This video is a great example of two failures: 1) Hazardous Communications and 2) Emergency Response recognition. There is no way he should have walked into the spill, much less into the spray to stop the leak. That was gasoline—NOT diesel; even if it had been diesel, his actions were still out of line. We […]
We have discussed these safety-critical valves extensively here at SAFTENG. I am a huge proponent of these valves, and they are required by most State Fire Codes and RAGAGEPs. Yet, we still find far too many processes handling Highly Hazardous Chemicals/Extremely Hazardous Chemicals that are missing this critical safety feature. As we have also discussed,
Most of us have seen a gate valve installed in piping, and 99% of the time, we want to see the valve handle in the VERTICAL-UPWARD position. However, when we need to install an “intervening valve” in the relief path, which ASME allows, we may/should see the valve handle(s) in the Horizontal or below Horizontal
This case is a classic example of how Latent Organizational Failures INFLUENCE the decision-making of workers (and middle managers). At the end of this press release, the DOJ admits that “Company management had informed some of its employees that if operations came to a halt, the company would suffer serious financial harm, potentially including dissolution.”
A total of seven people were taken to the hospital after a chlorine gas leak was reported. The cause of the leak was a truck driver who delivered a chemical to a Water Plant and “unintentionally mixed two chemical compounds in a holding tank.” This then released the chlorine gas “from the tank vent.” The
This United States Coast Guard alert supports my expectation that we must demarcate our HAZLOCs. I usually get pushback as the code does not explicitly require the boundaries of our HAZLOCs to be marked in any way. But in reality, if we want workers to respect the hazards of working inside a HAZLOC, then we
A recent marine casualty, resulting in a fire and severe injuries to two crewmembers, highlights the risks associated with:
Imagine the purchasing manager announcing at a staff meeting that the business is changing the supplier for one of your PSM/RMP-covered chemicals. There is nothing special about this chemical; it is a 100% pure solution/gas, so you think nothing is changing. But this chemical has come under a lot of questions by yours truly, and
It is great when I can convince an organization to pressure test and leak test its process piping. However, if this task is not done according to the book, we may have created a serious hazard. Two (2) safety-critical devices are often overlooked during pressure and leak testing, and missing either one or both can
This is why we MUST have a Quality Assurance process in our piping installations when welding joins the pipe. The same applies to the construction process vessels; however, most of those are “shop-built,” and we are outside the scope of those vessels. But a “field-erected” vessel would fall into our sphere of control.
PRAYERS and RIP 🙏 This is why we NEVER step in puddles… MINE FATALITY – On August 4, 2024, a contractor suffered severe chemical and thermal burns after he stepped into a deep opening in the floor obscured by puddled liquid. The contractor fell into a mixture of hot water and caustic liquid. On September
