It is important to note that preventive actions are not entirely the same for the different risk categories (minor, serious, or major): organizational failures generally play a much greater role in serious accidents than minor accidents. Indeed, a serious event usually implies the systemic failure of many barriers. The prevention of major accident hazards should, therefore, never be based on actions...

It is important to note that preventive actions are not entirely the same for the different risk categories (minor, serious, or major): organizational failures generally play a much greater role in serious accidents than minor accidents. Indeed, a serious event usually implies the systemic failure of many barriers. The prevention of major accident hazards should, therefore, never be based on actions...

In recent months we have seen some reductions in workforce across several clients.  Some of these clients are very mature in their approach to safety management, and others are not quite there yet.  In those businesses with a mature Safety Management System (SMS), one of these facilities is NOT a PSM/RMP facility – but they have a MOC process that they utilize effectively. The others...

Last week, I had an interesting discussion with a long-time client about the next steps in their safety evolution.  While working with their safety team members out and about in the plant, we hardly see any violations, errors, or mistakes when auditing work permits and the like.  But we are dressed like Christmas trees during these walk-throughs; thus, everyone knows who we are and can see...

Q3. You ask whether the recertification (i.e., the requalification) requirements in 49 CFR Part 180 are applicable to stationary cylinder systems installed in a building and refilled by a third party. A3. The answer is yes if the cylinders are represented as meeting the requirements of the HMR. Section 180.3(a) states no person may represent a packaging, such as a cylinder, as meeting the requirements...

Are you looking to improve safety performance and, more specifically, understand why workers are doing what they are doing? Human Factors may be a better tool than Behavior-Based Safety Observation Process, and there is a FREE tool we can use to perform our Initial HF assessment.   As most of you know, I am a big James Reason fan and have been using his Mistakes/Errors/Violations model since the...

If you want to broaden your understanding of Human Factors and workers’ decision-making process, here is a FREE chance to learn more about this aspect of OSH and PS.  PLEASE NOTE: This is a course from the UK’s HSE, so the times are UK times. But I have used the UK’s HSE materials for decades in my writings @ SAFTENG and actual work (HF analysis as part of PHAs and the likes)...

At 5:15 p.m. on October 27, 2013, three (3) employees and a supervisor were working on the deck of three (3) barges to ready them for delivery. The supervisor and one of the employees entered the #1 cargo tank of barges #1 and #2 to check the deep well blind on the deep well inspection flange. Another coworker, assisted by Employee #1, also entered the #1 cargo tank. Employee #1, 59, became dizzy and...

On January 20, 2017, Employee #1, 45, was tasked with removing a “Victaulic Blind Flange” on the inlet section of a 400-ton chiller held in place with a split collar. The machine had been idle for over four (4) months as it was winterized, with all electrical connections removed and locked out. The employee began loosening the bolts on the collar… … HomeRead More »

At 1:00 a.m. on January 19, 2019, Employee #1, 45 years old, employed by a plumbing company, was working at a refinery. He was removing a blind flange in preparation for installing 2-inch piping to a 2-inch line in the MHF Alkylation unit. When the flange was unbolted… … HomeRead More »

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 29, 2020, an employee, 30, was installing a full face blind on a flange on a reactor. Then, the probe stem fell inside of the reactor, and the employee tried to fish it out. Using a Jacobs ladder, the employee entered the unprepared reactor that was not cleared for entry because the reactor still contained vinyl chlorine. … HomeRead More »

At 1:30 p.m. on July 24, 2020, two employees were reconnecting two (2) 2″ flanged pipes after cleaning the 4″ header. The employees were beginning to unbolt the blind on the last pipe to reconnect it to the header when… … HomeRead More »