It has become fashionable to claim that human error is implicated in 80-90 percent of all major accidents. While probably close to the truth, this statement adds very little to our understanding of how and why organizational accidents happen.
In the first place, it could hardly be otherwise, given the range of human involvement in hazardous systems.
Second, the term ‘human error’ conveys the impression that all unsafe acts can be lumped into a single category.
But errors take different forms, have different psychological origins, occur in different parts of the system, and require different management methods. In addition, this assertion fails to acknowledge that people’s behavior within hazardous systems is far more constrained than it is in everyday life. The actions of pilots, ships’ crews, control room operators, and the like are tightly governed by managerial and regulatory controls. These administrative controls form a major part of any hazardous system’s defenses and are of two (2) main kinds:
