On January 11, 2022, OSHA began an inspection at your facility located at XXXXXXXXXXX, MA. The inspection revealed that employees in Flower Production were exposed to occupational quantities of whole and ground cannabis and were not provided effective information and training on the hazards involved in the cannabis production and grinding process. On January 7, […]
Respondent is the owner and/or operator of a gas processing plant that has on-site for use/storage 55,126 pounds of sulfur dioxide, 8,240 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, 130,000 pounds of butane, and over 10,000 pounds of hydrogen. Respondent has three RMProgram level 3 covered processes, which store or otherwise use sulfur dioxide, butane, and hydrogen. Sulfur
At 7:00 a.m. on March 25, 2022, an employee entered a grain bin. The grain bin was 28 feet in diameter. The center of the bin had floor grate(s) with a conveyor underneath turned on to move grain. The grain was not flowing, so the employee entered the bin from a top hatch and climbed
At 10:15 a.m. on February 16, 2022, Employee #1, 27, removed a flange from an overhead pipe as part of a multi-employer pipe replacement project. He was not aware that a different pipeline had been locked out. A heated slurry solution of boric acid and zinc oxide was released from the pipe he was working
Flammable processing areas are required to have exhaust ventilation per 1910.106(e)(3)(v). But we continue to see serious errors in the ventilation design basis, specifically where the vapors are being exhausted. The OSHA standard simply states the vapors must be exhausted to a “safe location,” but this phrase is not defined nor quantified in 1910.106.
Listen to this 1980 news recap of the 1970 Crescent City, IL LPG BLEVEs. Talking about Railcar design and labeling needs. It seems like crazy times compared to what we have now.
At 4:15 p.m. on January 28, 2022, an employee was assisting in hydro-testing a joint of steel pipe (39.5-feet long, 9 5/8 OD, 1580 psi). While pressurized, the employee walked into the testing area. At the same time, the plug on the pipe failed, leading to the pipe striking the employee. The employee was killed
At 4:51 a.m. on January 15, 2022, Employee #1 and Employee #2 (Millwrights) were assigned to replace a pump in a Methylene Diphenyl Diisocyanate (MDI) Unit at the Di-Chlorination Column at approximately 2:00 a.m. The discharge line for this column discharges about a foot off the ground right next to the pump where the employees
Two employees attempted to remove a flow meter at 11:30 a.m. on February 21, 2022. As the employees began to loosen the pipe, peracetic acid sprayed out onto the employees. The employees were hospitalized to treat chemical burns to the head and neck.
At 5:00 p.m. on February 4, 2021, an employee was working for a firm that manufactured fabricated structural metal. He was performing abrasive blasting with steel shot. He was wearing a supplied air respirator (SAR). While using the supplied air hood, he lost consciousness. A pressure testing operation downstream on the plant airline allowed nitrogen
At 12:00 noon on August 19, 2021, an employee utilized an airline respirator that was attached to a nitrogen line. The employee died from a lack of oxygen.
At 7:45 p.m. on December 1, 2020, Employee #1, a production lead supervisor, entered the chill/production room. She observed a cloud generating in the immediate area of the freezer tunnel. She investigated the cause of the cloud and was killed by asphyxiation. Approximately one hour later, Employee #2, a production supervisor, entered the chill/production room.
