During emergency incident operations, team members and responders face the most challenging aspects, both physically and psychologically, of their vocation.
Ensuring safe operations at incidents can reduce team member and responder injuries and fatalities and limit exposure to health hazards. Paragraph (p) of the proposed rule is based on current industry practices, as reflected by NFPA consensus standards and FEMA’s “National Incident Management System” (NIMS), and would not present new requirements for most Emergency Service Organizations (ESOs) and Workplace Emergency Response Employers (WEREs).
Proposed paragraph (p)(1) would establish requirements for incident command and management.
Paragraphs (p)(1)(i) and (p)(1)(ii) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure that the IMS developed in accordance with paragraph (o) of this section is used at every emergency incident and that every incident has an Incident Commander (IC) or a Unified Command (UC).
For an IMS to be effective on large-scale incidents, it must be used on small-scale incidents so that all involved are familiar and experienced with working within its scope. Also, it is important that every incident, no matter how large or small, has a person designated to be in charge. For a simple EMS response for a sick person laying in the yard with two EMS providers on the ambulance, one provider would be designated the leader, or IC, and in charge of response activities for the incident.
Under proposed paragraph (p)(1)(iii), the WERE and ESO would need to ensure that the task of overseeing incident safety is addressed, or an ISO is assigned and designated to monitor and assess the incident scene for safety hazards and unsafe situations and develop measures for ensuring team member and responder safety.
The task of overseeing incident safety is sometimes called the “safety” role. Typically, the IC would oversee the safety role on small(er) incidents. For larger or more complex incidents, where division of labor is appropriate so that the IC is not overwhelmed, a team member or responder (usually with seniority or in a higher tier) can be designated to fill the safety role as the ISO. Whoever fulfills the safety role needs to be mindful of observed and anticipated safety hazards and develop measures to stop or correct them to prevent injuries or fatalities.
Proposed paragraph (p)(1)(iv) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure that if an incident escalates in size and complexity, the IC divides the incident into strategic or tactical level management components.
Dividing complex incidents into manageable components allows for an appropriate span of control for team members and responders managing the components and reduces the likelihood that the IC or component managers will be overwhelmed. For example, a derailed and overturned passenger train is a large-scale incident that involves multiple WERTs or ESOs spread apart by distance due to the length of the train and also by the train itself being a large obstruction physically separating one side of the incident from the other. In this situation, the ESO could divide the incident into geographic areas, separating each side of the tracks (north/south, east/west) into individual divisions (as described in NIMS), with an overall IC and a senior team member or responder designated as the division leader.
Under proposed paragraph (p)(1)(v), the WERE and ESO would need to ensure that a Unified Command (UC) structure is utilized on incidents where the complexity requires a shared responsibility among two or more WEREs, ESOs, or other agencies.
For example, a common situation requiring a UC could be during a large-scale wildfire that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, such as town/city, county, state, and federal lands (such as national parks). The UC would likely comprise individuals who would be the IC in their jurisdiction to coordinate efforts and operate together to achieve a common goal to mitigate the incident and prevent injuries and fatalities.
Proposed paragraph (p)(1)(vi) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure that IC(s), team members, and responders are rotated or replaced during complex or extended operations, as determined by the WERE or ESO.
Emergency response activities can be physically and mentally challenging, resulting in fatigue that can impair the team member or responder’s ability to safely and effectively perform their duties. It is important that team members and responders receive adequate rest breaks and the opportunity to mentally decompress.
Proposed paragraph (p)(2) would establish requirements for the incident commander.
Paragraph (p)(2)(i) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure a team member or responder is assigned as the IC. Each incident needs someone to be in charge, who would serve as the IC.
However, the team member or responder designated to fill the role of IC may change as the incident progresses and more senior tier team members or responders arrive at the scene, or as the incident escalates in size or complexity.
Paragraph (p)(2)(ii) would require each WERE and ESO to ensure that the identity of the IC and the location of the command post are communicated to the team members or responders who are on the incident scene or responding to it.
The IC should announce the specific location of the command post via radio. For communications via radio between the sender and receiver, the command post could be anywhere within range of the radio. However, most often incident scene communication occurs face-to-face. Thus, team members and responders need to know who and where the IC is on the scene. Often, response vehicles are used as the command post, but where multiple vehicles are on the scene, it may be difficult to distinguish which vehicle is being used as the command post. The command post could also be a free-standing table/command board close to incident operations or away from vehicles. A visible object, such as a steady or flashing light of a distinct color or a flag, banner, or other visible marker, could be used to help identify the location of the command post. If the IC is outside of the identified vehicle, a distinguishing garment, such as a reflective vest with “Command,” or other suitable means should be used to identify the IC.
Under proposed paragraphs (p)(2)(iii) and (iv), the WERE and ESO would need to ensure the IC conducts a comprehensive and ongoing size-up of the incident scene that places life safety as the highest priority and performs a risk assessment based on the size up before actively engaging the incident.
Factors involved in a size-up vary depending on the type of incident (e.g., fire, EMS, technical rescue), but all size-ups need to include evaluation of the safety hazards to the person/people involved in the incident, bystanders, and team members and responders. Size-up is an ongoing process that includes a continuing evaluation of information received and assessment of the hazards present. When feasible, the size-up should include a 360-degree walkaround survey of the involved structure or incident scene to evaluate the incident from all angles so that a clear mental picture of the scope of the incident can be developed.
Under proposed paragraph (p)(2)(v), the WERE and ESO would ensure the IC coordinates and directs all activities for the duration of the incident.
This provision would require the IC, or successive ICs, to remain engaged in managing the incident from beginning to end. Similar to the IC role being passed as an incident escalates, the IC role could be passed again as the incident de-escalates. Because all activities must be conducted under the direction of the IC, “freelancing” (operating without direction from the IC and outside the scope of the IMS) on the incident scene would be prohibited.
Proposed paragraph (p)(2)(vi) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure the IC develops an Incident Action Plan (IAP) that prioritizes life safety for each incident, updates it as needed during the incident, and utilizes the information contained in the PIP.
The IAP helps coordinate incident operations and activities and ensures they support the incident mitigation objectives. The IAP provides structure to manage the incident. For the majority of incidents, the IAP is usually not a formal, written plan, although for some large-scale incidents, the IC or UC may develop a written plan. Often, the IAP may only be documented on a fill-in incident management/incident command template, chart, magnetic or wipe-off board, or others means depending on the IC’s preference. If a PIP was developed for the incident scene location, proposed provision (p)(2)(vi) would require that it be used in the development of the IAP. The purpose for requiring the development of PIPs in proposed paragraphs (m) and (n) is to aid the IC’s management of the incident.
Proposed paragraph (p)(3) would establish requirements for control zones.
In paragraph (p)(3)(i), the WERE and ESO would be required to establish control zones at every emergency incident to identify the level of risk to team members and responders and the appropriate protective measures needed, including PPE. Control zones serve to delineate the areas where certain team members and responders are designated to operate. In addition to the protective measures or PPE needed for each zone, the differentiation among control zones may also indicate the required level of training (i.e., team member or responder tier) appropriate to operate in each zone.
Proposed paragraphs (p)(3)(ii) and (iii) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure the perimeters of control zones are designated by the IC, and that any changes to the perimeters during the incident are communicated to all team members and responders on the scene.
For control zones to serve their intended purpose, team members and responders need to be notified of the zone perimeters. As an incident escalates or de-escalates the boundaries of the zones are likely to expand or contract. For example, when a fire extends from one attached dwelling (i.e., townhouse, rowhouse) to another the zones would expand to include the additional dwelling on fire. As the fire is brought under control, the zones would contract. Team members and responders would need to be notified of these changes via radio or visually by the relocation of the marking method required by proposed paragraph (p)(3)(iv)(B).
Under proposed paragraphs (p)(3)(iv)(A)-(C), the WERE and ESO would need to ensure that control zones are established as no-entry, hot, warm, and cold, as defined in proposed paragraph (b); marked in a conspicuous manner, with colored tape, signage, or other appropriate means, unless such marking is not possible; and communicated to all team members and responders attending the incident before the team member or responder is assigned to a control zone.
These proposed provisions elaborate on the general requirements in the preceding provisions. The individual zones are defined in proposed paragraph (b), and further explained in the Summary and Explanation for paragraph (b).
