2015 Photo of the Week #42 (NOT a GHS compliant label – NOT even a nice try!)
HAZCOM labeling is not intended to be a “process of elimination”!!!!
2015 Video of the Week #42 (Electrical – metal sign into powerlines)
WARNING! NOT GRAPHIC, but you will witness three men loosing their lives in this electrical accident. Notice how quick and quietly these men loose their lives to 13,700 volts!
Temporary Enforcement Policy for Residential Construction Work in Confined Spaces
Memorandum For: REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS AND STATE PLAN DESIGNEES THROUGH: DOROTHY DOUGHERTY, Deputy Assistant Secretary From: JAMES G. MADDUX, Director, Directorate of Construction Subject: Temporary Enforcement Policy for Residential Construction Work in Confined Spaces
OSHA looses Fatal Lathe Guarding case
I am posting this to merely share the news, BUT PLEASE remember a worker DIED in this accident, so from a SAFETY PERSPECTIVE we really should not give a rats ass as to what a court found and reversed the OSHA citation. This posting is NOT intended for “ammo” to show we do not have
EPA RMP citations @ aluminum chloride manufacturing facility (Chlorine & $33,150)
Respondent is the owner and/or operator of a facility which operates as an aluminum chloride manufacturing Facility. On December 3, 2013, EPA conducted an inspection at the Facility to determine, among other things, Respondent’s compliance with Section 112(r) of the CAA. The Inspection included discussions with Facility representatives concerning the Facility’s covered process and risk
EPA RMP citations @ manufacturing facility (Vinyl fluoride, FATAL HW Explosion & $723,438 w/ SEP of $111,953)
Respondent is the owner and/or operator of a manufacturing facility, where vinyl fluoride is a raw material used at the Facility during the polymerization process, which is a risk management program covered process. The equipment in the polymerization process includes a supply tank, a reactor, separators, and a slurry flash tank. At the slurry flash
Is “competence” for doing a CS evaluation = to “competence” for doing a RECLASSIFICATION
OSHA’s new Confined Space standard for Construction requires a “competent person” in two CRITICAL functions; I should also point out these two functions are also CRITICAL within the General Industry functions as well. These include EVALUATING spaces and RECLASSIFYING a PRCS to a non-PRCS. Evaluation of Spaces 1926.1203(a) Before it begins work at a worksite,
OSHA citations for Flame-Retardant Clothing (FRC) in a non-PSM facility
This week OSHA issued a PPE citations to a glass manufacturing company after a worker suffered third-degree burns on his legs and hands when molten glass bottles fell on the production floor and ignited oil residue that had leaked from the machines. The proposed fine for ONLY the PPE citations involving FRC concerns was $85,000.
Confined Space Evaluations and a “competent person”
And it has begun… With OSHA’s new Confined Space construction standard, they stated in 1926.1203(a) that… Before it begins work at a worksite, each employer must ensure that a competent person identifies all confined spaces in which one or more of the employees it directs may work, and identifies each space that is a permit
Breaking down OSHA’s General Hotwork Requirements (1910.252(a)
For those of you at PSM/RMP covered facilities, this OSHA standard is a baseline requirement; however, this OSHA standard does NOT require a Hotwork permit. It merely “prefers” the authorization be “in the form of a written permit”. It was not until OSHA’s Process Safety Standard (and EPA’s RMP) that OSHA/EPA actually REQUIRE a hotwork
OSHA PRCS citations @ Railcar Cleaning business (Flammable Atmosphere & $963,000)
Moments before a blast ripped through a railcar on April 14, 2015, a check of the air quality inside indicated a serious risk of an explosion. Despite the warning, the company sent two employees, aged 41 and 45, into the railcar to work without monitoring the air continuously for explosive hazards as required, nor providing
Atmospheric Storage Tank fails under fire conditions (caught on helmet cam)
This was an atmospheric storage tank containing diesel fuel that failed under fire conditions. I believe this to be merely a failure of an atmospheric storage tank under fire conditions and the sounds from the video make it appear that the vent was either obstructed or an undersized vent OR the venting we hear just