Flammable processing areas are required to have exhaust ventilation per 1910.106(e)(3)(v). But we continue to see serious errors in the ventilation design basis, specifically where the vapors are being exhausted. The OSHA standard simply states the vapors must be exhausted to a “safe location,” but this phrase is not defined nor quantified in 1910.106. […]
Listen to this 1980 news recap of the 1970 Crescent City, IL LPG BLEVEs. Talking about Railcar design and labeling needs. It seems like crazy times compared to what we have now.
At 4:15 p.m. on January 28, 2022, an employee was assisting in hydro-testing a joint of steel pipe (39.5-feet long, 9 5/8 OD, 1580 psi). While pressurized, the employee walked into the testing area. At the same time, the plug on the pipe failed, leading to the pipe striking the employee. The employee was killed
At 4:51 a.m. on January 15, 2022, Employee #1 and Employee #2 (Millwrights) were assigned to replace a pump in a Methylene Diphenyl Diisocyanate (MDI) Unit at the Di-Chlorination Column at approximately 2:00 a.m. The discharge line for this column discharges about a foot off the ground right next to the pump where the employees
Two employees attempted to remove a flow meter at 11:30 a.m. on February 21, 2022. As the employees began to loosen the pipe, peracetic acid sprayed out onto the employees. The employees were hospitalized to treat chemical burns to the head and neck.
At 5:00 p.m. on February 4, 2021, an employee was working for a firm that manufactured fabricated structural metal. He was performing abrasive blasting with steel shot. He was wearing a supplied air respirator (SAR). While using the supplied air hood, he lost consciousness. A pressure testing operation downstream on the plant airline allowed nitrogen
At 12:00 noon on August 19, 2021, an employee utilized an airline respirator that was attached to a nitrogen line. The employee died from a lack of oxygen.
At 7:45 p.m. on December 1, 2020, Employee #1, a production lead supervisor, entered the chill/production room. She observed a cloud generating in the immediate area of the freezer tunnel. She investigated the cause of the cloud and was killed by asphyxiation. Approximately one hour later, Employee #2, a production supervisor, entered the chill/production room.
At 11:30 a.m. on October 15, 2021, Employees #1 and #2, both maintenance contractor employees, were assigned to install a pressure safety valve (PSV) on a flare header in a methylene diphenyl diisocyanate (MDI) unit when they were exposed to nitrogen and carbon monoxide. The installation procedure requires supplied air respirators. The employees were staging
At 10:10 a.m. on February 1, 2022, an employee connected the wrong chemical tote, (i.e., Dilac instead of Dibac) to a day tank containing a chlorine solution. The chemical reaction of the two chemicals caused a vapor release. Eight employees sustained unspecified respiratory illnesses, and six were hospitalized for treatment.
At 8:15 a.m. on February 1, 2022, an employee poured paraformaldehyde into an aqueous ammonia solution inside a vessel. There was a chemical reaction, resulting in an explosion. Two employees suffered chemical burns to their backs and arms, and one of the employees was hospitalized.
At 3:10 p.m. on February 2, 2022, an employee, 26, performed maintenance on a Raven AccuFlow System Applicator. The employee began the ammonia bleeding procedure wearing safety glasses and rubber gloves. After approximately 20 to 30 minutes, the employee no longer heard a whistling sound and believed that the system was completely bled out. When
