At 8:00 a.m. on June 26, 2022, two employees, 45 and 46, were emptying and cleaning an open-topped frack tank (Tank #4) at an oil and gas services site. There were no eyewitnesses and the employees were working at a remote site by themselves, so few details are known about what occurred.
At 1:45 p.m. on July 18, 2022, an employee, 51, was preparing to replace an ice machine at a retail store. The employee searched for the electrical panel to de-energize the ice machine but could not locate it. The employee was employed by a refrigeration equipment company and did not work at the retail store.
At 1:30 p.m. on August 7, 2022, an employee worked as a production supervisor in his office when the deluge system alarm was activated. Approximately 30 seconds after the audible alarm was engaged, the foam generators were activated and began to disperse 2.2% high expansion foam. The employee attempted to exit his office to reach
At 4:00 p.m. on July 4, 2022, an employee was cutting off a motor and base of a dust collection system using an oxygen-acetylene torch at a farm machinery and equipment manufacturing facility. When the employee moved the cutoff motor base, a dust cloud formed and ignited, causing an explosion. The employee sustained second and
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on March 15, 2022, an employee, 30, disconnected nuts to a line for service and repair work. The employee was working to depressurize lines of ammonia for service work. The team had isolated, performed proper lockout/ tagout, and bled the line assigned for work off. The employee began disconnecting nuts on
This is a great synopsis of how serious accidents build within an organization over time because of the lack of a functioning SMS. When reading this, think “swiss cheese model” from Reason and the “domino model” from Heinrich. Disasters are essentially organized events. To occur, they typically require the systemic and prolonged neglect of varying
This is a great synopsis of how serious accidents build within an organization over time because of the lack of a functioning SMS. When reading this, think “swiss cheese model” from Reason and the “domino model” from Heinrich. Disasters are essentially organized events. To occur, they typically require the systemic and prolonged neglect of varying
When a facility’s hazardous materials piping is assembled with bolted flanged joints, it needs a maintenance procedure to properly assemble and disassemble these flanged joints. Along with this procedure, a means to pressure/leak test the bolted flanged joint must be used to ensure leak tightness. Subject to code/regulatory requirements, the worker should establish:
A movement within the safety community, primarily online banter, somehow finds fault with a WRITTEN safety management system (SMS). There are even books published on the topic that are being pushed, decrying written programs as a bureaucratic waste of time, too controlling, no value added, etc. I find this very sad, but they do have
ASME PCC-1, Guidelines for Pressure Boundary Bolted Flange Joint Assembly, is a MUST have (and read) for process safety professionals managing piping systems that have bolted flanged joints. In fact, Chapter 15, JOINT DISASSEMBLY, has some specific requirements that a facility should adopt as part of its Line Break SWP for flanged joints. HINT: the
A RAGAGEP, which is often overlooked for pipe flanges but is fair game for OSHA and EPA to reference, is ASME PCC-1, Guidelines for Pressure Boundary Bolted Flange Joint Assembly. The RAGAGEP outlines the training personnel needs to safely assemble and disassemble flanged joints in hazardous material(s) piping circuits. A facility with flanged piping should
Training and qualified personnel must assemble flanged joints in hazardous materials piping systems (see Appendix A of ASME PCC-1). Consideration should be given to establishing a finished joint examination process as part of the facility’s QA/QC assurance program. A leak or failure in a piping system can be a minor inconvenience for low-consequence fluids, or
