By: Victor Dearman Jr. CIRO, CRST Flagging tape is not LOTO! And never has been. I would bet good money the operating procedure for this compressor has LOTO covered, but those are just documents to look good in a binder sitting on a shelf collecting dust because they are viewed as a necessary evil to […]
Establishment Size: All sizesStandard: 1910.119 Process Safety Management
The CSB has released an UPDATE into its ongoing investigation into the fatal November 12, 2024, explosion in Louisville, Kentucky. The incident killed two employees and seriously injured three others. The explosion caused significant property damage to the facility and nearby homes and businesses. Debris was ejected outside the facility’s fence line, flying up to
I have upload my REVISED Car Seal Program and the PowerPoint that goes with it to the Document Library – Chemical Process Safety folder.
I just uploaded my newest version of the SAFTENG Car Seal Program that reflects the code requirements in 2025. A client has learned they need to car seal some valves that are “intervening valves” after a PRD and before a header. The OEM commissioning the process stated they had a Car Seal Program and would
Three People Died Due to the Blast The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released a new safety video on its investigation into the January 24, 2020, fatal propylene release and explosion at the Watson Grinding and Manufacturing Company facility in Houston, Texas. The massive explosion resulted in the death of two workers
With the recent catastrophic and fatal pressure vessel (PV) failure in KY, I have to speak up and point out a very dangerous and unfortunately common failure we see in our work. Far too often we visit a facility under the guise of doing process safety work and we typically find the PSM covered PVs
Fundamentally, employers and employees must be alert to the fact that working with a “closed system” does not always ensure safety. Operations involving the opening of valves or pumps on otherwise closed systems or working on such equipment that is not isolated or locked/tagged out are particular sources of danger. When a normally closed system
At 8:04 a.m. on May 11, 2023, an employee, 58, working for an oil and gas support services company was found dead. On 5/10/23, the night before, the employee had instructed his coworkers from other contractors to go home, and he would finish the job up. This was the last time anyone had spoken to
At approximately 9:20 a.m. on December 1, 2010, Employee #1, #2 and #3 were working on the barge of an oilrig (Rig Number 1). They were removing a Christmas tree flange, an assembly of valves, spools, and fittings used to control the flow of oil or gas out of the well, with a cutting torch.
When we think the task is to improve safety for an entry, we may lose sight of the risks associated with opening process equipment, specifically flanges in the event. On July 23, 2009, Employee #1 and a coworker, both contract employees specializing in preparation of refinery equipment for entry, were installing blinds in piping preparatory
At 9:00 a.m. on October 6, 2019, an employee was attempting to open a flange. Steam released, burning the employee’s legs and lower body. The employee was hospitalized. 29 CFR 1910.269(d)(2)(iv)(D): The procedure did not clearly and specifically outline specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout
