Another tragic ending to a “Line Break” gone bad. This one involved opening a flange on a steam line in an attempt to “bleed off” the steam by loosening flange bolts. IT DID NOT GO AS PLANNED, and two workers perished with 70% burns! At 6:52 p.m. on August 10, 2020, two (2) employees (30) […]
We say this for so many of these maintenance tasks… LINE BREAK PERMIT brings so much safety to maintenance work that it should extend well beyond PSM/RMP-covered processes. The Safe Work Permitting process, when developed, implemented, and managed PROPERLY, will go a long way to reduce the chances of this type of accident. At approximately
At 4:15 p.m. on December 6, 2021, a contractor, 26, removed transmitters from tanks to winterize the facilities. As the employee removed the bolts and loosened the transmitter from a tank, the contents (50% concentration of Sodium Hydroxide) sprayed out and onto the employee’s eyes, face, head, and chest (upper torso). The employee attempted to
The question was asked… If the underground piping is protected by a cathodic protection system, does this system need to be turned OFF and Locked Out before workers begin working on the pipe?
Interesting facts about this event: On October 10, 2024, at 4:23 p.m., approximately 27,000 pounds of hydrogen sulfide gas were released during maintenance at the Refinery in Deer Park, Texas. The release fatally injured two (2) contract workers. Background Information The facility is a petroleum refinery located in Deer Park, Texas and is a Limited
Today, the CSB released a second update on its ongoing investigation into the fatal hydrogen sulfide (H2S) release that occurred on October 10, 2024, at the PEMEX Deer Park Refinery in Deer Park, Texas. Two contract workers died during the incident, and over 27,000 pounds of toxic hydrogen sulfide gas were released. Local authorities issued
Fundamentally, employers and employees must be alert to the fact that working with a “closed system” does not always ensure safety. Operations involving the opening of valves or pumps on otherwise closed systems or working on such equipment that is not isolated or locked/tagged out are particular sources of danger. When a normally closed system
At approximately 9:20 a.m. on December 1, 2010, Employee #1, #2 and #3 were working on the barge of an oilrig (Rig Number 1). They were removing a Christmas tree flange, an assembly of valves, spools, and fittings used to control the flow of oil or gas out of the well, with a cutting torch.
At 9:00 a.m. on October 6, 2019, an employee was attempting to open a flange. Steam released, burning the employee’s legs and lower body. The employee was hospitalized. 29 CFR 1910.269(d)(2)(iv)(D): The procedure did not clearly and specifically outline specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout
Another example shows us that serious hazards can be found OUTSIDE of chemical processes, and applying the Line Break/Equipment Opening Procedure and Permit to these hazards could go a long way in controlling these recognized hazards. DEFINING and QUANTIFYING “hazardous energy” sources is STEP 1 in ensuring the process/system can be safely opened. Step 2
