A recent accident has me explaining the fundamentals of our profession that so many seem to have lost in the past decades. You have a hazard; DISTANCE yourself from that hazard If you can not put DISTANCE between you and the hazard, then a BARRIER is necessary Our Hot Work Programs are a perfect example […]
At 4:15 p.m. on January 28, 2022, an employee was assisting in hydro-testing a joint of steel pipe (39.5-feet long, 9 5/8 OD, 1580 psi). While pressurized, the employee walked into the testing area. At the same time, the plug on the pipe failed, leading to the pipe striking the employee. The employee was killed
At 4:51 a.m. on January 15, 2022, Employee #1 and Employee #2 (Millwrights) were assigned to replace a pump in a Methylene Diphenyl Diisocyanate (MDI) Unit at the Di-Chlorination Column at approximately 2:00 a.m. The discharge line for this column discharges about a foot off the ground right next to the pump where the employees
At 11:30 a.m. on October 15, 2021, Employees #1 and #2, both maintenance contractor employees, were assigned to install a pressure safety valve (PSV) on a flare header in a methylene diphenyl diisocyanate (MDI) unit when they were exposed to nitrogen and carbon monoxide. The installation procedure requires supplied air respirators. The employees were staging
At 10:10 a.m. on February 1, 2022, an employee connected the wrong chemical tote, (i.e., Dilac instead of Dibac) to a day tank containing a chlorine solution. The chemical reaction of the two chemicals caused a vapor release. Eight employees sustained unspecified respiratory illnesses, and six were hospitalized for treatment.
At 8:15 a.m. on February 1, 2022, an employee poured paraformaldehyde into an aqueous ammonia solution inside a vessel. There was a chemical reaction, resulting in an explosion. Two employees suffered chemical burns to their backs and arms, and one of the employees was hospitalized.
At 3:10 p.m. on February 2, 2022, an employee, 26, performed maintenance on a Raven AccuFlow System Applicator. The employee began the ammonia bleeding procedure wearing safety glasses and rubber gloves. After approximately 20 to 30 minutes, the employee no longer heard a whistling sound and believed that the system was completely bled out. When
The rupture of the V-1 vessel appears to have caused a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE, pronounced ‘blev-ē). A BLEVE is the “sudden loss of containment of a pressure-liquefied gas existing above its normal atmospheric boiling point at the moment of its failure, which results in rapidly expanding vapor and flashing liquid. The
Updated on 11/1/22 Effective Date: October 22, 2022 This rule created a new chapter, refinery worker training and certification in high-hazard facilities, implementing the advanced safety training requirements under chapter 49.80 RCW, adopted by the Washington State legislature in 2019. Chapter 49.80 RCW, requires owners of petroleum refining or petrochemical manufacturing facilities to use
New York City’s Community Right-to-Know Law (Local Law 92) requires facilities where extremely hazardous substances or regulated toxic substances are present at or above federally determined levels (Threshold Planning Quantity), to prepare and submit a Risk Management Plan to the Department of Environmental Protection on or before March first of every year. In situations where
We have recently heard the phrase “inherent safety” used by OSHA and EPA as both agencies work at revising/updating their process safety standards. But what exactly is “inherent safety,” and why is it at the top of the Hierarchy of Controls for process safety? Inherently safer practices are an approach to designing safer chemical plants,
