The recent news from Boeing’s CEO regarding their cultural challenges reminded me of a discussion I had with one of my favorite plant managers, Dale Fannin, in 1996. It was an uncomfortable discussion, as I had my a_s handed to me, regarding all my “cheerleading” rather than being a safety leader. Dale, as were two […]
Victor Dearman Jr. CIRO, CRST One of the challenges to my post was “What if the flagging tape was to indicate that the valve was in an abnormal position?” This was followed up with a challenge as to whether or not anything forbids such a method. Operating procedures should be designed to meet the requirements
A soft drink manufacturer had a 3-ton capacity carbon dioxide (CO2) receiver tank at the plant. The tank contained 2000 pounds on the day of the explosion. The establishment was evacuated due to flooding river waters in the area. The plant was secured and evacuated. No employees were at the workplace. Suddenly, the storage tank
On September 19, 2002, Employee #1 was painting one (1) of six (6) tanks containing carbon dioxide when three (3) of them suddenly exploded. He was killed. The tanks were originally built as railroad tank cars for liquefied petroleum gas and they were not designed to store carbon dioxide.
At 7:00 a.m. on October 31, 2022, an employee, 36, was brazing a copper line in an electrical equipment room that was equipped with a carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system. The fire extinguishing system activated, discharging and flooding the room with carbon dioxide. The employee was unable to escape the room and was overcome and
In response to a report of a fatality at Respondent’s place of business, Complainant initiated an inspection that concluded with Complainant issuing a four-item Citation and Notification of Penalty. For the most part, the specifics of the alleged violations—which include: are not particularly complicated. The wrinkle in this case is whether the workers identified by
“Why did they have a Rupture Disc and a Relief Valve together?” As I alluded to in my post regarding CBS’s update, this arrangement is fairly common but comes with some very SPECIFIC requirements. These requirements can be found in: But the top four (4) requirements, we as safety engineers should be looking for in
I have shared the ASME and NBIC “code” requirements for these arrangements and it has already stirred a number of debates/questions; of which the API has offered some excellent guidance on this design. (emphasis by me)
It has grown tiresome, but it remains a teachable moment, to debate “engineers” who want part of ASME/NBIC to be the gospel and other parts not so much. The ammonia refrigeration industry just can’t seem to grasp the critical need in their “Common PRV Header Design” v.s. having more “holes in the roof” (as they
Recently I was asked if “torquing” threaded pipe is required by code. I answered the inquiry by referring the client to ASME B1.20.1-2013, which states: 1.4 Sealing (NPT and NPSC Only)…1.4.3 Tightening Torque.Due to application-specific variables such as materials, wall thickness, operating pressures, etc., no guidance is given in this Standard regarding joint-tightening torque. However,
Another incident where the lack of respect for static electricity and flammable atmospheres results in severe injuries. A Teflon bristle brush generates a lot of static electricity; coupled with the low flashpoint of Naptha (73F) and we have a serious hazard. At 5:30 a.m. on February 24, 2020, an employee, 42, was scrubbing interior surfaces
FACT: Most flammable liquid vapors have a Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) of less than 1 millijoule (mJ). Most of us do not even feel static which is less than 15 mJ. So the amount of energy necessary to ignite most flammable vapor atmospheres is not even observable by humans. At 6:15 p.m. on October 30,