Proposed paragraph (p)(3)(v) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure that only team members and responders with an assigned task are permitted in the hot zone.
The hot zone is the area with the greatest potential for risk of injury or exposure to hazards. Team members or responders entering the hot zone without an assigned task would be considered to be freelancing, thus operating outside the scope of the IMS, and therefore placing themselves at risk, and potentially increasing the risk to those designated to operate within the zone. Freelancing team members and responders are also likely to be difficult to track in the personnel accountability system established in proposed paragraph (p)(2)(vi).
Paragraph (p)(3)(vi) of the proposed rule would require the WERE and ESO ensure that where a no-entry zone is designated, team members and responders are
prohibited from entering the area. A no-entry zone can be established for any number of reasons.
The most important reason is to protect team members and responders from injury or death. For example, during a structure fire, there is the danger of a wall or other
part of a structure collapsing. The area where the collapsing structural components are likely to fall would be designated as a no-entry zone, and team members and responders would be prohibited from entering that area. While not a hazard to team members and responders, a no-entry zone could be established to protect evidence for a potential criminal investigation.
In paragraph (p)(3)(vii) of the proposed rule, the WERE and ESO would be required to ensure that for each zone the appropriate protective measures are designated, including PPE, that are commensurate with the hazards in the zone the team member and responder will be operating in, and that each team member and responder appropriately uses the protective measures for that zone.
The protective levels of PPE needed vary for each zone level, with the highest level needed for the hot zone. A protective measure for a downed electrical wire could be to maintain a certain, safe distance away from the downed wire (a no-entry zone), with no specific PPE needed.
Proposed paragraph (p)(4) would require safety and health measures to be taken on the incident scene.
Under proposed paragraphs (p)(4)(i) and (ii), WEREs and ESOs would be required to identify the minimum staffing needed to ensure that incidents are mitigated safely and effectively and ensure that operations are limited to those that can be safely performed by the team members and responders available on the scene.
OSHA recognizes that many WERTs and ESOs “do more with less.” The proposed provisions would require the WERE and ESO to identify the staffing needed for various types of incidents that they may respond to, potentially prompting a request for mutual aid resources, but also that they limit operations to those that can be safely performed with the team members and responders on the scene. NFPA 1710 and NFPA 1720 provide guidance on staffing levels for various types of firefighting ESOs. To be clear, OSHA is not specifying nor recommending minimum staffing levels for emergency response vehicles or the minimum number of team members or responders needed on an incident scene for safe incident operations, except with respect to the “2-in, 2-out” requirement discussed below. Operations on the incident scene would need to be limited to those that can be safely conducted by the team members or responders on the scene.
This provision includes an exception to the 2-in, 2-out requirement and coincides with proposed provision (f)(2) of this section. OSHA’s intent is that this exception is for the rescue of a person in imminent peril only, where team members or responders observe, or are informed by a witness of the imminent life hazard. The traditional emergency services adage may be relevant when considering whether an exception to the 2-in, 2-out requirement would be appropriate: “Risk a lot to save a lot, risk little to save little; risk nothing to save nothing.” This proposed provision is not intended to be used as a loophole for non-compliance with proposed paragraph (p)(4)(iii). Some organizations have tried to use the existing 2-in, 2-out requirement to justify minimum staffing levels on emergency response vehicles, which is a mischaracterization of the requirement. The four team members or responders need not arrive on the same vehicle and could arrive at the incident scene separately to be in compliance with the proposed provision.
Under proposed paragraph (p)(4)(iv), the WERE and ESO would need to ensure that at least two team members or responders enter the structure or enclosed area with an IDLH atmosphere as a team and remain in visual or voice contact with one another at all times, unless there is insufficient space for two team members or responders, such as for example, in a confined space or collapsed structure.
Two team members or responders are needed to work together as a team in case one has an issue that requires the assistance of the other one. Often visible contact is not possible in dark or smoke-filled locations. Voice contact is person-to-person, without the use of radios, so that they can hear one another in case one needs help.
Proposed paragraph (p)(4)(v) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure that outside the structure or enclosed area with the IDLH atmosphere, a minimum of two team members or responders are present to provide assistance to, or rescue of the team operating in the IDLH atmosphere. One of the two team members or responders located outside the IDLH atmosphere may be assigned to an additional role, such as IC, so long as this team member or responder is able to perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of other team members or responders operating at the incident.
