In June 2008, a cylinder was dropped, and its top valve hit a concrete platform. The impact of the cylinder valve on the concrete caused the threads on the screw connection, which held the valve on the cylinder, to fail, resulting in complete separation of the valve from the cylinder. The cylinder’s internal pressure was […]
At 11:30 p.m. on March 19, 2009, Solus Industrial Innovations LLC employees from the third shift had just come to work. Their employer is a manufacturer of plastic conveyor parts. One employee (Employee #1) pointed out to the on-shift supervisor that there was a pool of water near an 80-gallon water heater that was being
In May 2009, a compressed air tank failed, blowing the bottom off of the tank and sending fragments flying into a concrete wall, puncturing the wall. The investigation following the incidentrevealed several serious problems with the condition of the tank, including severe corrosion and rust at the bottom of the tank, where it failed, and
On March 3, 2010, a Peoples Gas worker died, and another was seriously injured after they were struck by a pipe while pressure-testing an underground gas main.
Summary On the days leading to January 6, 2014, unusual weather conditions with high-temperature variations caused a large pressure rise inside the three storage vessels at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) compressed natural gas (CNG) fueling facility. The pressure increase reached the point where the relief valve on each vessel opened automatically and released gas
Worker Fatality During Attempted Removal of Blind Flange on Cell 14 Magnet Cooling Water System Summary On October 21, 2015, two National High Magnetic Field Laboratory (NHMFL) mechanical technicians were involved in an incident while attempting to remove a Victaulic blind flange from supply piping on a Magnet Cooling Water (MCW) System. The mechanical technicians
As a part of the hazard assessment requirements in 40 CFR Part 68, Subpart B, I must analyze worst-case release scenarios and document certain analyses in my risk management plan (RMP). How many worst-case release scenarios must be analyzed, and how many analyses must be specifically documented in the RMP?
How do the Clean Air Act (CAA) risk management program requirements differ from the hazardous chemical reporting requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)?
This is safety satire on a Friday afternoon after a long week! I may not be a Certified Welding Inspector (CWI) or a Visual Level II inspector certified per ASME V Supplemental NDE Certification requirements. Still, I believe API 570, Section 8 Repairs, Alterations, and Rerating of Piping Systems allows only a dozen or fewer
I have spent much time with clients doing “Engineering and Code Reviews.” These have been instrumental in avoiding many issues when it comes time for the INITIAL PHA. Depending on the process size and complexity, these can take 0.5 – 3 days, but that time is spent ensuring the primary containment systems and all the
It is rare; I can not recall ever disputing NFPA in any of their guides/standards/codes. However, section 27.7 of NFPA 30 is worded incorrectly and needs to be called out as it poses significant risks if followed by the letter. Section 27.7 covers the pressure and leak testing of “flammable liquid” piping circuits. Although I
If you want a spirited process safety debate, simply mention the practice of having “intervening valve(s)” before or after a Pressure-Relieving Device (PRD). There are some who swear that it is not allowed, but in fact, it is. This is how I learned about the “Car-Seal” program early in my career. ASME B31.12 is one
