Chemical Process Safety (PSM/RMP)

Lack of formal PSV testing procedure and formal Car-Seal program led to LNG piping BLEVE and subsequent VCE

“The Natural Gas facility lacked a formal PSV testing procedure that included a QA/QC process to ensure that PSV’s are properly returned to service after testing with isolation valves car–sealed in their correct positions. At the time of the Incident, operators were trained to assist with PSV testing by observing another more experienced operator and

Another fatal NH3 LOPC event from a refrigeration process at a food plant

Preliminary investigation indicates that two (2) HVAC contractors were in the vicinity of the ammonia leak when it was initiated. Norwood’s first responders were able to stabilize and transport one man to Good Samaritan Medical Center, and he was then further transferred to Massachusetts General Hospital for specialized treatment.  The second contractor, 68, was deceased

Summary of Potential Changes to the Existing PSM Standard

The potential changes of scope include: Clarifying the exemption for atmospheric storage tanks Expanding the scope to include Oil- and Gas-Well Drilling and Servicing Resuming Enforcement for Oil and Gas Production Facilities Expanding PSM coverage and requirements for reactivity hazards Updating and expanding the list of HHCs in Appendix A of the existing PSM standard

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