Paragraph (p)(4)(vi) of the proposed rule would require WEREs and ESOs to ensure each team member and responder in the IDLH atmosphere uses positive-pressure SCBA or a supplied air respirator in accordance with the respiratory protection program specified in the proposed paragraph (f) of this section.
The air pressure inside the facepiece of a positive-pressure SCBA and supplied air respirators is constantly higher than the air pressure outside the facepiece. Therefore, if a break in the seal of the facepiece to the face should occur, the high internal air pressure will push air out thus preventing contaminated
air from entering.
Proposed paragraph (p)(4)(vii) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure that each supplied-air respirator used in an IDLH atmosphere is equipped with a NIOSH-certified emergency escape air cylinder and pressure-demand facepiece.
An escape cylinder is needed in case something happens that stops the air flow from the air hose, or an event occurs that requires the team member or responder to rapidly escape, thus disconnecting from the air hose to avoid being hindered by a potentially entangled air hose. Under proposed paragraph (p)(4)(viii), the WERE and ESO would ensure that team members and responders use NIOSH-certified respiratory protection during post-fire extinguishment activities, such as overhaul and fire investigation. Once the fire has been substantially extinguished, team members and responders typically begin overhaul activities to find and expose any smoldering or hidden pockets of fire in the area that has burned. Usually, SCBA is no longer needed to protect team members’ and responders’ respiratory systems from the heated gases. However, other combustion products are still present. Thus, NIOSH-certified respiratory protection suitable for carcinogenic combustion products would be needed. Fire investigator team members and responders are also exposed to combustion products while performing their duties on a fire scene, even after an emergency incident is contained. Therefore, these team members and responders would also need to use respiratory protection.
Proposed paragraph (p)(5) would establish requirements for communication between the emergency communications and dispatch center, and team members and responders and the IC; and for on-scene communication.
Paragraph (p)(5)(i) of the proposed rule would require the WERE and ESO ensure, to the extent feasible, that there is adequate dispatch and monitoring of on-scene radio transmissions by an emergency communications and dispatch center. Emergency communications and dispatch centers are known by many different terms, such as emergency communications center, public safety communications center, and 911 center. OSHA recognizes that WEREs and ESOs may not have direct supervision or authority over the emergency communications and dispatch. However, OSHA expects that emergency communications and dispatch centers would do what they can to ensure adequate monitoring of on-scene radio transmissions. Even where the WERE or ESO does not have direct supervision or authority over the communications and dispatch center, the WERE or ESO must still take all feasible steps to ensure adequate monitoring of on-scene radio, such as by notifying the communications and dispatch center of the need for monitoring and cooperating with them to facilitate such monitoring. Where a WERE or private ESO does not utilize the public emergency communications and dispatch center or knows that the center will not be monitoring on-scene radio transmissions, the WERE or ESO must ensure that their own means of communication with team members and responders are monitored in accordance with proposed paragraph (p)(5)(i). Monitoring of incident scene radio transmissions is important for relaying information, ensuring requests for additional resources are acknowledged and processed, and most importantly, ensuring Mayday calls are not missed.
Proposed paragraph (p)(5)(ii) would require the WERE and ESO ensure there is effective communication capability between team members or responders and the IC.
This may involve providing each team member and responder with their own portable, two-way radio. However, in many cases, effective communication may be achieved by ensuring all team members and responders work with someone who has a radio.
Proposed paragraph (p)(5)(iii) would require the WERE and ESO ensure that communications equipment allows mutual aid team members and responders to
communicate with the IC and other team members and responders.
For mutual aid to be effective, WEREs and ESOs need to be able to communicate with each other on the incident scene. Radio technology has evolved through the years and continues to evolve such that some two-way radios used by team members and responders have communication capabilities across many radio channels and frequencies. OSHA is not proposing to require that WEREs and ESOs replace existing radio equipment with the latest equipment. Instead, the proposed provision would require the WERE or ESO to ensure communication capability, which could be that those WEREs or ESOs with mutual aid agreements be equipped with two-way radios that match or work with each other’s frequency(ies) or that separate mutual aid frequency be established and provided on their existing radios.
