Chemical Process Safety (PSM/RMP)

Differences in accident history between Program 1 eligibility and the hazard assessment

Program 1 eligibility under 40 CFR §68.10(b) is contingent upon the process NOT having had an accidental release of a regulated substance that led to offsite death, injury, or response and restoration activities at an environmental receptor within five years prior to the risk management plan submission. Additionally, as part of the hazard assessment required […]

Dispersion Modeling Systems Relevant to Homeland Security Preparedness and Response

As one of its core research focuses, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Homeland Security Research Program (HSRP) is interested in refining its tools and methodologies to better characterize the fate and transport of hazardous contaminants during all phases of an emergency response. Atmospheric dispersion modeling is one tool that can be used for effective

Pipe Welding and Welder Qualifications (ASME B31.1 and 31.5)

If you’re installing/repairing/modifying your chemical process piping using ASME B31.3 and 31.5, these standards have some strict QA/QA requirements for who can make the welds to join the piping.  These welders MUST be qualified in accordance with ASME Code, Section IX, “Welding Qualifications.”  ASME Code, Section IX, Part QW-103.1, states that: “Each manufacturer or contractor

Deficiencies in Process Piping Cause Gas Release Incidents (QA and MI programs)

An increased number of gas release incidents have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico Region due to leaks from cracked welds, ring gaskets, flange gaskets, inlet nozzles, pipeline risers, suction headers, pressure safety valves (PSVs), and fuel gas lines. These gas release incidents involve deficiencies in Quality Assurance and Mechanical Integrity programs and are caused

Do the quantities of two separate vessels that are interconnected with a closed valve need to be aggregated for the worst-case release scenario analysis?

Pursuant to the risk management program regulations, facilities must perform an offsite consequence analysis for the worst-case release scenario. Do the quantities of two separate vessels that are interconnected with a closed valve need to be aggregated for the worst-case release scenario analysis? 

Are mechanical controls such as alarms considered administrative controls and therefore limit the worst-case release quantity?

For the purpose of analyzing the worst-case release scenario required as part of the hazard assessment at 40 CFR Part 68, Subpart B, the worst-case release quantity is identified as the greatest amount held in a single vessel or pipe, taking into account administrative controls that limit the maximum quantity (40 CFR §68.25(b)). Are mechanical

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