The Respondent owns and operates a chemical manufacturing facility. On or about April 8 – 12, 2013, an EPA instructor conducted an inspection of the Respondent’s facility after several incidents with on-site and off-site impacts.
Respondent has the following processes at the stationary source:
A. South Liquefaction (Chlor-Alkali) (excluding Brine Treatment);
B. North Liquefaction (Chlor-Alkali) (excluding Brine Treatment);
C. Chlorine Tank Car Loading;
D. Perchloroethylene/Trichloroethylene Unit – the Ammonia process only;
E. Tri-Ethane II Unit – Methyl Chloroform process chlorination and Vinyl Chloride Process;
F. Ethyl Chloride Unit – EC/HCL process;
G. Greater EDC unit – EDC chlorination EDC/TRANS
I. North Dock (excluding solvent storage);
I. PHH Unit – Vinyl Chloride process, EDC chlorination process;
J. Vinyl Chloride Storage South Terminal;
K. Sulfur Chloride Unit;
L. Vinyl Chloride and Ethyl Chloride loading at Derivatives Shipping Area;
M. Membrane Cell Chlorine (excluding Brine Treatment);
N. Plant”C” Chlorine (excluding Brine Treatment); and
0. Plant “A” Chlorine (excluding Brine Treatment)
40 C.F. R. § 68.130 specifies the following threshold quantities for the regulated substances listed below:
A. ammonia (anhydrous) – 10,000 pounds;
B. chlorine – 2,500 pounds;
C. ethyl chloride – 10,000 pounds; and
D. vinyl chloride – 10,000 pounds.
Respondent has exceeded the threshold quantity for one or more of the following regulated substances
A. ammonia (anhydrous);
B. chlorine;
C. ethyl chloride; and
D. vinyl chloride
B. VIOLATIONS
Count One – Failure to Follow Operating Procedures
40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1) provides that the owner or operator shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear Instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address, among other things, startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown. The PHH #2 furnace is part of the PHH Unit. the PHH Unit is a “covered process”. On or about December 20, 2013, the Respondent attempted to restart the PHH #2 Furnace following a trip condition. On or about December 20, 2013, the Respondent failed to adequately follow the operating procedures for the restart of the PHI-I #2 Furnace. On or about December 20, 2013, a fire occurred at the PHH# 2 furnace during an attempted restart of the PHH #2 Furnace.
The fire resulted in the release of approximately 2400 pounds of vinyl chloride and approximately 130,000 pounds of hydrogen chloride (anhydrous) [hydrochloric acid]. The fire resulted in approximately $8,000,000 of on-site property damage.
According to information the Respondent obtained from third parties, the fire resulted in the following off-site impacts:
- 1 person hospitalized;
- 27 persons received medical treatment;
- 110 persons were evacuated; and
- approximately 5,000 persons were sheltered-in-place.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(1) by failing to adequately follow the operating procedures for the restart of the PHH #2 Furnace.
Count Two – Failure to Develop and Implement Operating Procedures Which Included Steps Required to Correct or Avoid Deviations
40 C.F.R § 68.69(a)(2)(ii) provides that the Owner or operator shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address, among other things, steps required to correct or avoid deviations. The PHH #2 furnace is part of the PHH Unit. On or about December 20, 2013, the Respondent attempted to restart the PHH #2 furnace following a trip condition. An over-firing condition occurred during the attempted restart of the PHH #2 Furnace following a trip condition. On or about December 20, 2013, a fire occurred at the PHH # 2 furnace during an attempted restart of the PHH #2 furnace. The fire resulted in the release of approximately 2400 pounds of vinyl chloride and approximately 130,000 pounds of hydrogen chloride (anhydrous) [hydrochloric acid]. The fire resulted in approximately $8,000,000 of on-site property damage.
According to information the Respondent obtained from third parties, the fire resulted in the following off-site impacts:
- 1 person hospitalized;
- 27 persons received medical treatment;
- 110 persons were evacuated; and
- approximately 5,000 persons were sheltered-in-place.
The safe operating envelope documents for the PHH #2 Furnace did not contain criteria/preventive action for furnace over-firing scenarios. Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(a)(2)(ii) by failing to develop and implement operating procedures for PHH #2 furnace which included steps required to correct or avoid the deviations.
Count Three – Failure to inspect Pipe in PHH Unit
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a) provides that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) applies to the following process equipment
- Pressure vessels and storage tanks;
- Piping systems (including piping components and valves);
- Relief and vent systems and devices;
- Emergency shutdown systems;
- Controls (including monitoring devices and scissors, alarms, and interlocks); and
- Pumps
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) provides the following:
- Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment.
- Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally acceptable good engineering Practiccs.
- The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience.
