GAS MAIN acts as a PROJECTILE during PRESSURE-TESTING
On March 3, 2010, a Peoples Gas worker died, and another was seriously injured after they were struck by a pipe while pressure-testing an underground gas main.
On March 3, 2010, a Peoples Gas worker died, and another was seriously injured after they were struck by a pipe while pressure-testing an underground gas main.
Summary On the days leading to January 6, 2014, unusual weather conditions with high-temperature variations caused a large pressure rise inside the three storage vessels at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) compressed natural gas (CNG) fueling facility. The pressure increase reached the point where the relief valve on each vessel opened automatically and released gas
Worker Fatality During Attempted Removal of Blind Flange on Cell 14 Magnet Cooling Water System Summary On October 21, 2015, two National High Magnetic Field Laboratory (NHMFL) mechanical technicians were involved in an incident while attempting to remove a Victaulic blind flange from supply piping on a Magnet Cooling Water (MCW) System. The mechanical technicians
As a part of the hazard assessment requirements in 40 CFR Part 68, Subpart B, I must analyze worst-case release scenarios and document certain analyses in my risk management plan (RMP). How many worst-case release scenarios must be analyzed, and how many analyses must be specifically documented in the RMP?
How do the Clean Air Act (CAA) risk management program requirements differ from the hazardous chemical reporting requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)?
This is safety satire on a Friday afternoon after a long week! I may not be a Certified Welding Inspector (CWI) or a Visual Level II inspector certified per ASME V Supplemental NDE Certification requirements. Still, I believe API 570, Section 8 Repairs, Alterations, and Rerating of Piping Systems allows only a dozen or fewer
I have spent much time with clients doing “Engineering and Code Reviews.” These have been instrumental in avoiding many issues when it comes time for the INITIAL PHA. Depending on the process size and complexity, these can take 0.5 – 3 days, but that time is spent ensuring the primary containment systems and all the
It is rare; I can not recall ever disputing NFPA in any of their guides/standards/codes. However, section 27.7 of NFPA 30 is worded incorrectly and needs to be called out as it poses significant risks if followed by the letter. Section 27.7 covers the pressure and leak testing of “flammable liquid” piping circuits. Although I
If you want a spirited process safety debate, simply mention the practice of having “intervening valve(s)” before or after a Pressure-Relieving Device (PRD). There are some who swear that it is not allowed, but in fact, it is. This is how I learned about the “Car-Seal” program early in my career. ASME B31.12 is one
I have written many articles relating to ASME B31.3 and the QA/QC requirements each weld/flange must meet. However, in B31.12, Table IP-10.4.2-1 Required Nondestructive Examinations, the code requires 100% VT (Visual examination). The code goes on to require a more extensive examination sampling of 5-10% joints using with Liquid Penetrant (PT) or Magnetic Particle (MT).
As I dig deeper into ASME B31.12, Hydrogen Piping, I continue to find nuggets of best practices for HAZMAT piping. ASME B31.12 requires each operating company having industrial piping, pipeline, and commercial and residential systems to have Operational, Maintenance, and Emergency Plan(s) that include the following:
I have been working with several clients who are on a Hydrogen Fuel journey. It is fun to get deep into process safety protection schemes regarding NFPA 2 and ASME B31.12 and see the similarities and extra code requirements when dealing with large H2 gas systems. One of the interesting items regarding H2 piping is