Today, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released an update on the agency’s investigation of a fatal release of toxic hydrogen sulfide gas at the PEMEX Deer Park Refinery in Texas on October 10, 2024, which killed two workers and injured 13 others. PLEASE UNDERSTAND we may know WHAT happened, but we […]
Last week, we saw the devastation of a catastrophic failure of a pressure vessel (PV) in Louisville, KY. We still do not know the cause of this failure, just that it was a “cook vessel #6. SAFTENG members can see my breakdown of the photographic evidence available from the Courrier Journal (local Louisville newspaper). But
ATF Louisville said it has definitively identified the origin of last week’s deadly plant explosion. The investigation led them to the origin of the explosion: Cooking Vessel No. 6 on the South side of the facility. They can say that the vessel failed definitively… it was likely an issue with overpressurization. Some of that vessel
Another example shows us that serious hazards can be found OUTSIDE of chemical processes, and applying the Line Break/Equipment Opening Procedure and Permit to these hazards could go a long way in controlling these recognized hazards. DEFINING and QUANTIFYING “hazardous energy” sources is STEP 1 in ensuring the process/system can be safely opened. Step 2
This Louisville explosion has started the debate about the plant being in a residential area. What most of the media and local politicians fail to mention is that the plant has been there since 1948. The neighborhood was allowed to build up around it because of lax zoning and spineless politicians. So to blame the
For example, the popularity of flammable refrigerants. The risk is real! R-600a is an isobutane, a flammable substance like you might find in a cigarette lighter.
A couple of KEY items, reading between the lines: https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/cuisine_solutions_investigation_update_-_final_to_publish1.pdf
The Courier-Journal has released more photos. Below is my analysis of these photos, using their and Google Maps road images. The first image below is the PRE-EXPLOSION image. In it, we can see the two (2) standing cooling towers/condensers. The one in the blue box is the one that was destroyed and came to rest
This week, we saw a fatal explosion in Louisville, KY. This same facility, albeit under a previous ownership, had a catastrophic failure of a PV in 2003. The photos coming out of the post-analysis of this week’s event look to be a similar type of explosion. CLICK HERE to see the pics. Here is my
Inspections As of the 3rd quarter of the fiscal year (Q3), EPA completed 133 CAA Section 112(r) (Risk Management Program) inspections. Enforcement Cases As of the 3rd quarter of the fiscal year (Q3), EPA took action at 73 facilities to decrease the likelihood of chemical accidents. Sasol Chemicals: In April 2024, EPA finalized a settlement
The EPA’s revisions of its Risk Management Plan requirements regarding emergency drills have gotten much attention. However, they were always a bit behind when it comes to the International Fire Code. And need I remind those of you reading this that many states have adopted the IFC in some form. A Group H occupancy is
One of the acceptable “protection techniques” for electrical enclosures within a Hazardous Location is to “pressurize the enclosure.” Here are the three (3) Types of Pressurized Enclosures and the HAZLOC they are permitted to be used, and their design basis: NFPA 70, 500.7, (D) Purged and Pressurized. This protection technique shall be permitted for equipment in