The 2″ Quench Dopp Overhead (QDOH) return line near the Quench Tower is part of the PHH Unit. On or about November 4, 2012, a leak was observed in a weld on the 2″ Quench Dopp Overhead (QDOH)return line near the Quench Tower. On or about November 4, 2012, a temporary clamp was placed over the leak on the 2″ QDOH return line near the Quench Tower. On or about November 12, 2012, an engineered clamp was placed over the leak on the 2″ QDOH return line near the Quench Tower. On or about November 28, 2012, the Respondent repumped the engineered clamp on the 2″ QDOH return line near the Quench Tower. On or about December 24, 2012, a fire occurred in the PHH production area. The fire resulted in the release of approximately 15,000 pounds of vinyl chloride. The fire resulted in the following on-site impacts:
- 1 person injured; and
- approximately $3,900,000 of on-site property damage.
The Respondent’s investigation of the fire focused on the breached 2″ Quench Dopp Overhead (QDOH)return line near the Quench Tower. Ultrasonic Thickness (UT) readings taken on the piping after the December 24, 2012 fire indicated a general thinning of the line with some localized areas of accelerated thinning. The 2″ Quench Dopp Overhead (QDOH)return line near the Quench Tower was not adequately inspected.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) by failing to adequately inspect the 2″ Quench Dopp Overhead (QDOH)return line near the Quench Tower.
Count Four- Failure to Conduct Mechanical Integrity Inspections of Certain Pipes
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a) provides that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) applies to the following process equipment:
- Pressure vessels and storage tanks;
- Piping systems (including piping components and valves);
- Relief and vent systems and devices;
- Emergency shutdown systems;
- Controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks); and
- Pumps
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) provides the following:
- Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment
- Inspections and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally acceptable good engineering practices.
- The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience.
As of May 9, 2013, the respondent failed to inspect 2255 pipes at one or more of the covered processes. Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) by failing to conduct inspections of certain pipes at certain covered processes.
Count Five – Failure to Conduct Certain Mechanical Integrity Inspections of Pressure Vessels
40 C.F.R. § 68.73(a) provides that the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) applies to the following process equipment:
- Pressure vessels and storage tanks;
- Piping systems (including piping components and valves);
- Relief and vent systems and devices;
- Emergency shutdown systems;
- Controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks); and
- Pumps
67. 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) provides the following:
- Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment.
- Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally acceptable good engineering practices.
- The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers’ recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience.
As of May 9, 2013, the Respondent failed to conduct remaining life calculations for 319 pressure vessels at one or more of the covered processes. The remaining life calculations is required by API 510. The remaining life calculations in API 510 is a recognized and generally acceptable good engineering practice.
Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d) by failing to conduct certain types of tests and inspections of certain pressure vessels at certain covered processes.
Count Six – Failure to Update Process Hazard Analysis Every Five Years
40 C.F.R § 68.67(f) provide that at least every five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis, the process hazard analysis shall be updated and revalidated by a team meeting the requirements in 40 C.f.R. § 68.67(d), to assure that the process hazard analysis is consistent with the current process. The S. Liq. CL2 Compression Process is part of the South Liquefaction (Chlor-Alkali) (excluding Brine Treatment) process. The Respondent updated the process hazard analysis for the S. Liq. CL2 Compression Process on September 13, 2007. The Respondent was required to update the process hazard analysis for the S. Liq. CL2 Compression Process by September 13, 2012. The Respondent failed to update the process hazard analysis for the S. Liq. CL2 Compression Process until March 13, 2013. Therefore, the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. 68.67(1) by failing to update the process hazard analysis for the S. Liq. CL2 Compression Process until March 13, 2013.
III. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT
A. CIVIL PENALTY
For the reasons set forth above, the Respondent has agreed to pay a civil penalty of $877,992.
B. SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRO.JECTS
Respondent shall conduct the following supplemental environmental projects (SEPs):
A. Hydrogen Chloride Leak Detection and Repair (HCL LDAR) SEP.
Respondent shall use the Rebellion Photonics Gas Cloud Imaging (GCI) system to monitor the PHH Unit for hydrogen chloride (HCL) leaks on a monthly basis. The monitoring will be conducted pursuant to a written leak detection system and repair (LDAR) program, which is attached as exhibit A and incorporated by reference into this CAFO.
B. Emergency Equipment Donation
1. Within 120 days of the effective date of this CAFO, the Respondent shall purchase and donate the following equipment for the Moss Bluff Fire Department:
- Two (2) Toughbook Laptop computers, which will allow the fire department to enable enroute fire engines to have access to preplan information location maps with water supply details.
- Firehouse Cloud Software, which will able mobile users to access the software currently used by the fire department for all record keeping.
- Two (2) MSA Altair 5 Multi Gas Detectors. These detectors test levels of combustible gases in lower explosive limit (LEL) and/or volume percentage range, oxygen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, ammonia,chlorine, and other gases, depending on sensor configuration. The detectors are equipped with MotionAlertTM, which lets others know if the user has become immobile, and instantAlertTM, a manual alarm that alerts others if a dangerous situation has arisen.
- One (1) MSA Altair Multi Gas Detector docking Station.
The Respondent is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the SEPs. The total expenditure for the SEP described in paragraph A shall be not less than $108,000, and the total expenditure for SEP described in paragraph B shall he no less than $11,000.
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