Incident overview An ammonia release occurred in the mezzanine area at an industrial food processing facility, which resulted in the evacuation of the facility and temporary shutdown of the ammonia plant.
Incident overview The bolted flanged connection on the suction of a reciprocating compressor failed causing an uncontrolled release of ammonia into the machinery room. The ammoniadetection system worked as designed activating the ventilation system and alarming the appropriate parties. The leak was isolated and no injuries resulted.
Incident overview Manhole gasket seal on an oil separator pressure vessel failed to hold ammonia in the vessel which resulted in the exhaust ventilation system to be activated.
Incident overview There were no injuries or property damage due to the Ammonia release from the pinhole in the 1” piping to the Hydro Cooler Surge Drum. The Ammonia vapor set the leak detector on at 50 ppm which activated the alarms. The Ammonia Vapor was drawn in from the outside of the building where
Incident overview The bonnet gasket on the isolation valve between the brine chiller and the oil pot leaked approximately 10 lbs ammonia into the mechanical room. Two (2) refrigeration technicians had completed draining oil from the oil pot and when the isolation valve was closed the bonnet gasket leaked ammonia into the brine chiller insulation.
Following the release of the Fernie Incident Investigation Report Technical Safety BC developed new ammonia refrigeration industry maintenance guidelines to support facility owners and refrigeration professionals with implementing the report recommendations. The purpose of these guidelines is to provide ammonia refrigeration plant owners and operators with guidance and basic information about the development, documentation, and
On July 13, 1973, at a fertilizer plant, one of four 50-ton (metric) pressure-storage tanks (horizontal bullet type) failed. The failure resulted from brittle fracture of a dished end. No specific source of cracking, or a “triggering incident” was identified. An estimated 30 ton of anhydrous ammonia was released, plus another 8 ton from a
I am trying to get the details behind this one. I do know it was a vertical vessel inside an engine room. it failed, catastrophically, and did considerable damage inside the engine room as well as off-site. No off-site injuries or damage (other than the grass in the median of the road where it came
As I have said before, these OSHA “Approval of Information Collection (Paperwork) Requirements” request for comments is such a nice summary of what we have to do to just meet OSHA minimums and properly manage some of our programs. So many non-safety managers have no idea what their safety professionals do day-to-day, so I like
OSHA does a nice job explaining to the Department of Homeland security what the Fist Aid requirements in General Industry, Construction, and Maritime industries are in this 2019 LOI. They also reiterate when a facility would need an in-house first aid team vs. relying on the local FD/EMS services. This letter also explains the CONTENT
At 2:30 p.m. on September 13, 2010, Employee #1, Employee #2, and Employee #3 were tasked with the dismantling of a scaffold level within a phosgene containment dome. During their dismantling work, at approximately 80 feet above the ground, alarms specific to phosgene gas were triggered. The process within this Dome was the manufacturing and
