EPA issued a Process Safety Alert in 2007 in response to several investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) which involved the failure of excess flow valves (EFV). While EFVs are in extensive service and have prevented numerous pipe or hose breaks from becoming much more serious incidents, experience has shown that in some cases the […]
The information in this report was collected by staff in the North Carolina Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) Program. Ammonia releases in North Carolina have resulted in injuries, hospitalizations, and workplace evacuations. Some examples of ammonia releases in NC include:
The UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the onshore chemical and major hazard industries collaborated in the collection of causation information and lessons learnt from Loss of Containment incidents. This was a voluntary scheme aimed at collecting information on the underlying causes of loss of containment events. The aim being to identify common failure
Each employer must address actions that workers will take when there is an unwanted release of highly hazardous chemicals. Employers will need to decide: if they want workers to handle and stop small or minor incidental releases; whether they wish to mobilize the available resources at the plant and have them brought to bear on
I have referenced these writers before when discussing process safety and once again they communicated the message better than I could regarding how we should analyze “process alarms” when we claim them to be a layer of protection. We should only accept alarms that have been established using a RAGAGEP in their design (audible, visual,
There are new details regarding the March fire at a Memphis, TN refinery that killed one contract worker and injured two others. TOSHA has completed its investigation and the refinery was hit with a proposed $63,000 in fines for 16, serious, alleged violations. TOSHA listed the potential cause as “failure to isolate and control ignition
I have referenced this newsletter many time and have linked to it many times, but never officially posted it as a resource for process safety folks. It is FREE and published by EPA Region 10 every other month. Like this posting on relief system design basis, there is literally tons of material that can be
AMMONIA FATALITY (a worker at a winery has died after being exposed to ammonia – one of the workers accidentally opened a wrong valve and released ammonia into a confined area – the man was one of six workers exposed – the other workers tried to rescue the man but were unable to get to
This is an excellent presentation showing what is believed to have happened leading up to and after the Amuay Refinery Vapor Cloud Explosion on 8/25/12. Excellent modeling, but based on assumption, showing how a vapor cloud progresses. To date, the loss of life now exceeds 50 with many more severly burned. The off-site devistation was
UPDATED 9/11/12 with CCTV video footage showing the steam release, followed by the flash fire, followed by te dark smoke.
NH3 gas is COLORLESS! Check out the SDS or any data source if you think I’m kidding. What we are seeing in that “white smoke” or “cloud” is moisture in the air (i.e., humidity) condensing on the very cold NH3 gas. So the question I often get is: How much NH3 gas is needed to
