Respondent owns and operates a stationary wet corn milling plant, which uses sulfur dioxide (anhydrous) (SO2) to control microbial growth during the corn steeping process and to weaken the starch-gluten bonds. Sulfur dioxide (anhydrous) is a regulated substance. See 40 C.F.R. § 68.130(a), Table 1. The Facility maintains a maximum inventory of the regulated toxic substance sulfur dioxide (anhydrous), that exceeds the threshold quantity of 5,000 pounds of sulfur dioxide (anhydrous) as set forth in Table 1 at 40 C.F.R. § 68.130. The Facility’s sulfur dioxide system consists of a truck unloading station, storage tank 09V2, a vaporizer, a steep acid storage tank 14V20, freshwater tank 15V2, sulfur dioxide detection sensors, and associated piping. The Facility is subject to Program 3 because the covered process is subject to the OSHA process safety management standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(1), and does not meet the Program 1 eligibility requirements at 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(j).
On October 25, 2023, EPA conducted an announced inspection of the Facility (October 2023 Inspection). During the October 2023 Inspection, EPA inspectors reviewed documents relating to the RMP that the facility provided (RMP Documents). The RMP Documents included aspects of the Facility’s RMP involving the management system, offsite consequence analysis, process safety information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training, mechanical integrity, management of change, pre-startup safety review, compliance audits, incident investigation, hot work permits, employee participation, emergency response, and contractors.
Allegations
I. Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions
A. Process Safety Information
ABS Consulting performed a relief system review in 2017 to determine whether the relief system met current standards. The review yielded six recommendations to be implemented in order to meet the standards. At the time of the October 2023 Inspection, the Respondent had only addressed one of the recommendations.
Respondent failed to maintain information regarding the relief system design and design basis, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(iv).
During the October 2023 Inspection, a system design for the ventilation system was not present at the Facility. At the time of the inspection, Respondent was in the process of obtaining quotations for the ventilation system design.
Respondent failed to maintain information regarding the ventilation system design for the process, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(1)(v)
Respondent has not documented that the Facility’s relief system and SO2 ventilation system comply with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.
During the October 2023 Inspection, inspectors toured the Facility and made several observations (Inspector Observations).
Inspector Observations included:
a. The piping system around the freshwater tank, designated as 15V2, was not appropriately marked. The markers were not placed in a visible location for the plant personnel and did not provide information about the direction of the flow. Furthermore, they were not located near directional changes, valves, and flanges.
b. The piping network encircling the vessel designated as 14V20, which is situated within the caustic room, in addition to the pipes that extend beyond this room, were lacking proper identification markings to provide information about the pipe contents, the direction of the flow, and whether the contents were hazardous or not.
Respondent failed to ensure that the piping system referenced in paragraph 65 complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.65(d)(2).
B. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
The PHA, conducted on February 19, 2018, (2018 PHA), yielded 41 recommendations related to the processes involving propylene oxide (PO), POCl3, and SO2. Out of these recommendations, 40 have been addressed and closed. However, Respondent has not addressed the recommendation to review the design requirements for ensuring adequate ventilation of process buildings in PO, POCl3, and SO2 covered process areas.
The latest PHA was conducted on February 2, 2023 (2023 PHA), through the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) methodology. It produced 25 recommendations among three covered processes. One recommendation, still open, was repeated from the 2018 PHA.
Respondent failed to resolve one PHA recommendation in a timely manner, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e).
C. Contractors
During the October 2023 inspection, inspectors discovered that the PVS delivery drivers connect their delivery trucks to plant air and storage tank 09V2 every five days and unload liquid anhydrous SO2 into the vessel (tank 09V2).
