Think about the kids who came from abusive homes vs. those who came from supportive homes where they knew they were loved. It isn’t all peaches and cream, but they KNOW when they are loved and supported, and it shows in how they live their lives and in how they make decisions. We hold our […]
Over my career, the most profound advancement in safety management was the recognition and shift away from lagging indicators (i.e., injury rates) to leading indicators within our safety management system (SMS). But as this approach to safety metrics became more widespread, we have seen even leading indicators become a “number game” that gets manipulated as
If you think safety metrics is old fashion and leads to “manipulating behaviors”, go out to your car and disconnect your dashboard/pull fuses so that you get no analytical feedback data on how well you are staying within your safe operating envelope of yours and the car’s performance. Then tell me metrics are not needed
If the phrase “safety culture” has become so toxic in today’s world, is it wrong to use the phrase “culture of safety”? I mean, it is nonsense to claim an organization has no culture. Some can say it over and over, but that does not mean it is right. ALL groups have a culture that
This information is preliminary and subject to change. On February 4, 2023, at about 0640 central standard time (CST), Federal Express (FedEx) flight 1432 (FDX1432), a Boeing 767-32LF, and Southwest Airlines flight 708 (SWA708), a Boeing 737-79P were involved in a runway incursion with overflight that resulted in a loss of separation at the Austin-Bergstrom
Every time I see the Lifelock commercial with the “security monitor” in the bank being held up I can not help but think about our profession. Replace the security guard with a safety pro and go through the commercial. Too often we are relegated to “accident monitors”., Oh I’m not a safety professional – I’m
There is a new source for RMP Data. This new source is provided by the Data Liberation Project. Below is a breakdown of the new site – data was last updated in 2022.
When reading this, think about the “Swiss cheese model” from Reason and the “domino model” from Heinrich. “Disasters are essentially organized events. To occur, they typically require the systemic and prolonged neglect of varying signs and signals of danger, creating deep pockets of organizational ignorance, organizational silence, and organizational blindness. When signals of risk are
At 12:45 p.m. on July 5, 2022, Employee #1, 46, and his coworker cleaned a baghouse on a roof. The employee was wearing a Tyvek suit, KN95 respirator, and a safety harness when he made an entry into a steel baghouse, which is a confined space. National Weather Service reported conditions of 93 degrees F,
At 1:30 p.m. on April 19, 2022, an employee, 35, was back welding inside a spool vessel (titanium pipe) that was 24 inches in diameter. The employee was asphyxiated due to the displacement of oxygen by argon gas.
At 4:15 p.m. on June 14, 2022, two employees entered a 21-inch sewer manhole to conduct vacuum testing, not knowing that it was oxygen deficient. Both employees were overcome and died.
At 8:00 a.m. on June 26, 2022, two employees, 45 and 46, were emptying and cleaning an open-topped frack tank (Tank #4) at an oil and gas services site. There were no eyewitnesses and the employees were working at a remote site by themselves, so few details are known about what occurred.