Under proposed paragraph (p)(6), OSHA would require the WERE and ESO to ensure that the personnel accountability system established in proposed paragraph (q)(2)(vii) is IMPLEMENTED AT ALL INCIDENTS. As the name implies, the personnel accountability system is intended to keep track of team members and responders operating on the incident scene. Its primary purpose is to identify any missing team member or responder.
For instance, if a WERE or ESO establishes that a personnel accountability check be conducted at a certain time interval and at that time interval it is determined that someone is missing, the personnel accountability system should be able to identify the individual and where they were expected to be operating on the incident scene. Many WEREs and ESOs are accustomed to using some form of personnel accountability system. The proposed provision would require that a personnel accountability system be used at every incident.
Paragraph (p)(7) of the proposed rule would require the WERE and ESO to implement a Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) at each structure fire incident where team
members or responders are operating in an IDLH atmosphere, in accordance with the SOP established in paragraph (q)(2)(viii) of this section.
Rescuing a team member or responder who is in trouble and in need of rescue is a difficult process. It is important that a properly staffed and equipped RIC be established at incidents where team members and responders are operating in IDLH atmospheres so that they can be deployed quickly when needed as team members and responders operating in an IDLH have a limited supply of air available in their SCBA.
Proposed paragraph (p)(8) would require the WERE and ESO ensure that medical monitoring and rehabilitation procedures are implemented, as needed, in accordance with the SOP established in paragraph (q)(2)(ix) of this section.
The IC would need to consider the circumstances of each incident and make provisions for rest, medical monitoring, and rehabilitation of team members or responders operating at the scene. Requirements for on-scene rehabilitation were considered appropriate by several commenters to the 2007 RFI (Document ID 0022; 0032; 0037; 0041; 0044; 0046; 0047; 0049; 0051; 0052; 0060; 0063; 0071; 0072; 0083). Having preplanned medical monitoring and rehabilitation procedures that can be applied to a variety of incident types is essential for the health and safety of team members and responders.
Paragraph (p)(9) of the proposed rule would require that the WERE and ESO implement the traffic safety procedures, as needed, in accordance with the SOP
established in paragraph (q)(2)(x) of this section.
As noted in Section II.A., Need for the Standard, many responders are injured and killed while operating at incidents on roadways and highways. To reduce the likelihood of injuries and fatalities, WEREs and ESOs would need to establish traffic safety procedures that could include using a large vehicle to block traffic lanes and the wearing of reflective PPE. Also, WEREs and ESO should consult with the appropriate authorities regarding procedures for the complete shutdown of traffic movement on the roadway or highway to protect team members and responders from moving vehicles on the scene of an emergency incident. Some emergency incidents may necessitate the WERE and ESO to call upon the services of employers who do not typically provide emergency services. One example would be to call upon the services of a heavy-duty wrecker-rotator and operator to lift a tractor-trailer truck that has overturned unto a car with people trapped inside or calling a construction company to provide a bulldozer and operator to cut a fire line or access road for a wildland fire. Another example is calling a plumber with a sewer camera to search for trapped victims in a collapsed structure. These workers would provide their skills and equipment, when needed, to support team members and responders operating at an emergency incident. Known in the proposed rule as skilled support workers (SSW), they would potentially be exposed to some of the same hazards as team workers and responders.
Proposed paragraphs (p)(10)(i)-(v) would require the WERE and ESO to ensure that prior to participation at an incident scene, each SSW has and utilizes PPE appropriate to the task(s) to be performed; an initial briefing is provided to each skilled support workers (SSW) that include, at a minimum, what hazards are involved, what safety precautions are to be taken, and what duties are to be performed by the SSW; an effective means of communication between the IC and each SSW is provided; where appropriate, a team member or responder is designated and escorts the SSW at the emergency incident scene; and all other appropriate on-scene safety and health precautions provided to team members and responders are used to ensure the safety and health of each SSW.
The SERs participating in the 2021 SBREFA panel generally agreed that SSWs did not need additional emergency response-specific PPE when responding to emergency incidents (Document ID 0115, p. 10). The SERs indicated that, even at emergency incidents, SSWs generally would need only the PPE they normally would use on any job. Any additional PPE that the SSW would need to be protected at the incident scene would need to be provided by the WERE or ESO.