024 non-fatal days lost incident rate for the mine was 3.02, compared to the national average of 1.22 for mines of this type.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On March 5, 2025, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the worker arrived at the mine to start his shift. Throughout the shift, he and four others workers performed maintenance and repairs on the plant as needed. At 9:20 a.m., the plant shut down because the incoming power to the water pump that supplied water to the plant was interrupted. The deceased decided that while the plant was down, he would repair the belt skirt rubber on the No. 14 belt conveyor. He went to the motor control center (MCC) and placed his lock on the No. 14 belt conveyor circuit breaker. Then, he traveled 575 feet from the control tower to Tower 3, where he adjusted the belt skirt rubber on the No. 14 belt conveyor.
After he repaired the belt skirt rubber on the No. 14 belt conveyor, he attempted to remove a strip of belt material wrapped around the tail roller for the No. 12 belt conveyor. He removed a piece of guarding from the side of the No. 12 belt conveyor to gain access to the self-cleaning tail roller, where the strip of belt material was located. He entered the enclosed belt conveyor structure and made his way to the tail roller. While he was in the belt conveyor structure, the incoming power was restored to the water pumps, and the Control Tower Operator went through the plant start-up procedures. The Control Tower Operator sounded the manual alarm and started the belt conveyors, including the No. 12 belt conveyor. The deceased did not have time to exit the confined space of the belt structure and became entangled between the belt and the self-cleaning tail roller of the No. 12 belt conveyor.
When the plant resumed production after the audible alarm for the belt conveyor start-up sounded, the Control Tower Operator tried to reach the deceased on the radio, but did not receive a response. The Plant Manager drove to Tower 3 and sounded his truck horn to get deceased’s attention, but he did not see him. The Plant Manager exited the truck, walked up to the platform on Tower 3, and found the deceased between the belt and the tail roller. Due to the extent of his injuries, the Plant Manager did not attempt first aid. He immediately called 911 at 10:58 a.m. Charlotte Fire Department and Emergency Medical Services arrived on the scene at 11:00 a.m., and the Charlotte Fire Department Battalion Chief pronounced the worker dead at 11:06 a.m.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
Weather
The weather at the time of the accident was rainy, 63 degrees Fahrenheit, with 16 mile per hour southernly winds. The investigators determined that the weather did not contribute to the accident.
Equipment Involved
The No. 12 belt conveyor had a 24-inch-wide belt and was 254 feet long. A 460-volt Toshiba 25 HP electric motor powered the belt conveyor. The self-cleaning tail roller was 16 inches in diameter, and the area that the deceased accessed had less than 6 inches of clearance from the edges of the belt and the guards he did not remove. While the plant was down, the deceased locked out and tagged out the No. 14 belt conveyor but not the No. 12 belt conveyor. The circuit breakers for both belt conveyors were located in the MCC. The deceased informed the Control Tower Operator that he was going to perform maintenance on the No. 14 belt conveyor but did not inform the Control Tower Operator of his intention to perform work on the No. 12 belt conveyor. The mine operator did not de-energize and block the No. 12 belt conveyor against hazardous motion, which contributed to the accident.
At the time of the accident, the mine operator had a written procedure for de-energizing, locking out, tagging out, and blocking equipment against hazardous motion before performing repairs or maintenance. The procedure did not require visual or audible confirmation that everyone was clear of the area prior to restarting the equipment.
Training and Experience
The deceased had over seven years of mining experience with two years of experience at the mine. He received task training for plant maintenance, including the procedures for de-energizing, locking out and tagging out equipment, on July 26, 2024. Investigators determined he received all training in accordance with MSHA Part 46 training regulations.
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
The accident investigators conducted an analysis to identify the underlying causes of the accident. The investigators identified the following root cause, and the mine operator implemented the corresponding corrective action to prevent a recurrence.
Root Cause: The mine operator did not de-energize and block the No. 12 belt conveyor against hazardous motion.
Corrective Action: The mine operator developed and implemented a revision to the Lock and Tag-out procedure. This revision includes labeling all belt conveyors and tailpieces, and visual confirmation of miners working in the areas prior to starting the equipment. The mine operator trained all miners on the revision, which emphasizes verification prior to starting the equipment.
CONCLUSION
On March 5, 2025, at 10:55 a.m., the deceased, a 57-year-old welder with over seven years of mining experience, died when he became entangled in a belt conveyor tail roller.
The accident occurred because the mine operator did not de-energize and block the No. 12 belt conveyor against hazardous motion.
Source: https://www.msha.gov/data-reports/fatality-reports/2025/march-5-2025-fatality/final-report