While doing some “Pre-Start Up Review” work for a client, I was tasked with reviewing the Emergency Response aspect of the facility’s ability to respond to an NH3 incident. As part of this review I asked the question… Have we coordinated our emergency response needs with the LEPC and the local FD(s)? This is a NEW […]
As I have said many times before, the world of process safety can be a very confusing and strange sandbox to play in. There are so many rumors and innuendoes stemming from the fact that our PSM/RMP world is made up of a weave of RAGAGEPs, many of which practicing process safety professional can’t fully understand
9/2020 UPDATE: I have contacted the Minnesota Department of Agriculture, Pesticide & Fertilizer Management Division regarding a statement on this 2-page “Cheat Sheet” regarding their apparent requirement that Hydrosrtatic RVs be put on NH3 vapor piping and vapor hoses. This is how it is presented: Hydrostats must be installed in each section of liquid and
With OSHA’s Process Safety Management standard coming up on its 27th birthday, we are seeing companies still grappling with managing their Hazardous Locations (HAZLOC). When the process involves a flammable liquid or gas, it is still fairly common to find a HAZLOC containing permanently installed equipment that is not rated for the HAZLOC. And by
The act of draining/venting a highly hazardous chemical (HHC)/extremely hazardous substance (EHS) from a process can be one of the most hazardous tasks a worker can undertake, but there are some easy and cheap actions/designs we can consider to reduce these hazards. Some of the best guidance I have come across is the IIAR’s “Oil
Recently I had the pleasure of working with a client on a PHA project during which we came across another excellent example of how “start-up’s” can be very different from the “normal start-up” procedure. I like to bring these examples to our attention as we still hear this all the time… “our initial start-up/normal start-up/start-up
The decision by the OSHRC settles several KEY PSM application debates. The accident involved a boiler that provided steam to a covered process and the boiler also used fuel from the refinery process(s) so OSHA took the position the boiler was part of the “covered process” because it was both interconnected and co-located such that
After unscheduled maintenance to drain oil from the pumps, the refrigeration system was noted to be slow to return to performance and oil contamination of some system evaporators was suspected. The responding refrigeration mechanic stated he attempted to improve system performance by closing valves to generate pressure within an evaporator to move or dislodge potentially
As barriers or safety systems can fail, it is essential to design them well and understand their reliability, which is expressed in an SIL rating. The Safety Integrity Level relates to the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD). We use complete orders of 10 to describe the reduction factor:
At 4:30 p.m. on March 15, 2018, an employee was performing a pressure test on a pump. Sulfuric acid of 93% concentration splashed on the employee. The employee sustained second-degree chemical burns to the left thigh and third-degree burns to right thigh.
WorkSafeBC launched a three (3) phase ammonia inspection initiative after three (3) workers died in an ammonia leak at an ice skating rink in October 2017. Working with Technical Safety BC, WorkSafeBC inspected 228 ice rinks, curling rinks, and recreational rinks during phase one of the initiative. Of those, 181 used ammonia-based refrigeration systems and 1,108 orders