On October 29, 2021, while a PVS driver was delivering and offloading a partial load of SO2, liquid anhydrous SO2 was spilled into a puddle of water, which caused it to fume and harm two XXXXXXX Contractors. During the incident investigation, it was discovered that the driver had never visited the plant before, and it is possible that it was also his first time unloading a partial load of SO2. The investigation also found that there was a lack of proper training for the PVS drivers, insufficient communication between the PVS driver and PVS personnel off-site, and inadequate communication between the PVS driver and Respondent’s personnel while at the Facility.
PVS delivers SO2 and hooks the delivery truck up to unload directly into tank 09V2. The procedure of hooking up and unloading SO2 into tank 09V2 has a direct influence on process safety, therefore, PVS is a contractor under the RMP regulations as defined by Section 68.87(a) of the CAPP.
Respondent failed to comply with the owner or operator responsibilities with regard to its contractor PVS, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.87(b).
D. Emergency Response
During the October 2023 Inspection, Respondent informed inspectors that it is a responding stationary source, per 40 C.F.R. § 68.90(a). The RMP Documents do not indicate that coordination occurs at least annually, and more frequently, if necessary, to address changes: at the stationary source; in the stationary source’s emergency response and/or emergency action plan; and/or in the community emergency response plan.
Respondent failed to coordinate response needs with local emergency planning and response organizations at least annually, and more frequently if necessary, to address changes: at the stationary source; in the stationary source’s emergency response and/or emergency action plan; and/or in the community emergency response plan, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.93(a).
The RMP Documents indicate that the coordination response needs with local emergency planning and response organizations have not been fully documented. The documentation did not indicate the names of individuals involved and their contact information (phone number, email address, and organizational affiliations).
Respondent failed to document coordination with local authorities, including: the names of individuals involved and their contact information (phone number, email address, and organizational affiliations), in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.93(c).
The 2023 PHA evaluated Human Factors as Node 20 and confirmed that the emergency exit and response signs, including windsocks, were adequately visible and easily understandable.
The Facilities Emergency Action Plan in section B. Evacuation routes and shelter areas – Plantwide assembly areas indicates that the assembly area to be used depends on the location and nature of the emergency, as well as the wind direction.
During the October 2023 Inspection, inspectors toured the Facility and observed that there were no windsocks to indicate the direction and speed of potential hazardous gas leaks in the vicinity of the SO2 storage tank and truck unloading station. A wind flag was installed next to the HCL tank, 10 feet above ground, but it was visually obstructed within 30 feet in nearly every direction, and surrounding buildings were blocking potential wind from reaching the flag and indicating wind direction.
Respondent, by including inaccurate instructions in the Emergency Action Plan in section B. Evacuation routes and shelter areas – Plantwide assembly areas, failed to develop and implement an emergency response program for the purpose of protecting public health and the environment, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a).
Procedures for inspecting, testing, and maintaining emergency response equipment were not found and reviewed as a part of the emergency response program during the October 2023 inspection.
Respondent failed to develop and implement an emergency response program that includes the procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a)(2).
Evaluation reports that include: a description of the exercise scenario; names and organizations of each participant; an evaluation of the exercise results including lessons learned; recommendations for improvement or revisions to the emergency response exercise program and emergency response program; and a schedule to promptly address and resolve recommendations for the reviewed exercises were not provided and reviewed during the October 2023 inspection.
Respondent failed to prepare an evaluation report within 90 days of each field and tabletop exercise, in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.96(b)(3).
E. Risk Management Plan
Respondent submitted the Risk Management Plan (RMP) on April 5, 2019, with XXXXXXXXXX as the emergency contact.
XXXXXXXXXXX left Respondent in October 2020. Respondent resubmitted the RMP with the current emergency contact information on October 21, 2023.
Respondent failed to submit a correction of the emergency contact information within one month of any change in the emergency contact information required under § 68.160(b)(6), in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 68.195(b).
F. Terms of Consent Agreement
Based on analysis of the factors specified in Section 113(e) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e), the facts of this case, and Respondent’s cooperation, the EPA has determined that an appropriate civil penalty to settle this action is $99,624.
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