An operator was found unresponsive at an Oil Battery. The operator’s body was found lying inside a partially open utilidor where a valve was open and gas escaping. The battery is a sour gas (oil & gas with hydrogen sulphide) site. The Medical Examiner report stated the cause of death was due to hydrogen sulphide exposure.
Operator 1 (fatally injured worker) had been working to unblock a needle valve of the cyclone separator where methanol was injected into the dump line. Operators were responsible for monitoring the facility, maintenance, well checks, and maintaining wells in the field. Operator 1 had 30 years of experience as a production field operator.
Operator 1 had worked at the Oil Battery for 10 years as a senior operator and had many years of experience as a production operator in sour (hydrogen sulphide) service. He had completed mandated safety training.
Operator 2 had been working at another location of the lease site completing well checks.
Operator 2 returned to the Oil Battery to find Operator 1 unresponsive and partially inside the opened cyclone separator utilidor. Operator 2 had 35 years’ experience in the oil and gas industry, predominantly in sour service, and was a contract operator. Operator 2 had completed mandated safety training throughout their oil and gas career.
Equipment and materials
The Oil Battery was an upstream crude oil and gas collection and processing facility. The Battery was composed of above-ground storage tanks (ASTs) used to hold crude oil from producing wells in the area. Additional treatment (dehydration, sweetening, water, and sedimentation separation, etc.) equipment was used to make the crude oil ready for sale to the pipeline system. The cyclone separator was attached to the dehydration building and was used to remove water from the oil/gas before additional processing (Figure 1).
Sequence of events
The operators were assigned to the Oil Battery in August of 2017, on a long term rotating shift. Operator 2 had left the battery to work on a compressor around 7:30 a.m. the morning of January 27, 2018. Operator 2 returned to the battery just after 1:00 p.m.and expected to find Operator 1 in the control room. When Operator 2 did not find Operator 1’s truck parked there, Operator 2 drove around until they found Operator 1’s truck by the dehydration building (Figure 2).
Operator 2 then got out of their truck and heard “gas blowing”from an open valve. Operator 2 looked for Operator 1 in the dehydration building,first at the northdoor, and then at the door near the utilidor cyclone separator. Operator 2 then saw Operator 1 near the utilidor cyclone separator (Figure 3).
Operator 1 was lying on the ground inside the cyclone separator utilidor. Operator 2 went and shook Operator 1 and got no response, while hearing gas escaping from an open valve. Operator 2 then called their supervisor, actuated the battery“emergency shut down”, put on their self -contained breathing apparatus(SCBA), closed the open valve, removed panel doors to the utilidor, removed their SCBA, and attended to Operator 1 (Figures 4 and 5).
Emergency Medical Services arrived at the scene and attempted to resuscitate Operator 1. Due to exposure to hydrogen sulphide, Operator 1 could not be resuscitated and was pronounced deceased at the scene.
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